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ABSTRACT 
 
This research studies undocumented policy practices within UK aid in general and the 
Department for International Development (DFID) in particular.  It focuses on the policy 
practices or initiatives taken by various actors in influencing and shaping policy in the 
everyday life of aid bureaucracy. For this purpose, I have chosen as case study the evolution 
of DFID’s Social exclusion (policy) framework within the timeframe of 1997-2010.  
The research findings identify undocumented initiatives taken by the policy entrepreneurs 
within aid bureaucracy. These efforts are directed not only towards benefitting the global 
poor but also at increasing institutional efficacy in delivering aid. Policy entrepreneurs 
execute these policy practices, also termed policy entrepreneurship, proactively on the 
political, administrative, and executive levels. Anthropological analysis and methods allow 
me to look beyond formal policy processes at the undocumented policy practices.   
Many development professionals, consultants, and office bearers while walking on the tight 
rope of internal policy and bearing the cross of the highly politicized organizational culture of 
the DFID, skilfully conveyed advice based on empirical insights to those high up. They 
transfer their disciplinary knowledge and empirical understandings to the policy makers and 
political actors in the larger interest of the development industry as well as the poor from 
recipient countries.  
On the one hand, from an anthropological perspective, this study broadens our understanding 
of the classical rational model of decision making within the bureaucracy. On the other hand, 
in the context of contemporary DFID bureaucracy, it highlights how civil servants resolve the 
moral-political conflict between their obligations towards the institutions they work with and 
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their solidarity towards issues of human rights and social justice through their activism and 
policy entrepreneurial spirit.   
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Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.1 In the cottage of Cinderella  
 
It was a cold evening in November 2014. The weather was rather chilly and getting colder 
with the receding day. We just had a delicious homemade English dinner. I was sitting in a 
chair in front of the fireplace in a warm cottage in north London with a cheerful lady. She is 
in her mid-sixties but seems to have a childlike chuckle in her eyes. She is a former 
bureaucrat from the Department for International Development (DFID). The deep satisfaction 
about her eventful career in DFID is written on her face and is reflected in her every word she 
says. She savours the incidents from her past as she confides in me:  
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“Although we social development advisors did not always agree with each other, we had unanimity of 
objective and it was to be instrumental at our level best in global poverty alleviation. From the point of 
view of politically seasoned diplomats, this was a naive and too idealistic endeavour on our part. 
Probably this is why senior officials from Foreign Office (FO) called DFID ‘the Cinderella 
Department' – a department run by idealist women with unrealistic ideas. But this was not without 
internal resistance and technical obstacles raised within the department.  We were learning our own 
little ways around to get the things done within aid bureaucracy and overarching political “dictates”. 
I joined the DFID headquarters in London after working in different positions in various DFID country 
offices in South Asia for nearly five years. Despite on and off internal friction between departments 
DFID then was a vibrant work place pulsating with new ideas. There was a sense of freedom and 
agency to the extent that you could pursue what you thought would produce value for the institution. In 
those days social exclusion policy was, a much talked about concept. I was quite enthusiastic about it 
due to my latest grassroots work experiences with women from the socially excluded communities 
from South Asia. I was convinced that the social exclusion framework should be employed in aid 
policy to South Asia, as the women from socially excluded communities were the worst off victims of 
gender inequality in the health sector.  However, not many of my colleagues were thinking on the same 
lines. Some were upholding the rights-based approach while others were focused on a gender in 
development agenda. I could not sit idle; the emails from the field, the information shared by local 
activists and the hapless faces of illiterate anaemic women queuing for treatment in remote health 
centres miles away from their hamlets would not let me sleep. After taking stock of the situation, I 
planned a three-pronged strategy, which had to be implemented in parallel.   
I joined forces with the political actors, vis-a-vis proactively engaged and encouraged a civil society 
organization working on social exclusion in South Asia for lobbying. Simultaneously, I started rigorous 
person-to-person persuasion on an individual level and networking the like-minded development 
professional from the DFID in particular and the UK Aid1 in general to create consensus on the social 
exclusion policy framework. Eventually, our efforts paid off and the DFID aid resources were 
channelled towards the aid programs focussed on gender and health, concentrating on health facilities 
                                                             
1 Abbreviation for Department of International Development, UK also called ‘UK Aid’, Available on : 
     
http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Work-with-us/corporatecommunications/ Accessed on 28/11/2014 
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to women from socially excluded communities. No needs to mention the programs were based on the 
social exclusion framework.” 
The excerpt above from my field notes is one of the key testimonies by an informant about 
their voluntary and self-motivated but strategic policy endeavours as a policy entrepreneur 
within the aid bureaucracy.  
 
1.1.1 An overview of chapter 
 
This thesis focuses on the extra-official activities or undocumented policy processes whereby, 
the development practitioners and aid bureaucrats whom I call “social policy entrepreneurs” 
who attempt to influence the policy practices and shape the policy in the everyday life of aid 
bureaucracy. This thesis identifies the phenomenon by looking at the nature of these 
undocumented policy practices and intention behind them. This study examines how these 
activities were conducted, who conducts these activities, and what is the rationale behind 
these policy practices. This research also reflects on the problems of access to the inner 
circles of aid bureaucracy as well as aid organizations, which sheds light on the complex 
work cultures of the premiere aid bureaucracies.  
This chapter attempts to unpack the main argument of the thesis while evaluating the 
theoretical authorities from the field of social sciences and social anthropology. The first 
section of this chapter elaborates the main argument and key terms employed in the thesis. It 
gives a short account of the research problem. The second section provides a description of 
the empirical focus on the key research themes. The key themes are concerning the evolution 
of social exclusion policy framework along with a short historical account of the conceptual 
framework, further elaborating how the social exclusion concept emerged and changed over 
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the time. The third section gives the theoretical overview of the complementary theoretical 
framework that I am using to support my argument. It will also provide a brief discussion on 
these theoretical approaches used in the context of the research, the key institutions, and 
stakeholders. While section four offers an overview of all chapters from the thesis. 
This research is not solely about an institution called DFID nor is it about its standard 
operating practices in the formal organizational bureaucratic set-up. This research examines 
the voluntary policy practices and personal strategies applied by social policy entrepreneurs 
in their everyday life within the international aid bureaucracy to help poor communities on 
grassroots. It focuses on the undocumented practices they perform that go beyond their 
regular official obligations within institutions so as to benefit the poor communities. 
However, this thesis does allude to the organizational structure of the DFID and explore the 
evolutionary processes of the social exclusion policy framework within DFID from the lens 
of extra-official policy practices.   
 
1.1.2 A note on DFID 
 
DFID is UK’s premier aid organization, which administers and coordinates various flows of 
development aid from the UK aimed towards global poverty alleviation. This aid enterprise is 
done while calibrating with United Nation’s international development goals, that is the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)
2
 in the past and Sustainable Development Goals in 
the present. DFID is an independent department of UK Aid headed by a Permanent Secretary 
under a separate cabinet level minister. The Permanent Secretary is the most senior civil 
                                                             
2 Available on :https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/department-for-international-development/about 
Accessed on 16/12/2015 
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servant in the department who chairs the Executive Management Committee that provides 
strategic direction of the management of DFID’s operations, staff, and financial resources.3 
There are five offices in DFID: Country Programmes, Economic Development, Finance, and 
Corporate Performance, Policy and Global Programmes and special country programme for 
the Middle East and Humanitarian and Conflict. Individual Director Generals, a Head of Top 
Management Group and the Principal Private Secretary is accountable to the Permanent 
Secretary who heads these offices. Most of the action researched for this study falls within 
the ambit of the subdivision or department under the Director General of the Policy, and 
Global Programmes, who is responsible for the development, support and the promotion of 
policy. This department directly assists in poverty alleviation and achievements of the MDGs. 
The Director General works closely with the Head of Research and DFID’s research program 
to ensure a strong two-way relationship between policy and research.
4
 The abovementioned 
analytical framework of social exclusion was adopted by DFID for poverty alleviation from 
Latin American, South African and South Asian countries in 1997 (See Chapter 4 : Section 
I).  
 
1.1.3 Undocumented practices  
 
With regard to undocumented practices, it is clear that the nature of extra-official practices is 
defined in terms of formality in relation to standard official procedures. However, I am aware 
of the blurred line between formal and informal practices within institutional set ups that 
makes it difficult to make a distinction between what is formal and what is informal. The 
                                                             
3 Available on : https://www.gov.uk/government/people/mark-lowcock 
Accessed on :15/14/2015 
4  Available on: https://secure-reference.data.gov.uk/2014-09-30/doc/public-body/dfid/unit/tmg 
Accessed on 15/12/2015 
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formal, official ways involve the institutional ways of doing things that involves a specific 
code of conduct, documentation, limited spheres of preordained activities, systemized forms 
of practices and processes of policy making. In contrast, by informal, I mean implicitly 
carried out activities those are of an extra-official, voluntary, and mundane nature but of 
political-strategic import. These seemingly mundane activities have a cumulative effect on 
achieving the social mobility and economic development of recipient communities as well as 
aid delivery. 
 
The informal ways of doing things impinge upon the formal or standard official practices. In 
Seeing Like a State, Scott states that, “the formal order, to be more explicit, is always and to 
some considerable degree parasitic on informal processes, which the formal scheme does not 
recognize, without which it could not exist and which it alone cannot create or maintain” 
(Scott 1998:310). Scott (1998:256) illustrated this by a form of action called “work to rule” 
during which the workers went on strike rather than stopping their jobs, meticulously 
observing job manuals verbatim to the effect that production is practically stopped.  
 
The above illustration  of “work to rule” helps us to see the overlapping and inseparable 
nature of formal and informal modes of work in the entire spectrum of human practices in the 
aid organization like any other institutions (Crewe and Young 2002 p: v).  Along the lines of 
Crewe’s (2014: 674) argument, I use the term “organizations,” merely to describe the 
boundaries of what I am studying (as opposed to families, communities) but neither 
organizations nor institutions serve as explanatory concepts. As  Crewe (2014:673) points out 
the institutionalist approaches that "depict institutions as sets of rules and norms that exist 
within and between organizations... downplay the heterogeneity, individual agency, and 
contractions those are vital for explaining change and dynamism" within institutions, hence 
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making it difficult to map the phenomena like implicit and undocumented policy practices. 
Nevertheless, the term social policy entrepreneur employed throughout the thesis implies the 
development practitioners, aid bureaucrats, policy practitioners, development agents, or 
social development professionals working with DFID or UKAid are directly or indirectly 
engaged in the voluntary policy processes and development intervention in the larger interest 
of poor communities. 
 
1.1.4 The problematic of popular policy perceptions 
 
A general assumption about policy making revolves around the formal policy making 
practices, that ‘‘an idea becoming a bill, elected officials vote on it, and if all goes well, the 
bill gets enacted into law’’ (Stachowaik 2009:1). This is a simplistic linear model of policy-
making, which entails the identification of the problem, deciding the policy of solution and 
implementation of the policy (Sutton 1999:9).  On a political, bureaucratic levels this 
involves formal-official brainstorming, such as commissioning research, sponsoring and 
organizing conferences, workshops, seminars, publishing the related literature like working 
papers, White papers and  moving the motion, drafting  bills, getting them  passed, 
implementing policy, regulation of material and human resources through state-run 
institutions. These procedures or processes are prominently perceived as top-bottom 
processes with descending flow of ideas where the top-level policymakers and administrators 
do all the brainstorming, take key policy decisions and the bureaucratic hierarchy in 
descending order implement what they have been told in the order of authoritative hierarchy.  
 
However, the above-discussed dominant discourse of policymaking tells us little about the 
autonomous junctures or interstices within bureaucratic institutions wherein the authorities 
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are subverted and hierarchies are bypassed. It does not tell us much about why certain 
policies come into fruition while others do not. Nor does it tell us about how policy changes 
are successfully promoted and facilitated irrespective of the dominant policy paradigms. 
Therefore, in engaging with the abovementioned questions this study attempts to explore this 
“semi-autonomous twilight zone” and the cognate policy processes and practices within the 
overarching architecture of aid bureaucracy. 
 
Scott (1998:6) states, “informal practices are an essential feature of any real, functioning 
social order” (in our case an institutional set up). Some studies do point out the entangled 
nature of policy processes and complexities in terms of strategic policy interventions that 
involve the roles of knowledge, networks and political context and opportunity windows 
(Crewe and Young 2002: vi; Jones 2009:5; Hummelbrunner and Jones 2013). This thesis 
documents the way the above-mentioned informal policy practices or activities feature during 
the policymaking and implementation stages yet seldom documented.  
 
The basic nature of these activities is quite mundane, casual, regular and hence informal but 
of political and strategic import from the development perspective. The subjective 
understanding of right and wrong, individual convictions concerning good and bad, just and 
unjust guide these activities rather than the canon of institutional behavioural propriety or 
organizational dictates about the bureaucratic code of conduct. It may also be out of biased 
perceptions about theories or ideas based on first-hand empirical knowledge. It could be 
about making a case or lobbying for certain projects or policies voluntarily with aid of like-
minded people within and out the formal setup of the aid institutions. (See chapter 6)  
These policy practices and strategies are non-profit and non-commercial in nature but strive 
to produce social value in collaboration with people and organizations engaged in social 
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innovations that usually imply economic activity (Hulgard 2010:297). However, due to the 
dynamic and contingent relationship between formal and informal ways of doing things in 
institutional settings, formal practices suppress the informal one.  As Scott (1998:6) observes, 
“the parasitic nature of the formal organizational scheme of work suppresses the informal 
processes” rendering them to be unacknowledged hence undocumented. I demonstrate this 
informality through an empirical account of the voluntary but strategic policy practices of 
social development practitioners as they shape policy ideas and practices. Here I am not only 
concerned about the trajectory of policy within aid institutions but also the non-profit 
informal endeavours of various actors. These actors are called "social policy entrepreneurs” 
like “social development entrepreneurs”,5 who go beyond mere aspirations of altruism, 
without expectation of economic interest, and with solidarity and moral responsibility 
towards the poor and socially excluded communities.   
I argue that policy formation and implementation are not entirely a top-down flow of ideas, 
formal/official, hegemonic, systematic linear process, but fraught with political ups and 
downs, contending ideas, and discontinuities that essentially tread through the twilight zones 
of extra-official undocumented policy practices. These key informal policy practices involve 
strategic ideological assertions, indirect counselling, briefing, implicit, and explicit advocacy, 
and systematic utilization of agency on the part of key stakeholders and actors within the 
donor institutions and the recipient countries that eventually actualize the policy in the 
everyday life of the aidland.
6
  
 
                                                             
5 Hulgard (2010:6) employed this term through the lens of Human economy approach to defining the individuals 
who are engaged in private, non-profit endeavours toward the social development of public in various levels of 
institutions and bureaucracies.  
6 Aidland is a ‘metaphor’ employed by Raymond Apthorpe ( 2011b:198 ) for the “realm of development aid 
policy and practices” 
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In terms of the case study of the social exclusion policy framework in DFID, it would be 
helpful to see from the theoretical point of view of how the gradual policy changes were 
worked out, introduced, and advocated during the emergence of social exclusion theme in the 
DFID. However, this would entail the assumption of social exclusion policy framework as an 
idea or conceptual framework. Once we assume it this way, it could be interpreted through 
the concept of the social life of ideas (Appadurai 1995:4) while examining the origin and 
trajectory of social exclusion framework. Here the social life of ideas would imply the life 
cycle or movement of ideas through social actors and context. The social life of idea is 
characterized by the propagation, circulation, internalization, production, contention, and 
dissemination of ideas and conceptual frameworks. These ideas and themes are embedded in 
the social, political, cultural, and economic spheres of life, internal social structures, across 
the institutions, organizations, and networks of professionals and people before and after their 
emergence as policy themes and frameworks.   
 
1.2 Empirical focus 
 
The empirical focus of this research is to study DFID and related bureaucrats, civil servants, 
and the policymakers. This is a study of a subset of professionals and civil servants from the 
international aid organizations who are defined as social policy entrepreneurs. These people 
are engaged in participatory and non-profit activities. The aim of these activities termed as 
social development enterprises is to benefit the global poor. Various stakeholders are affected 
by these types of activities (Defourny and Nyssens 2010: 289) in our case are aid 
bureaucracy, politicians, civil society organizations from both donor and recipient countries 
and target poor communities.  
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 The research is done particularly but not exclusively in the light of case study of DFID’s 
Social Exclusion Policy (SEP) framework between 1997 and 2010. This study centres on the 
dramatic journey of the SEP framework, related actors and the circumstances that played a 
critical role in the framework's inception and traction in DFID and beyond from 1997 to 
2010. As a conceptual analytical framework, the social exclusion framework spearheaded the 
paradigm shift in poverty analysis in European nations and international development 
industry from the 1990s onwards (Room 1995:3). The lifespan of the SEP framework in 
DFID coincided with the regime of New Labour government until the policy shift followed 
by the accession of the Conservative Party to power in the UK.  This policy transition and its 
context are exclusively discussed in Chapter 4. 
 
Social exclusion as a term and conceptual framework for poverty analysis originated in 
France in the late 1960s as a part of a local initiative by a Polish priest called Wrezinski who 
intended to work out a program for the "poor next door" to his parish.
7
 His intentions were 
more religious and social than political. Once the humble efforts of the priest started gaining 
popularity from the point of view of the inclusion of those who were excluded from French 
mainstream society, this concept was adopted as a term to signify about 10 percent of the 
French population by the French Ministry of Policy (de Haan 2001:23).  Once the humble 
efforts of the priest started gaining popularity, the French Ministry of Policy adopted this 
concept as a term to signify about 10 percent of the French population, a step towards 
inclusion of the excluded into the French mainstream society (de Haan 2001:23).   In 
addition, the increase in the academic-political awareness about the failed promises of 
welfare states in post-World War Europe accelerated the process of the emergence and 
                                                             
7 Available on  http://www.atd-quartmonde.org/ATD-Quart-Monde-la-memoire-des.html,  Accessed on : 
12/08/2014 
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acceptance of social exclusion as a conceptual framework (Room 1995:9). Later the 
European commission adopted this conceptual framework to assess poverty in European 
countries due to the ineffectiveness of conventional economic criteria (Room 1995: 11). On 
the theoretical front, the analytical framework of social exclusion took into consideration the 
non-economic basis of poverty-analysis, highlighting the social, cultural, and political-
structural causes of exclusion against in addition to the economic criteria applied by the 
earlier knowledge-regimes and governments (Silver 1994:532). The social exclusion 
framework stressed on the political and social structural reasons of poverty rather than the 
unequal income alone, which was considered the prominent cause of poverty (Saith 2001:10). 
Kabeer (2000) observes that after the World Summit for Social Development
8
 in 1994, there 
was an increased attention towards the utility of the social exclusion concept in reference to 
the issues of poverty, inequality, and social justice in developing countries among the 
Institute of International Labour Studies, the Asian Development Bank, the Inter-American 
Development Bank, and the World Bank. 
 
Silver (1994:532) classified this concept into the threefold typology of solidarity, 
specialization, and monopoly that encompasses multiple meanings of exclusion. This is 
further distinguished between different theoretical perspectives, political ideologies, and 
national discourses of respective countries that accepted and accommodated this concept 
accordingly.  France for example, looked at social exclusion through the lens of solidarity 
while UK looked at it from the liberal perspective and so on (Silver 1994:539, de Haan 
2011). In addition, this schema provided an explanation of multiple forms of social 
                                                             
8
  A convention of over 100 heads of State and Governments agreed to meet in Copenhagen, Denmark on 
November 1994 as per the United Nations General Assembly  resolution 47/92, to tackle the critical problems of 
poverty, unemployment, and social integration  
Available on : http://www.iisd.ca/vol10/1037001e.html, accessed on 11/11/2012 
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disadvantage such as economic, social, political, and cultural, which covers a range of 
theories of citizenship and racial-ethnic inequality as well as poverty and long-term 
unemployment. Social exclusion policy used to be part of the UK government's domestic 
policy. Up until 2010, it has its internal politics and articulation in the country. The 
consecutive defeats of the Labour party led to brainstorming within the party that resulted in 
the 1992 party manifesto prepared by the late John Smith, MP, and leader of Labour party. 
This manifesto talked about poverty in the UK as an issue of social injustice (Haddon 2012:1-
5). It planned and proposed to build renewal strategies for Britain and its underclass to bring 
them into the national mainstream. A commission was appointed to produce a report on 
poverty and social exclusion in the UK that stressed a dire need to address poverty within the 
English society (Haddon 2012:5). Poverty in English society was considered to be the 
consequence of the exclusion of the majority from the mainstream due to many social reasons 
like unemployment, school dropout etc. (SEU brochure 2004). In addition to sending 
messages to the former Labour vote bank and attracting the emergent lower middle class, this 
political initiative offered a new approach to include the poor and to understand poverty in 
the UK compared to the economic parameters applied by Conservative governments (Haddon 
2012:11).  
 
The Commission on Social Justice established by Labour party leader late John Smith (1934-
1994) culminated into IPPR report on The condition of Britain: Strategies for Social renewal, 
this report had a deep impact on the future social policies of victorious Labour party (IPPR 
1994, SEU 2004).   Mandelson who was a close confidant of then Prime Minister Tony Blair 
formed SEU (Social Exclusion Unit) in 1997 (Peters and Besley 2014:107). Later on, the 
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minister of international development and team of Social development advisors for research 
and policy division DFID played a crucial role in upholding social exclusion framework.   
 
1.2.1 Aid Bureaucracy: an Overview 
 
This section sets a scene for us to understand the institutional background of undocumented 
policy practices. Moreover, it offers a brief overview of the salient features of aid institutions 
and bureaucracy that sustain the development industry through its circular activities of 
knowledge production and project management. These continuous policy processes involve 
creating policy consensus and producing development knowledge that legitimizes and 
rationalizes the continual development intervention (Cornwall and Brock 2005:5). In 
addition, this section underlines the importance of studying the intermediary actors that play 
crucial roles in the policy formations and the emergence of policy themes by virtue of their 
inter-organizational movements and professional experiences in the aid industry. 
Aid institutions, overseas development organizations, international economic institutions 
(like World Bank), think tanks (like the Institute of Development Studies and the Overseas 
Development Institute) play key roles as processors, producers, and managers in the 
production and management of development knowledge (Broad 2007:700). Here 
development knowledge implies demographic, statistical-economic data produced and 
published by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) in addition to DFID’s 
internal resources produced by their satellite think tanks. This is what Mosse calls “paradigm 
maintenance” (2011: 16). These form the basis of the development ideas and themes that in 
turn form the basis of projects and policies. Later, those who adopted these concepts and 
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themes   reworked and redefined them to serve their current or long-term purposes. 
Knowledge production, management, dissemination, and commissioning of research to 
various academics and researchers are the key activities of these aid institutions other than 
managing aid and development interventions in recipient countries (Broad 2007:700-1). 
  
The entire organizational structure of DFID and associated organizations described above 
influence the bureaucratic actions and ambiance within these organizations. Another 
phenomenon that turns these organizations into fertile grounds for the exchange of ideas, with 
international, political, and economic undercurrents is the movement of the civil servants, 
bureaucrats and development professionals between Europe based aid institutions like DFID 
and the World Bank, the IMF, and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). As 
my fieldwork, data shows in Chapter 4, this augments the political propensity of the UK 
government to abide by the policy dictates of the World Bank. The terminologies, concepts, 
and policy themes upheld by individuals and collectives reflects this exchange of 
international ideas and concepts is reflected in at any given time (Cornwall and Eade 2010). 
The nature of the flow of ideas, its internalization on the individual as well as network and 
institutional level is a complex phenomenon. The political pressures and decrees that arise out 
of the politically skewed or biased understandings and viewpoints of ministers and senior 
civil servants regarding the entire project of international development assistance compound 
the complexity. However, this did not stop social policy entrepreneurs or social development 
entrepreneurs from exerting their agency and shaping top-down policy communication. 
 
This was the reason behind including the social development advisors (SDAs), governance 
advisors, aid-managers, policymakers, and experts from international non-government 
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organizations (INGOs) like Action Aid and Christian Aid as well in the study. It provided an 
opportunity to study the knowledge interface between institutional structure and individuals 
(Long 2001:277). The policy-projects of DFID or UK Aid focus on the issues of education, 
health, gender inequality, and social exclusion in order to tackle chronic poverty in middle-
income countries such as India and Brazil. These programs are run through the International 
NGOs Partnership Agreement Programme (IPAP), a joint venture between seven UK-based 
INGOs.
9
 A management agency coordinates with these seven INGOs for DFID. However, as 
Action Aid and Christian Aid are main collaborators of the DFID I have chosen some 
informants from these INGOs for this study along with the DFID. 
 
1.2.2 Theoretical overview 
 
I utilize the theoretical framework of “social life of things” (Appadurai 1995:4) to theorize 
the social life of policy ideas and I supplement this with an actor-oriented approach so as to 
look at the informal or undocumented policy practices. Along with, I discuss the concept of 
solidarity economie to help me understand the main intention behind those policy practices 
(Peattie 1987; Lars 2010; Hart 2010). I combine critical discursive analysis (CDA) and an 
actor-oriented approach to policy formation and practices to show that actors are not passive 
conductors of top-down flows of policy ideas and that  aid institutions are not monolithic 
(Long 2001; Escobar 1995, Fairclough 2002). Rather, both are active catalysts of change in 
                                                             
9 Usually, the DFID collaborates with recipient governments through Ingo’s like Action Aid, Christian Aid, Oxfam, Save the 
Children Foundation (SCOFF), Skillshare, Water Aid, and Voluntary Service Overseas (VSO).  A management agency 
coordinates with these seven INGOs for DFID India. Infrastructure Professional Enterprise (IPE) provides technical and 
management support to the seven INGOs for capacity building, financial co-ordination, and other activities.  
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policy ideas within the overlapping and intersecting structures of aid organizations and 
beyond the recipient countries (Mosse 2005b). 
  
The “social life of things” was a conceit employed by Appadurai (1995:3) to illuminate the 
ways in which people find value in commodities and the exchange of these things, and how 
that in turn imparts value to social relations. Appadurai perceives “the economy as a 
particular social form” that “consists not only in exchanging values but in the exchange of 
values” (1995:4). The centrality of circulation of values embedded in commodities is akin to 
the circulation and exchange of ideas between human beings.  This is based on the premise 
that ideas are embedded in the human mind and the internalization, articulation, imitation, 
implementation and exchange of ideas goes hand-in-hand with the movements and actions of 
people, which exemplifies the social life of ideas. As one of the key informants said, "the 
policy themes and ideas exist in the air they are all over.” By this, she meant people as 
individuals or cluster clusters of likeminded people exchange, transfers, adopt, internalize, 
and reproduce the ideas they acquire and internalize from their social, cultural, and political 
milieu.  
 
Additionally, the “solidarity economie” approach will be used to understand the intentions 
behind the undocumented activities, which feeds into the concept of social development 
entrepreneurship. The theoretical framework of social entrepreneurship underlines the 
phenomenon of the policy practices of aid professionals aimed towards the social 
development of the poor or public welfare, in general out of solidarity, with no profit 
intended.  
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1.2.3 Policy ideas as social practice 
 
During my fieldwork, I encountered anecdotal accounts of development professionals about 
acts that culminated in bringing about considerable change in the life of the poor through 
their interventions in policy and project. The changes achieved were from the perspective of 
social responsibility of the development industry and its various institutions. For example, 
percolation of funds and the diverting of aid resources towards the “deserving” communities 
rather than those who are deemed needy as per the institutional understanding of politically 
correct
10
 . These acts were practical in nature. As they often stated, it was "what has to be 
done" or "what is the right thing to do" and was decided informally by these social policy 
entrepreneurs rather than what they should have been doing within the confines of formal 
institutional schemata or according to the book. This was achieved diplomatically and tacitly 
while going against the flow of contemporary political assumptions within DFID’s forma l 
institutional understanding of its dominant internal policies. Consequently, their acts were 
neither accounted for or documented in the planned formal order of the DFID chronicles, 
which Scott (1998:311) calls a “missing link” between the formal order and informal 
processes in the administrative systems. Kulothoungan (2009:1) applies Popper’s "situational 
analysis framework" to study social enterprises. Karl Popper (1962:200) maintained that "the 
most important element in explaining the social phenomenon is to understand the logic by 
which individuals tend to act in ways that they believe are adequate, or appropriate, in the 
situation as they conceive it" (Kulothoungan 2009:3).  Hence, the phenomenon of social 
entrepreneurship, looked from the lens of the Popperian argument of situational logic 
framework (1962:200), gives us “an opportunity to look at social entrepreneurship concept as 
                                                             
10 Here ‘political right ‘implies the ‘political stand’ on certain situations that would serve the economic –
political interests of ruling party or institutions and related stakeholders rather than what is commonsensical 
‘right’. 
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the interplay of institutional frameworks acted upon by individual agency, in specific 
situational context” (Kulothoungan 2009:3).  
 
In the conceptualization above, the Bourdieun logic of social practice (1995:56) as an 
expression of internalized habitus can complement the Popperian logic that could help us 
enhance our understanding of the rationale and intentions of social or social policy 
entrepreneurs behind the undocumented strategic policy practices (Kulathoungan 2009:3). 
Whereas, habitus consists of the general dispositions, inclinations, attitudes and values of any 
particular social arena that is embodied by the inhabitants (Bourdieu 1995:56). The 
institutional habitus constitute a complex amalgam of agency and structure, which could be 
understood as the impact of a cultural group or social class on an individual’s behaviour as it 
is mediated through an organization (Reay et al 2001:1).  However, on the calculated 
responses of habitus, Bourdieu (1990:53) contemplates:  
It is never ruled out that the responses of the habitus may be accompanied by a strategic      calculation 
tending to perform in a conscious mode of operation that the habitus performs quite differently, namely 
an estimation of chances presupposing transformation of the past effect into an expected objective. But 
these responses are first defined, without any calculation, in relation to objective potentialities, 
immediately inscribed in the present, things to do or not to do, things to say or not to say, in relation to 
a probable, upcoming future.  
Moreover, the crucial role familial and institutional habituses play during the practices is 
characterized by the interplay of interests, biases, and values translated by socio-culturally 
situated aidmen and aidwomen into international policy regimes. Bourdieu (1990:52) 
highlights the contradiction between the theory of practices as practice and intellectualist 
idealism, he says that:  
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Contrary to positivist materialism the objects of knowledge or individual convictions are constructed, 
not passively recorded and the principle of this construction is the system of structured, structuring 
dispositions, that is the habitus, which is constituted in practice that is oriented towards practical 
functions and not the objective. 
Bourdieu (1990:52) argues that the social world cannot be seen as a representation and 
practices are not the mere acting-out of roles or the implementation of plans. Hence we can 
conclude that the motivating force or intentions behind the policy practices by social policy 
entrepreneurs could be tracked back to the calculated responses of familial as well as the 
institutional habituses against what they intend to achieve through those practices. 
 
1.3 The economie solidaire of social entrepreneurs 
 
The present study underlines the paradigm shift in the theoretical-analytical approach towards 
poverty analysis that started from Europe, later travelled to the World Bank, and further seen 
as the new way of looking at the root causes of global poverty, as is discussed further in 
Chapter 4. Simultaneously, it hints towards the phenomenon of the social entrepreneurship 
that goes beyond the notions of altruism, patron-client relationship, or humanitarian 
understandings of meta-official sustained endeavours. While the altruistic actions by 
development practitioners directed to bring about positive changes in the lives of the poor at 
the grassroots level are occasional or one-off, the social policy entrepreneurs intermittently 
conduct their activities tacitly, devising novel ways of policy intervention. 
 
I will apply the CDA, with its various tools like normalization, generalizations, and 
legitimation, to make sense of the organization, categorization, and modification of the object 
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and subjects of the social exclusion framework by certain actors from their privileged social 
political position at particular junctures of time and space. Additionally, the actor-oriented 
approach is applied to help in understanding the actualization of the policy through the 
informal practices. The analytical lens of social entrepreneurship concept was used due to the 
lack of clear ideas about the intention behind these informal policy practices that did not fit 
into the formal administrative executive model of working of aid bureaucracy. In order to 
highlight the intentions inherent in the policy practices that are not official in nature, they 
could not fit into the conventional understanding of altruism or patronage. The relevance of 
the concept of social development entrepreneurs is based on the proposition that it involves 
professionals from state bureaucracy or development institutions that were engaged in social 
entrepreneurship (Hulgard 2010:297). The concept of social entrepreneurship derives its 
theoretical strength from broader human economy approach (Hart 2010).  
 
I maintain that an actor-oriented approach will not only facilitate my exploring the social life 
of policy ideas and development practitioners as active agents within development industry 
but it will also help me in studying the social entrepreneur activities of development 
professionals. On one hand, economie solidarie or the social entrepreneurship approach 
highlights the rationale behind the action or policy practices of development practitioners and 
social development entrepreneurs. On the other hand, it helps us comprehend the reasons that 
make them rise above the officialdom or the iron cage of bureaucracy (Weber 2005:124-25), 
as discussed in Chapter 2. Here, the term social entrepreneur is used synonymously for 
development practitioners and professionals aid bureaucrats who attempt to shape and 
influence policies and projects throughout their careers in the aid industry without any 
expectation of monetary benefit or equivalent economic value. The basic concept of 
entrepreneurship essentially involves an enterprise or investment of economic value with an 
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inherent expectation of economic reciprocity. However, similar endeavours that involve 
planning and investment of time, money, talent, and resources in hand with no profit intended 
and the desire to achieve social development out of solidarity is what makes it social 
entrepreneurship or social development entrepreneurship, a concept rooted in Latin America 
and evolved in Francophone countries and USA (Peattie 1987; Hulgard 2010:294, Hart 
2010:15). Acts of social entrepreneurship have been in practice long before their 
conceptualization on the individual level. However, the essence of this thesis lies in 
highlighting these practices in the aid industry as a sustained and collective phenomenon 
throughout the life-long careers of development agents and social policy entrepreneurs as is 
reflected in the fieldwork findings. 
 
1.4 Overview of the thesis 
This chapter served to introduce the thesis as a whole. Chapter 2 contains the literature 
review. It engages with a wide range of literature dealing with the anthropology of 
development in general and anthropology of policy in particular. It also discusses the relevant 
theoretical approaches to development practices and policymaking processes.  
 
Chapter 3 sketches out the analytical methodological framework applied to research and 
fieldwork. It maps the course of the entire fieldwork and justifies the relevant research 
methods applied throughout the research. In reference to the non-interviews, this chapter 
contemplates over my exclusion as well as inclusion as a researcher from the research field.  
Thus, on one hand, it is about non-cooperation or reluctance on the part of some of the key 
aid institutions and key informants. In the context of my own fieldwork experience, this 
chapter discusses the evasive tendency of aid organizations towards researchers that is 
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directly related to the complex nature of organizations and institutional perception of self by 
their members. At the same time, it mirrors the contradictory interplay of the power vested in 
these organizations and the discourse of liberal democratic institutions working for 
international development woven around them.    
 
Chapter 4 is divided into two major sections. First section maps out the life course of the 
concept of social exclusion. It considers how social exclusion framework was originated, 
conceptualized and became a part of the European social analytical project on poverty. It 
highlights how the state, institutional and non-institutional actors and factors shaped the 
concept of social exclusion respectively incorporating this framework as British domestic 
policy framework and later of as international aid policy theme for DFID and World Bank.  
Second section of Chapter 4 gives background of the institutional and political context of 
social exclusion framework. It elaborates on the phenomenon of framing an aid policy. It also 
includes the CDA exercise on the definition of social exclusion during two different phases of 
its life trajectory as an analytical framework for new forms of chronic poverty. These two 
phases are divided by nearly two decades, the 1970s, and 1980s. This chapter, with the aid of 
various tools of CDA, tries to track and reason the changes made in the two representative 
definitions of social exclusion. Eventually, it gives a fair picture of the inevitable role played 
by myriad actors and factors during the production of policy and cognate practices in 
different context, while underlining the undercurrents of unofficial practices. 
 
Chapter 5 describes and discusses case studies of informal or undocumented policy practices, 
which are conducted within aid institutions. These informal policy practices could not be 
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classified into categories but they involve the strategic ideological assertion, indirect counsel, 
briefing, implicit and explicit advocacy, and systematic utilization of agency on the part of 
key stakeholders and actors within the donor institutions. 
 
Chapter 6 corroborates the main theoretical argument on mediating an approach between 
CDA and actor-oriented research in policy practices with further fieldwork findings. In doing 
so, I point to the chasm between the dominant discourse of policy-making and everyday 
practices of policy makers from aid institutions by highlighting the undocumented 
phenomenon of extra-official policy practices, hinting towards new possibilities in the 
development industry.  
 
 
 
 
****** 
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Chapter 2 Literature Review 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter offers an overview of literature on the anthropology of policy and engages   with 
contemporary debates from the anthropology of development. This is done in order to 
formulate the research problem that involves the study of ‘undocumented policy practices and 
processes’ in reference to the case study of the emergence of social exclusion policy 
framework in the Department for International Development (DFID).  This chapter aims to 
achieve this by couching the research problem and corresponding theoretical challenges 
within the broader relevant literature on the anthropological study of policy. 
This chapter is divided into six sections. Following the introduction, the second section 
addresses the importance of anthropological study of policy in the present times. In the third 
section, I engage with the literature on the anthropology of development relevant to the 
anthropological study of policymaking. Here by anthropology of policy I mean the corpus of 
anthropological research which is focused on policy as a political phenomena irrespective of 
whether it is aid policy or not . By anthropology of development, I mean the research and 
studies that look at inclusive and broader expression of international development 
phenomena.   The fourth section brings together the previous two sections by discussing and 
analysing the various approaches used to study development policy practices. Moving 
towards the discussion of methods and theory, the fifth and sixth sections are dedicated to 
discussions on the discursive analysis of policy and theories of policy change respectively 
while formulating the research problematic. The seventh section offers a brief overview of 
the Weberian notion of ‘rational’ bureaucracy so as to theoretically contextualize and 
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comparatively analyse the phenomenon of undocumented policy practices I came across 
during my fieldwork. This is followed by the introduction of solidarity economic framework 
in the eighth section. The final section concludes the chapter, summarizing the major points 
of the chapter. 
 
2.2 The Anthropology of Policy 
 
In the preface of their pioneering monograph on the anthropology of policy, Shore and 
Wright offer a clear and concise argument for the importance and relevance of the 
anthropological study of the policy:  
“From the cradle to the grave, people are classified, shaped, and ordered 
according to policies, but they may have little consciousness of or control 
over the processes at work. The study of policy, therefore, leads straight into 
the issues at the heart of anthropology: norms and institutions; ideology and 
consciousness; knowledge and power; rhetoric and discourse; meaning and 
interpretation; the global and the local—to mention but a few.” (1997:4) 
Nevertheless, Shore et al. (2011) maintain, “policies are not always confined to texts, they are 
productive and continually contested, and ‘they show how’ policies are embedded within 
particular social and cultural worlds or ‘domains of meanings” (Shore et al 2011:1). They 
argue that the anthropological treatment of policy can open new perspectives, revealing 
processes of governance, power and social change that are shaping the world today (Shore 
and Wright 1997:10). Policies are major instruments through which governments, companies, 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), public agencies and international institutions 
classify and regulate the spaces and subjects that they seek to govern (Shore et al 2011:3, 
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Mosse 2011:12-13). Therefore, the analysis of policy processes enables us to “see the way 
fragments of culture and society are brought into new alignments with each other to create 
new social and semantic terrain” (Shore et al 2011:2). As it has already been mentioned this 
research will use the case study of social exclusion framework and its emergence in the DFID 
as a policy framework. On the lines of the above-mentioned perspectives, this study aims to 
look at the life-course of the conceptual framework of social exclusion from a local concept 
to an international framework of social-political analysis through the lens of undocumented 
policy practices. In doing so this research attempts to evaluate and examine the social – 
cultural and political context of this framework as well as the policy processes that shape the 
aid policies.  
 
More specifically, as anthropological research of international development policies and aid 
policy practices, in particular at the present time now, can shed light on the global-local 
processes that shape new alignments of social-cultural worlds or ‘domains of meanings’ 
(Shore et al 2011:1) in the age of globalization.  The aid industry or Aidland as Apthorpe 
(2011: ) perceives it subsumes network of aid institutions as well as networks of aid 
professionals, aid managers, consultants, researchers, and academics termed as epistemic 
communities by Mosse (2005 a : 6) .  The critical analytical study of the evolution of policy 
ideas and its emergence within the international aid infrastructure through a critical analysis 
of the literature, language, networks and practices of actors involved in international 
development intervention can offer us new insights into  the social specific contexts of the 
policy ideas (Mosse 2011: 9-11 ). The critical analysis of aid policies, in general, and social 
exclusion policies, more specifically, are particularly relevant for the study of development 
intervention in societies from South Asia, Africa and Latin America, where caste, status, 
descent, and occupation are the cause of the social exclusion (Kabeer 2000:84, de Haan 
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2011:20). Moreover, such studies are pertinent for understanding the dynamics of policy 
formation and its human dimension from actor-oriented perspective. 
 
Another reason why anthropologists need to study policy-making is because structural 
inequality produced by economic instability and the inability of the state to implement policy 
often results into policy failure (Dani and Haan 2008:25).  While this seems too logical, as 
Mosse (2005b) propounded we have little insight into the mechanisms behind the production 
of successes and failure of policy within the state and international bureaucracies; little is 
known about the ways in which policies influence the analysis of instability and structural 
inequality while producing the policy solutions . Thus it is necessary for anthropologists to 
turn their gaze on the processes of policy innovation and policy change within premier aid 
institutions in addition to examining the role of epistemic communities (Mosse 2005a:6) 
active within and beyond. This will help anthropologists and policy makers alike understand 
the potential loopholes and drawbacks in policy making that hamper a serious engagement 
with local politics during development delivery. In addition, this study would contribute to 
better development policy outcomes in the future (Mosse 2005b: 12; de Haan and 
Warmerdam 2012:4). This is what this study intends to do by examining the phenomenon of 
policy innovation, in this case, the origination of social exclusion as a conceptual-analytical 
framework, the local social –political aspect of its emergence . Moreover, this study attempts 
to look into the trajectory and processes of adaptation, advocacy, framing, and promotion of 
this French framework in the UK as domestic policy and as an international policy approach 
to tackle the poverty from South Asia, Africa, and Latin America in the DFID. 
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In the call for contributions for a new book series 
11
 Shore and Wright (2014:1) call for a new 
anthropology of policy that broadens the scope of the field. They suggest that anthropology 
of policy should attempt to shed light on how policies travel and elucidate how epistemic 
communities spread through the international agencies, think tanks, lobbyists, marketing, 
public relations agencies, and new categories of expertise play in shaping policy
 12
  . More 
importantly, they argue that the cycle of policy inception, traction, implementation, and 
eventual change in the aid industry should be looked upon from the lens of the above-
mentioned actors, their roles, institutions, and work cultures (2014:2). It is necessary to look 
at the role of ministries, municipal governments and other public-sector organisations and 
bureaucrats that are undergoing major transformations in order to understand how they 
influence the policy world and policy objectives. 
  
Therefore, on the one hand, I will draw on theories of development as a political phenomenon 
with embedded social and cultural underpinnings. On the other hand, I will build upon the 
anthropological view of policy as a product of the constellation of actors, text, discourses, 
and metaphor. In addition, this thesis will highlight the connection between disparate 
influential actors in complex power and resource relations that plays a pervasive and indirect 
role in shaping the local reality as well as the success stories of policies (Shore and Wright 
1997:11, Li 2007:227, Mosse 2006:2-3). By unpacking aid policy in this way, a host of new 
opportunities emerge. These opportunities allow anthropologists to produce more nuanced 
accounts of the ‘aid men’ and ‘aid women’, as well as networks of professionals those are 
engaged in the implementation and formation of development polices. These networks of 
                                                             
11  (Shore and Wright 2014) Available on : http://www.aaanet.org/sections/asap/new-anthropology-of-policy-
book-series/    Accessed on : 11/05/2015 
12  (Shore and Wright 2014) Available on : http://www.aaanet.org/sections/asap/new-anthropology-of-policy-
book-series/    Accessed on : 11/05/2015 
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‘aid-people’ play crucial role of influencing the aid practices in “Aidland”13 situated in the 
bureaucratic sites of donor as well as recipient countries (Apthrope 2011a: 198-200; Pollard 
and Street 2010:3).  
 
An overview of literature on the anthropological study of aid agencies, policy and actors 
shows that, in addition to the turning of the anthropological gaze towards ‘aidman’ and 
‘aidwoman’ practicing development over the last quarter of a century, there have been many 
theoretical developments and paradigm shifts that have taken place in the anthropology of 
development. These changes are characterized by a gradual shift away from the study of 
development practices towards the study of aid policies practices, a practice that Mosse 
(2011:9) terms “aidnography”.  In reference to the context of the failure of established 
theoretical propositions to make sense of development practices, Mosse (2006:2) found that 
instead of policy producing practice, practices produce policy.   This led Mosse (2004:1) to 
ask some pertinent questions to the policy makers and aid managers, such as - is good policy 
unimplementable? What if development practice is not driven by policy? He reached the 
conclusion that the things, which make for ‘good policy’, are those that legitimizes and 
mobilises political support, in reality making it impossible to implement (2004:1).  
 
Mosse (2005a, 2006a), who utilizes an actor-oriented approach – that is, the study the actors 
and their practices in development, aid and policy – stresses the necessity of theorizing the 
practices of development in the field. By theorizing practices, Mosse means the 
documentation of actions and decisions taken by actors situated at various levels according to 
their ideological inclinations, stakes, individual or institutional priorities and aspirations. This 
phenomenon seldom becomes part of development stories. Here ‘actor’ is an individual with 
                                                             
13
 Aidland is a ‘metaphor’ employed by Raymond Apthorpe ( 2011b:198 ) for the “realm of development aid 
policy and practices” 
31 
 
“personal and shared life-worlds and who acts and decides against the backgrounds of these 
life-worlds” (Long and Long 1992:20). She is also called a ‘social actor’, which is not simply 
seen as a disembodied social category (based on class or some other criteria) or a passive 
recipient of intervention, but an active participant who processes information and strategizes 
in dealings with various local actors as well as with outside institutions and personnel (Long 
and Long 1992:21). It is through actions that actors help to produce or reproduce methods 
and techniques, resources and ways of converting norms and relationships, groups and 
institutions, practices and patterns of behaviour, stereotypes, symbols, words, categories, 
classifications, and ways of expressing themselves (Seur 1992:119).  Therefore, the objective 
of this research project is to study “the ‘thought work’ and informal practices that occur 
within the various networks of professionals within donor agencies” such as the UK 
Department for International Development and non-governmental organizations (Mosse 
2011:7 emphasis in original). 
 
On this, one can say revealing the inherent practices of aid policy would inform the future of 
development interventions in its new context. Another important dimension of researching 
the phenomenon of development and aid policy practices should be the relationship between 
anthropology and development. The mutual theoretical-empirical reciprocity between 
Anthropology as a discipline that aims to understand the processes of social change and 
development practice as a phenomenon that aims to bring about social change in the lives of 
global poor (see below) makes it a pragmatic objective. A discussion on how the 
anthropological engagement with development and policy processes advances 
anthropological theory also sheds light on the complex set of policy processes. These policy 
processes involve norms and institutions, knowledge and power, discourse formation and 
political technologies (Burchell et al 1990:124). Simultaneously, making a critique of the 
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usefulness of development intervention will help policy makers and aid institution to increase 
their administrative efficacy and efficient service delivery. The present thesis grapples with 
the objectives stated in the agenda above through the case study of the evolution of the social 
exclusion policy framework in the DFID.  Incidentally, this study seeks to explore the nature 
of the policy processes and practices that constitute the complexity related to the processes of 
policymaking (Jones 2009). Nevertheless, while wearing the lens of criticality to look at the 
institutional politics, politics of policymaking and interest groups this study shall be open to 
new perspective and findings. 
 
Another example is the Mosse-DFID controversy (2005:9). Mosse’s prolonged association 
with the DFID led Indo-British Rainfed Farming Project (IBRFP) as an anthropologist-
consultant in India culminated in an anthropological monograph of insider’s account of how 
the success and failures in development projects are concerted actions or paperwork 
presentations of development practitioners. In some corners of DFID and among his 
immediate colleagues, this was considered a breach of professional ethics and betrayal of 
their trust (Mosse 2005:9-11). This provoked heated debate on the ethical code of conduct 
and professional propriety of what ethical damage Mosse as an anthropologist-development 
practitioner did in publishing the account of this project. On the other hand, Mosse made his 
intention clear by saying that in no way did he mean to betray the trust of his professional 
counterparts and DFID as an employer. Rather, his intention was to analyse his experience in 
an attempt to offer insight on the policy practices in the everyday life of DFID projects in the 
hopes that his sharing could improve policy practices. According to his argument, this work 
provided opportunities for engagement and self-critical reflection to help DFID become more 
reflective and efficient in future development interventions (Mosse 2006:243). Though one of 
the key informants denied any memory of this incident in the organizational mind of DFID, 
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the ripples of reaction to this incident are still experienced in the corridors of DFID by new 
researchers like me in the form of exclusion. 
 
Referring to the Foucualdian concept of political technology (Dreyfus and Rabinow 
1982:196), Shore and Wright (1997:7) observe, “The masking of the political under the cloak 
of neutrality is a key feature of modern power.”  With this in mind, government’s unease 
towards the involvement of anthropologists or the reason behind the aversion to the 
anthropological inquiry into how policies work and could be understood from the following 
two perspectives. Firstly, the critical-analytical gaze of anthropological research methods 
gives an upper hand to a researcher in understanding what I call ‘technology of politics’ of 
the modern state. Secondly, the anthropologist is equipped with theoretical-empirical 
understandings of the social-cultural underpinnings of the ‘native ways’, the knowledge much 
sought by politicians and colonial rulers to understand their subjects, their culture, and 
society for efficient governance. Now the latent fear or awareness of these strengths of the 
anthropological discipline to be able to see the subtleties and politics behind the processes in 
the first place could be at the core of the worry in the minds of politicians and policy-making 
institutions about anthropologists as researchers. This reminds me of the ‘cold shoulder’ 
given to me by DFID and related think tanks during my fieldwork (see Chapter 3). As one of 
my key informants said, “the nature of DFID’s development intervention is more of a 
management of aid flow rather than a humanitarian intervention to eradicate global poverty”, 
(interview, 22/08/2014).  Moreover, the aid managers have to take many decisions in the light 
of the priorities of their firm or corporation rather than from purely humanitarian instincts. 
 
Therefore, in these neo-liberal times, when the voices for wider demands of rights to 
information, audit culture and accountability from the state are on the rise, the state and its 
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machinery including the individual agents, such as politicians, bureaucrats of all levels and 
policymakers – warrants anthropological scrutiny more than ever before. This is exactly what 
this dissertation seeks to offer.  
 
2.3 The Anthropology of Development 
 
The last decade has witnessed a divergence in the agenda of the anthropology of 
development, in the UK. The anthropological attention towards the inconsistency between 
pure and applied anthropology was replaced by an inquiry into the relations between policy 
and knowledge production, supplemented by a critical assessment of the role of the 
researcher as well as development practitioner (Rossi’s 2004: 557). 
 
Up until the early 2000s, the focus of the anthropology of development was on the structural 
and political dimensions of the donor and recipient countries as well as recipients and their 
habitat (Fechter and Hindman 2011:11). The loci of anthropological exploration were the 
lives of aid recipients, their habitats, survival and livelihood strategies, gender relations and 
trajectories of their social-economic mobility and potential neo-colonial underpinnings of 
projects of poverty eradication (Fechter and Hindman 2011:12). The anthropological work 
produced during this period can be broadly divided into two categories. Firstly, there was a 
line of research that critiqued the move from the reality of development practices and 
dichotomies of indigenous vs. western knowledge and underscored the hazy processes of 
knowledge production by development institutions (Hobart 1993, Fairhead and Leach 1996, 
Gardner and Lewis 1996, Gould 2008, Mosse 2005, Crewe-Harrison 2002). Secondly, a 
school of thought that looked at development through the lens of Foucault and Said as a 
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project of cultural imperialism of Western domination over former colonies (Foucault 1980, 
Escobar 2001, Ferguson 1994, Mosse 2005b).   
 
The anthropology of development today shows renewed interest in the study of development 
aid, policy and practices of knowledge production (Mosse 2005, 2006). To put it in the words 
of Pollard (cited in Mosse 2011: viii) “this paradigm shift attempts to theorise development 
practices rather than dovetailing the practices into existing theories.” I utilize this approach in 
my research analysis. 
 
On the one hand, “development as an end product of involvement of numerous social actors 
belonging both to ‘target groups’ and to development institutions was considered to serve as 
an apt modality to be described and interpreted by Anthropology” (Sardan 2005:28). On the 
other hand, populist, ideological, and radical deconstructivst approaches to understanding the 
phenomenon of development were challenged and considered as biases that hindered the 
analysis of the interactions between different categories of actors in development as well as 
the intricacies of development phenomenon (,Grille and Stirrat 1997:21, Rossi 2004:557, 
Lewis and Mosse 2006:3).  
 
In their 2000 study, Gardner and Lewis (2000:16) challenged the common representation of 
development practices as monolithic and static (e.g. Escobar 2001, Fergusson 1994) by 
showing that the policy agendas and interventions of development organizations are 
influenced by various interest groups within and outside the development organizations. This 
finding suggested that the work of development organization could have a positive impact on 
the day-to-day lives of vulnerable sections of society in fragile states (Magrath 2010:1-2). 
Moreover, it underscores the pertinent need on the part of students of development to 
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understand that “development knowledge is not one single set of ideas or assumptions, while 
it may function hegemonically, it is also created and recreated by multiple agents who often 
have very different understandings of their work” (Grillo and Stirrat 1997:21). 
 
The necessity of a balanced social scientific view of development was felt from academic 
quarters in the wake of the vehement criticism directed towards the global development 
intervention as North-South domination (Escobar 2001:15-26), or as a disguised attempt of 
neo-colonization (Hobart 1993). This critical perspective that applied the Foucauldian lens of 
deconstructivistism in its radical form was critiqued theoretically and empirically as a 
Manichean view with monolithic notions of global dominance, resistance and hegemony by 
Grillo and Stirrat (1997), Gardner and Lewis (2000), Mosse (2004), Crewe and Harrison 
(1998) in their respective studies.  
 
Gardner and Lewis (2000) critiqued the monolithic presentation of international development 
in their case study of DFID’s 1997 White paper on development. This case study concludes 
that changes do take place in the agendas of development organizations that are the results of 
changes both within development organisations in personnel and in the balance of power 
between interest groups from DFID and civil society (2000). Refuting the rigid Manichean 
ideography of development intervention, Li proposes that the view of dominant donor and 
submissive recipient is a flawed perception as beneficiaries of development are not 
submissive but rather employ many ways of using, manipulating or negotiating with the 
actors within government machinery
14
 and development organizations to safeguard their 
interests at local levels (Li 2007:228). Similarly, Magrath (2010:4) argues against the 
phenomenon of development, as it is understood from a Foucauldian lens of governmentality 
                                                             
14 Here by government machinery I mean the administrative and bureaucratic hierarchies. 
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(1991:7)
15
 and emphasizes that development intervention does make a difference in countries 
where the government machinery of service delivery is inadequate and external aid is needed 
to help the poor.  
 
On the disciplinary and theoretical level, it was argued that the anthropological study of 
development, policy, and practices holds considerable potential for anthropologists who are 
intrigued by the workings of discourses, knowledge, power (discussed below), constructions, 
and the role culture plays in the interstices of development intervention practices and aid 
policies. Concurrently, the anthropological critique of development on global and local levels 
vis-a-vis organizational levels and individual levels was considered pertinent from the point 
of view of implementation (Mosse 2011, Gardner and Lewis, 1996, 2, Geertz 1973, Wright 
1994, Stirrat 1997).   
 
Furthermore, the ethnographic study of development claimed to challenge anthropologists to 
rethink their own assumptions and methods that defined anthropology as a discipline (Mosse 
2005, 2011, Lewis and Mosse 2006, Venkateshan and Yarrow 2012). However, there was a 
much wider post-colonial, and the global-political context behind the relative social scientific 
claim for a better and critical understanding of the processes of development practices. 
Specifically, disappointment in the wake of many international failures in delivering the 
loudly proclaimed time-bound results of global poverty eradication (Gould 2008, Rist 1990, 
Sumner and Tiwari 2010:9).   
 
This uneasy relationship between anthropology and development had a strong undercurrent 
of disenchantment about the project of modernity
16
 and ‘mission’ development in general. 
                                                             
15 Governmentality is a neologism coined by Foucault (Burchell et al 1991) joining ‘governor’ and ‘mentality’, 
by this term he meant the ‘conduct of conduct’ (Li 2007:275). 
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This disenchantment arose due to series of failures in fulfilling its promised goals and 
objectives of regional and global poverty eradication (Gardner and Lewis 1996, Gough and 
Wood 2004). The partially attained Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) is one of the 
latest prominent examples of such (Gough and Wood 2004, Sumner and Tiwari 2010). That 
is why the fifty-year old stable framework of development has been exposed to unparalleled 
critical scrutiny in the twenty-first century (Mosse 2005a:1). What Lewis and Mosse call an 
“impasse” was identified in development studies in the 1990s that persisted over the next 
decade, which gave rise to “post-development” perspectives (Lewis and Mosse 2006:1). This 
could be the main reason behind the recent U-turn of the anthropological gaze towards the 
movers and shakers of the international development enterprise in the late 1990s and early 
2000s (Rist 2007, Gould, 2008).  
 
How the ambiguous and problematic practices and concepts within the world of development 
were challenged and critiqued could be a topic of an independent research. However, this 
realization on the part of development practitioners and international development 
organisations is later reflected in the paradigm shift within ‘development institutions’. The 
visible changes in the theoretical-empirical approaches in policies were directed towards its 
‘development practices’ in developing countries during the late 1990s and early 2000s. This 
paradigm shift entailed a move to evidence-based knowledge and knowledge-based policy 
that marks the prominence of policy making in the international development industry 
(Trivedy ppt 2012
17). Mosse and Lewis call it the “new architecture of aid that refers to the 
focus of aid on policy reform rather than conventional investment projects” (2005:3).  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
16 This term is employed here in reference to  theory of ‘modernization’ that perceives ‘ development in terms of 
a progressive movement towards technologically complex and integrated forms of  “modern” society ( Long and 
Long , 1992, cited in Gardner and Lewis 1996:12) 
17 Available on : http://www.slideshare.net/idsuk/sussex-development-lecture-on-civil-society-by-roy-trivedy-
head-of-civil-society-dfid , Accessed on 26/11/2015 
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2.4 The nuances of ethnographic study of Aid and Policy  
 
This section offers a brief discussion on various nuances of an ethnographic study of policy 
and practices through social sciences. The prominence of ethnographic studies of 
development practices and discursive analysis of aid policies embedded in text and literature 
underline the significance of methodologies discussed in the following section. Then, the 
following subsection discusses the relevance of discursive analysis of aid policy literature, 
text, and documents.  
 
2.4.1 Ethnography of Aid and Policy: Norms and institutions; knowledge, 
power and discourse 
 
Ethnography, as a methodological approach, in the most general sense, can be defined as the 
study of a community or ethnic group at close quarters, resulting in a text (usually known as a 
monograph) (Gardner and Lewis, 1996: xiv). Lewis and Mosse (2006:1) did their 
ethnography of aid and agencies on the premise that “ethnographic research can provide 
policymakers and aid managers with valuable reflective insights into the operations and 
effectiveness of international development as a complex set of local, national, and cross-
cultural social interactions”.  
Lewis and Mosse (2006:15) argue that ethnography is an indispensable tool for understanding 
the dynamic relationship and complex ways in which a community and individuals relate to 
ideas applied and resources employed by international development agencies so as to make 
any international development agency successful. It follows that ethnography of aid policy 
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should study the roles of various actors from the policy level to the grassroots level and the 
political-historical context of theorization, policy formation, categorization, and development 
intervention in operation, i.e. development practices. However, to date, the majority of this 
research has focused on the senior bureaucrats and development professional and their 
experiences of political constraint while practicing policy.  
 
There are a number of ethnographic approaches used to study the aid, aid-policy, and policy 
making in international development. First, there are those that are concerned with the 
political economy of knowledge, its relationship to institutional power and the maintenance 
of organizational legitimacy focusing on the quality and accountability of expert knowledge 
(Mosse 2011:8). Secondly, there are those that ethnographically focus on the transmission 
mechanisms of expert knowledge covering a wide range of professionals in transnational 
agencies, firms, and NGO (Mosse 2011:9). Another ethnographic approach shifts attention 
away from the rationality of power-disciplining or governmentalizing towards a more 
ambiguous processes of actual knowledge production, to actor worlds and the social life of 
ideas highlighting the importance of actor relationships in the shaping and the importance of 
policy ideas in mediating professional relationships (Mosse 2011:10; Fechter and Hindman 
2011:2). 
 
Mosse (2011:11) underscores that decision-making knowledge, including, apparently hard 
economic facts and statistics, are the outcome of complex relationships including negotiations 
over status, access, disciplinary points of view, team leadership struggles, conflict 
management or compliance with client frameworks defining what counts as knowledge 
(Apthorpe 1996:17). Another aspect of an actor-focused approach to expertise is one that 
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focuses on the importance of policy ideas themselves and their artefacts: papers, reports, 
diagrams, and so forth. (Harper 1998:5;  Mosse 2011:11).  
 
Shore and Wright (1997: 21) argue that treating the policy as a new anthropological field 
means not only working on various sites but also scrutinizing new kinds of material (i.e. 
policy documents and its political-historical context). They challenge the conventional notion 
of policy as a top-down, linear and rational process and a field of study primarily for policy 
analysts. On the contrary, they maintain that ‘if anthropology has salience for understanding 
the policies as political and administrative processes, policies are inherently and 
unequivocally anthropological phenomena and hence can be read by anthropologists in 
numerous ways” (1997:12).  They argue that an anthropological understanding of policy 
should entail the analysis of the contradictory nature and effects of policy, including the 
complex ways in which people engage with policy; for instance, the meanings that policy 
holds for local, regional, national and internationally-based actors could be different and 
disparate (1997:11).  
 
For Shore and Wright, the policy itself becomes a site of contestation and negotiation, 
carrying forward the baggage of contemporary political agendas and vested interests of a 
range of actors, sometimes contradicting and other times overlapping (Shore and Wright 
1997:15,127).  Therefore, the inherent complexity of the policy processes and the multiplicity 
of the sites of policy hints towards the inadequacy of participant observation as a research 
method in one face-to-face setting (Shore and Wright 1997:11). Shore and Wright 
recommend that the 
“key is to grasp the interactions (and disjunctions) between different sites or levels in 
policy process that would entail ‘studying through’ and eventually tracing the policy 
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connections between different organizational and everyday worlds, wherein actors in 
different sites are oblivious to each other individual moral and ideological universes” 
(Shore and Wright 1997:11). 
 
Additionally, the potential altruistic motives of development practitioners underlying their 
professional decisions, policy advocacy, personal initiatives influencing the political 
decisions while in their office or field have been questioned (Fechter and Hindman 2011:22).  
For example, Li (2000:280) documents the use of both the international development 
intervention and local–national clout to benefit oneself by local dominant actors. 
Nevertheless, we cannot ignore the necessity for international development or state 
intervention to regulate available resources to benefit the marginalized. Whereas, the 
dominant social scientific epistemology stresses on the objective and neutral comprehension 
of social-political phenomenon and processes, there is a need for a new approach or 
analytical framework that would help us to comprehend the sustained activities of non-profit 
nature within the broader political economy of development aid those are based on solidarity 
rather than on-off altruistic efforts. 
 
Pollard and Street (2010:1) argue that looking at development practices from established 
theoretical perspectives is inadequate to give an actual picture of development phenomenon. 
Alternatively, they suggest that theories should be based on practices as they are performed in 
the field or day-to-day lives of development practitioners. Magrath (2010:3) proposes that the 
study of development practice can highlight the ‘blind spots’ of anthropological knowledge 
production. She argues that anthropologists, often steeped in Euro-American, Foucauldian 
theories of governmentality have been blinded to those spaces where the techniques of 
governmentality are desperately needed as the basis for extending basic services to a rural 
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citizen majority, and where they are actively strived for by government, development actors 
and publics alike.  
 
Crewe and Harrison (2002:27) observe that “development institutions (read networks of 
experts) operate with assumptions, values, and concepts, which are shaped in conjunction with 
historical and material forces… they are conglomerations of individuals and groups with varying 
interests, histories, and capacities for the agency; they diverge in their particular reinterpretation 
of ideologies.”  This is congruent with what Mosse (2004: xii) points out, that “aid agencies 
that involve practices of ‘productions of success’ rather than results at the grass-roots are 
interpretive communities”. He reiterates that “development programmes involve consensus 
building around authoritative interpretations; requiring networks of expert-supporter that 
creates knowledge based ‘epistemic communities” (Hass 1990 and Watts 2001 cited in Mosse 
2004:248). 
 
Mosse (2005a:38) encourages us to look at the social origin of policy ideas attracting our 
attention toward the epistemic communities, policy networks, the managed agenda-setting 
consultations and consultant experts and consensus formation involved in manufacturing 
transferable expert knowledge. He proposes that by looking at the power and professional life 
of experts across disciplinary, institutional and global/local divides, within and between 
epistemic and advocacy networks, research should examine how universal models are 
produced in socially specific contexts ( Mosse 2005b:15). Mosse maintains that ‘international 
policy regimes do not simply arrive, but are produced by intermediary actors, and middle 
managers, bureaucrats, clinicians, technicians, NGO staff, health workers or engineers’, 
whom he calls frontline workers (2005b:23).  These are the ‘episteme communities’, which 
translate the abstract global policies into their own ambitions, interests, and values (Mosse 
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2005b:23; Mosse and Lewis 2006). That is why Apthorpe (2011a:204) ruminates, “a good 
first question to ask in the particular case is precisely what that practitioner practices”. 
The complex ways in which epistemic community and individual development professionals 
relate to ideas applied and resources while working within an institutions to make a project 
success or failure could be effectively studied by ethnographic means (Lewis and Mosse 
2006:4). Therefore, the ethnography of aid policy should focus on the roles of various actors 
from the policy level to the grassroots level in the political-historical context of theorization, 
policy formation, categorization, and development intervention in operation (i.e. development 
practices). 
Moreover, Long (1992:9, 21) advocates the actor-oriented perspective equipped with key 
insights from wider anthropology in providing a valuable entry point and a way of seeing 
appropriate to specific development projects. This perspective allows us to view development 
projects themselves as communities. Combined with participant observation and 
anthropology’s holistic approach to social and economic life, it reveals the links between the 
micro- and the macro perspectives and hidden, complex realities that have a bearing on 
project-based work (Gardner and Lewis, 2000:18) often missed by other practitioners. Lewis 
and Mosse (2006:10-11) argue that an actor-oriented approach makes a useful entry point to 
the issue, “highlighting the ways in which social actors operate as active agents within 
development establishments, building social, political, and economic roles rather than 
following the normative scripts”. 
 
One of the challenges of identifying the research problem was to define it in a way that would 
make sense. I defined the anecdotal incidences from the professional lives of development 
professionals as undocumented policy practice. The very nature of these practices made it 
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somewhat not openly acknowledged or recorded as a part of the everyday bureaucratic 
documentation. Despite its significant role in policy change and development projects, these 
practices remained neglected or probably taken for granted due to their mundane appearance 
and regular nature. These are they practices conducted by bureaucrats out self-motivation 
hence not part of official-formal proceedings.  There were two ways to define them either to 
look for what has been documented or to search for another characteristic of those practises 
and look for its opposite phenomenon.  In terms of the later solution, I found that the 
undocumented policy practises are informal or unofficial in nature and another way round.  
Now the question is how to make sense of this unofficial phenomenon? Who is the source or 
conductor of these processes? Why are they conducting these practices?  What was their 
intention and what was the rationale behind these practices? Do these practices fit into the 
rational choice theory of decision making within the rational model of the modern 
bureaucracy?  I have evaluated the potential theoretical approaches and frameworks that 
would help me in making sense of this phenomenon, in the light of these questions.  As such, 
I employ this method in my study. This will facilitate examining the ways devised by 
development agents to intervene in the policymaking and development practices. This will 
not only entail the identification of the various strategies but also help to see what effect these 
strategies or employed by which actors within the bureaucratic setting of aid institution. The 
use of actor-oriented approach shall enable this study to focus and differentiate between the 
ideological dispositions as well as political inclinations of the range of actors and networks of 
development professionals.  I will concentrate on the actors through their practices and 
narratives while examining the phenomenon of undocumented policy practices and self-
motivated policy interventions. 
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 Following the above-mentioned research pattern has helped this project in observing the 
policy practices rather than theorizing them, eventually offering  a clear picture and insights 
into the playing out of the aid policy (Lewis and Mosse 2006: 5, 15, 21, Mosse 2011: viii, 
Pollard and Street 2010:1). The aid policy as it is shaped by varying factors and networks 
actors on various levels of architecture of aid and broader geo-political context of the policy. 
By term ‘architecture of aid,’ I am referring to “the set of rules and institutions that govern 
the aid flow to developing countries and various layers and interstices through the entire 
institutional body of development phenomenon, including networks of professionals working 
within and without” (World Bank paper 2008:27-28). From a broad perspective, my research 
will be a “studying through” the phenomenon called development and not “studying down” 
or “studying up” (Nader 1972:284, Wright 1997:11). Studying through helps, we understand 
the “ways in which power creates webs and relations between actors, institutions, and 
discourses across time and space” (Shore and Wright 1997:11) (emphasis added). 
 
In addition, we can say that actor-oriented ethnographic approach informed by what Lewis 
and Mosse (2006:5) call “methodological deconstructivism” could be used to get insight into 
the anatomy of the policy. As it highlights the ways in which beneficiaries and social actors 
and actors within aid agencies operate, negotiate, reinterpret, and contest the policy and its 
meanings within development establishments. (Mosse 2005:27). The knowledge management 
within development industry is characterized by making and re-making of the aid policy. This 
making and re-making are subject to the overarching policy paradigms as well as the 
dominant paradigms of social-economical analysis. In terms of this study, the point of 
discernment about the production of the new policy would be the exploration of the origin of 
policy framework i.e. social exclusion. As a part of discursive deconstruction exercise, I will 
look at the origin of this policy framework while exploring its journey and trajectory as an 
47 
 
analytical concept. I studied the processes of framing and re-framing of the policy themes in 
reference to the role of social policy entrepreneurs in terms of reinterpretation, negotiation, 
contestation, and adaptation of various variables into the processes on reframing of social 
exclusion framework to serve the pressing imperatives of the DFID during the emergence of 
this policy theme. 
The Foucauldian perspective seeks to understand how various institutions exert their power 
on groups and individuals, and how the latter affirm their own identity and resist the effects 
of power (Foucault 1980:69-71) through the architecture of aid. That would be to examine 
the practices of actors in the light of their level in a bureaucratic hierarchy. The orthodoxy 
within aid institutions like DFID has been challenged time to time due to changing 
configuration actors with their political and disciplinary biases (Eyben 2000, 2003). 
Moreover, the changes within the institutional structures and transitions in autonomy as well 
as change in the paradigms of development interventions has been highlighted as some of the 
significant factors that  shaped the changing work culture of DFID as an aid institution 
(Gardner and Lewis 2000). On the one hand, while the claims of development and 
empowerment has been challenged by studies like Hobbart (1993) Crewe and Harrison’s 
(1998), on the other hand, studies like Mosse (2005b) and Stirrat (2000) have scrutinized the 
‘concerted and creative paper-practices’ of aid bureaucrats manufacturing success and 
failures. However, this mixed record of research on the realistic performances of 
development in general and the DFID in particular from past decades prompts us to look at 
the potential new features of the institutional and development cultures in the present 
development industry. What makes the DFID and its work culture a significant ‘development 
bureaucratic setting’ to focus anthropological ‘gaze’ on is its international and leading 
position as one of the prominent global donor institutions that is the UK Aid. Besides its 
colonial context, DFID as new age British aid institution with its long history of development 
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intervention has enriched in its learning and experience of development policies and projects 
scattered all over global South. Characterized by its multilateral political and economic ties 
with developing countries as well as International financial institutions like World Bank, 
International Monetary Fund and UN, UK aid and its leading institution DFID makes an ideal 
setting to study aid bureaucracy, aid policy and management of global development 
interventions . The present study is interested in understanding how the bureaucratic standing 
of DFID hampered or facilitated the implementation of social exclusion policy.  Therefore, 
the present study utilizes the actor-oriented approach, which equips us with key insights from 
wider anthropology. In addition, this approach provides a valuable entry point and a way of 
seeing appropriate to specific development interventions, along with the emerging power-
relations and the roles the brokers, developers, aid managers and development practitioners 
play in the entire process (Mosse 2011:1-2).  
 
Nevertheless it sheds light on the (undocumented development practices of) development 
entrepreneurs who are committed to making difference at the grass-roots out of solidarity 
towards the poor (Laville 2010:112, Fechter and Hindman 2011:28). 
 
2.5 Anthropological theories on Policy change 
 
This section gives an overview of key anthropological studies and relevant theoretical 
approaches employed hitherto from the point of view of the research in hand. I take into 
consideration the studied opinion of pioneer  and experts on policy studies from the UK such 
as Apthorpe , Shore, and Wright, as well as one of the earliest studies on aid policy processes 
by Sutton (1999) setting a broader canvas for the present study. In addition, I included the 
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brief overview of ‘six theories about how policies change’ by Stachowiack’s (2009)18 latest 
research article. 
 
2.5.1 Theories of Policy change 
 
In 1980s the British Association for Social Anthropology in Policy and Practice (BASAPP) 
(later renamed as Anthropology for Action) organized and initiated the anthropological work 
on the inner workings of organizations as a governing institution in modern times. However, 
there were other sporadic studies conducted in the 1970s and 1980s, like those by Titmus 
(1974), Weiss (1986) and Apthorpe (1986). 
 
In 1994, Anthropology for Action organized a session on ‘Policy, Morality and the Art of 
Government’ in the Oslo conference organized by European Association of Social 
Anthropologists (Shore and Wright 1997:4). To this day, Apthorpe is considered one of the 
pioneering anthropologists to cast his anthropological gaze on development or aid policy as a 
power-wielding discourse on its subject of governance. As a special note on Apthorpe in this 
volume, Kuper (1983:190-1), writes that “Apthorpe is one exception who has kept his 
‘anthropological eyes’ focused on the way the discourse and practices of the development  
projects in which he has been involved help to reproduce relations of power in the modern 
world system.” Kuper’s (1983:190-1) remark that “like most applied anthropologists, 
Apthorpe has had difficulty in maintaining an anthropological audience speaks volumes 
about the kind of disciplinary abstinence towards the heavy political laden topic of policy. 
That was not considered suitable for research.” However, the publications like Shore and 
                                                             
18 Available on : http://www.innonet.org/resources/node/435 , Accessed on  13/10/2015 
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Wright (1997) not only mainstreamed the “criticality of the policy issues” as state 
mechanisms to govern the masses but also problematized the ‘nature of development or aid 
policies’ to its implicit ends of global governance (Shore and Wright 1997; Apthorpe 1986). 
 
This was followed by publications and work on hitherto un-researched issues of policy 
emergence and policy change that has long troubled the researchers. Interestingly enough, aid 
organizations and think tanks took this emergent issue on board quite quickly. Rebecca 
Sutton’s (1999) working paper titled The policy processes: An overview, published by the 
Overseas Development Institution (ODI) and funded by World Bank is one such example. 
This working paper summarizes key ideas in the conceptual framework of policy from five 
disciplines – Political science, Sociology, Anthropology, International Relations, and 
Management – in the context of a dominant linear model of policy evolution. She highlights 
the crosscutting themes of policy formation or evolution that emerge from these various 
disciplines. Those themes are the dichotomy between policy-making and implementation, the 
management of change, and the role of interest groups in the policy process, ownership of the 
policy process, the urge to simplify and the narrowing of the policy alternatives (Sutton 
1999:22).  
 
Drawing on the literature from all the disciplines Sutton (1999) extracts twenty-one points or 
circumstances that facilitate policy innovation. To summarize Sutton’s findings in her own 
words, “the policy, but springs out of a chaos of purposes and accidents, and not a matter of 
the rational implementation of well-planned strategies” (Sutton 1999:32). Of the many 
crosscutting themes derived by Sutton (1999), I could especially identify my fieldwork 
experiences with the theme of the dichotomy between policy-making and implementation and 
the role of interest groups in the policy process. Although this and the study by Stachowiack 
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(2009) below does not shed light on the inherent nature of ‘interest groups it did conform to 
my observations on development practitioners who could be called social development 
entrepreneurs. 
 
Another relevant work on the theories of policy formation or change is Stachowiack’s 
‘Pathways for Change: 6 Theories about How Policy Change happens ‘(2009). 
Stachowiack’s research article sheds light on the how the policy changes occur and how 
policy ideas can be effectively advocated or channelled. Stachowiack (2009:1), who is a 
director of Evaluation at Organizational Research Services (ORS), in Seattle, Washington 
and has authored A Guide to Measuring Policy and Advocacy, underlines the inadequacy 
behind the general assumption of a linear progression of policy ideas. She argue that the 
dominant perception about the policy process from a high school civics class is not more than  
“an idea becomes a bill, elected officials vote on it, and if all goes well the bill gets 
transformed into law”, (2009:1). Stachowiack states that the dominant discourse of 
policymaking seldom helps us in understanding why certain policies move forward while 
others not and how the policy change are successfully promoted. In her exclusive brief, she 
summarizes six theories of policy change based on six key researchers on policy innovation 
and policy advocacy. These theories are broadly divided into two categories: the global 
theories and theories about advocacy strategies or tactics. Global theories subsume the Large 
Leaps or Punctuated Equilibrium theory (Baumgartner & Jones 1993), Coalition theory 
(Sabatier Jenkins-Smith 1999), and Policy Windows theory (Kindon 1995). The theories 
about advocacy strategies or tactics include messaging and framework theory (Tversky & 
Kahneman 1981), power politics theory (C.Wright Mills, Domhoff 1990) and grassroots 
theory (Alinsky, Biklen 1983). As is evident, these six theories are based on studies by 
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American social scientists even though there are other collective or individual studies 
published by European social scientists. 
 
From Stachowiack’s above-mentioned work (2009:2), the ‘policy Windows theory’, 
‘messaging and framework theory’ and ‘power politics theory’  attracted my attention as my 
findings towards the initial stages of the social exclusion policy framework launching and the 
traction of  this policy framework in DFID resembles these theories. Here is more 
information on these three theories. 
 
First of these theories, i.e. the policy window theory of change constitutes four stages: 
problem defining, policy development, organizational capacity, and influencing the political 
climate. While framing, research and organizing fall under problem definition, the role of 
think tanks, identification of policy windows and networking or coalition building happens 
during the rest of the stages (Stachowiack 2009:9). 
 
The second one that is the messaging and framework theory of change entails development 
and dissemination of messages to target audiences so as to achieve a shift in social norms 
likely to bring about changes in attitudes, reaching an agreement over certain issues or 
solutions or increasing prioritization of issues or solutions. This theory strengthens the 
support system by changing the behaviour among target audiences who could be public as 
well as key actors or policymakers from the institutions. (Stachowiack 2009:10) 
 
The third theory of policy change i.e. power politics theory underlines the development of 
relationships with decision-makers and influential actors who can influence the policy issue. 
This is to be achieved through communication and coordination with key decision-makers 
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and key actors when policy opportunities emerge. Doing this strengthens the alliances 
between policymakers, helps bring a shift in social norms, and formation of political will to 
bring about changes in social and physical conditions of recipients. 
 
The abovementioned theories of policy practices resulting in policy changes and innovation 
provided theoretical grounds for the practices that resemble my fieldwork and would help 
support some of my observations. The voluntary actions of development practitioners, civil 
servants, and bureaucrats situated within various levels of aid bureaucracy or aid industry 
were private but non-profit in nature. While further reading on this I came across the classical 
writings of Max Weber on the Western bureaucracies and the rational choice behaviour of 
bureaucrats in them. The following section will deliberate on this topic and its relevance to 
the topic at hand. 
 
 
2.5.2 Weberian idea of bureaucracy  
 
Weber identified a rational-legal authority in bureaucracies that sought legitimacy from a 
legal order and the laws enacted within it. The Weberian definition of modern bureaucratic 
authority hinges on three modes of analysis: the principle of fixed jurisdictional areas usually 
regulated by laws or administration regulations; regular activities in the form of distributed 
official duties; and methodical provision made for the regular and continuous fulfilment of 
these duties that entails execution of the corresponding rights (Gerth and Mill 1958:196). 
This is contrasted with traditional forms of authority, which arose from phenomena like 
kinship. Weber maintained that rationalization describes a transition in society, wherein 
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traditional motivators of behaviour, such as values, beliefs, and emotions are replaced with 
rational calculations (Gerth and Mill 1958:56). Weber termed the increasing rationalization in 
Western societies an “iron cage” (Weber translated by Parsons 2001:18) that traps individuals 
in systems based solely on efficiency, rational calculation, and control.
19
  
 
However, my finding hints towards individuals of ‘social development entrepreneur’ type in 
aid bureaucracy more aware about the fine distinction between the mere rationale of rational 
behaviour as a civil servant and the rationale behind the solidarity or accountability towards 
the global poor. Hence, rather than getting trapped in the “iron cage” of institutional 
rationalization that traps individuals in systems based purely on efficiency, rational 
calculation and control, my informants freed themselves by coming up with a broader and 
wider form of rationalization that prioritises human solidarity’ along with their accountability 
towards enhancing the efficacy of their work-places or institutions. The Weberian analysis of 
rationalized behaviour of bureaucrats springs from the highly rationalized bureaucratic 
cultures. This rational behavioural model of bureaucrats within modern bureaucracy can be 
juxtaposed with the selfless behaviour of development professionals who are motivated by 
public welfare rather than their own interest, which is the pertinent aspect of rational 
behaviour theory. This juxtaposition can reveal a new dimension of official behaviour that 
forms the basis of the new category of official practices of extra-official nature. 
Consequently, offering or conforming a novel perspective that would strengthen a 
phenomenon that differs from the conventional understanding of rational bureaucratic 
behaviour. However, the potential justification behind this moral commitment raises 
questions about their intentions. I shall further discuss this in next section while 
contextualizing it with ‘social entrepreneurship’ concept and solidarity economy framework. 
                                                             
19 Available on :http://academic.udayton.edu/RichardGhere/POL%20307/weber.htm  
Accessed on 20/05/2014 
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2.5.3 Theoretical Bases of Solidarity Economy Approach 
 
In this section, the relevance of an emergent theoretical framework called solidarity economy 
shall be discussed, which will help shed light on the informal ‘policy practices’ of civil 
servants, bureaucrats and development practitioners within and outside the premises of aid 
institutions. An engagement with the ‘solidarity economy’ framework helps in understanding 
the nature of moral obligation or compulsion the development practitioners feel about their 
informal intervention in policymaking or actualizing the policy.  
 
The practices that shape the policies and policy outcomes are often referred to, but seldom 
elaborated in the studies on the policy process and policy change. These practices sometimes 
looked through the lens of ideological inclinations, disciplinary leanings, and other times 
through the altruistic and patronizing angles (Porter et al 1991, Fetcher and Hindman 2011). 
These practices are conducted on individual levels or by networks of like-minded policy 
practitioners and development professionals. However, is seems logical to ask what is the 
compelling force or moral imperative behind these informal actions within formal structures? 
I believe that the ‘solidarity economy’ concept as a theoretical framework can help us answer 
that question.  
 
Solidarity economy is a conceptual framework that puts forward the idea of an economy built 
on solidarity. Scholars like as Keith Hart, Jean-Louis Laville, and Cattani have termed it as 
the Human Economy (Hart et al 2010). ‘The idea of an economy built on solidarity is well 
entrenched in Brazil and in France as economie solidaire, is gaining support in Anglophone 
countries as well as solidarity economy’ (Hart et al 2010:15). The conceptualizers of Human 
Economy build on the premise of the integration of ‘moral politics’ (i.e. to want to be good, 
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do well, to pursue the good life) beyond market and state. This is based on the assumption of 
“economics with a human face” (Hart et al 2010:13) which is based on the postulation of 
Noble laureate Elinor Ostrom , that human behaviour is not always governed by self-interest 
(Taylor 2010:236).  
 
However, the concept of solidarity economy is an offshoot approach that derives its 
theoretical-empirical strength from the broader framework of the human economy. The 
proponents of solidarity economy observe that ‘social enterprise’ or becoming a ‘social 
entrepreneurs’ have become an important aim of many development practitioners and 
policymakers (Hart et al 2010:15-16). Moreover, these actors are conscious about the welfare 
of poor people against the broader politics of international aid while taking a moral-political 
stand (this is reflected in my findings as well) (Mosse 2011). However, this moral stand does 
not contradict or conflict with their rational choices implied by the Weberian concept of 
officials from European bureaucracy. This framework could be used to look at the creative 
ways social policy entrepreneurs formulate between markets and state that upholds the idea 
of ‘community participation’ (ibid). This could also highlight the way they articulate and 
utilized the groups and networks within and beyond their instant aid institutions to initiate, 
advocate and mobilize resources towards what they deem to be serving the interest of poor. 
 
Another critical dimension of the economie solidaire is the dominant postulation that, market 
economy usually thought to be neutral is not devoid of any ideology. On the one hand the 
advocates of the human economy approach are assured about the theoretical strength and 
practical existence of these phenomena, and they believe that the economic models and 
approaches that dominate media and universities responsible for obscuring this concept (Hart 
et al. 2010). On the other hand, it is argued that the human economy approach reinforces neo-
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liberal programs for dismantling social democracy due to the potential tension between the 
attempt to develop genuinely solidarity approaches to markets and politics (Hart et al 2010). 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter while setting the disciplinary and theoretical context for my research onset, I 
discuss the importance of the study of policy within anthropology. This is followed by  
engagements with various debates and approaches applied for the broader anthropological 
studies of Development in general and paradigm shifts into the anthropological gaze from the 
recipients of development aid back to the donor institutions and actors in particular. This 
section also shades light on the strength and shortcomings of the dominant deconstructivist 
and ethnographic approaches applied to study international development. This exercise was 
undertaken so as to set forth the necessity of a balanced social scientific view of development 
that could be achieved through the combination of research methods in reference to the 
context of the research in hand. Later I highlight the relevance of ethnography and discourse 
analysis to study aid and policy. Further, the key theories of policy change are exemplified 
contextualizing and drawing on the similarities and common planes between them in 
reference to the study. The Weberian idea of rational-legal authority in bureaucracies is 
discussed so as to set an argument based on my fieldwork findings that go beyond the 
classical understanding of ‘iron-cage’ of institutional rationalization by bureaucrats. As it was 
perceived by Weber in his classical work on bureaucracy, that bureaucrats are trapped in 
‘iron cage’ of institutional rationalization i.e.  What are their rational duties according to the 
institutional credo against the traditional motivators of rationalization? Eventually, I elaborate 
on the social solidarity economy framework so as to build a theoretical premise for my 
58 
 
potential argument in the light of non-economic nature of the social entrepreneurial feats. 
Another objective is to engage with the theoretical framework, which underlines the 
traditional motivators against the institutionally engineered bureaucratic rationality.  
This thesis describes the evolution of an aid policy framework called social exclusion while 
focussing on the roles of various aid bureaucrats and development practitioners from the 
DFID in influencing the previously mentioned policy and cognate policy processes. Here the 
role of the development practitioners and bureaucrats I am talking about is not regarding their 
standard official duties in the formal organizational setup but more about the undocumented 
strategies, they apply while going beyond their regular official obligations so as to help the 
people from the developing countries out of their personal commitment. However, this 
commitment could not be dovetailed in the concept of general altruistic activities or 
patronizing attitude of development professionals. Neither this commitment could be 
understood from the classical theoretical approach that underlines the institutional 
rationalization of modern bureaucracy. These prolonged practices were more than mere 
kindness out of humanitarian perspective. The longitudinal aspect and sustained nature of this 
informal phenomenon made me look for the concept of solidarity and hence the ‘economie 
solidaire’ concept. However, the informal ways of undocumented policy practices should be 
understood as Scott (1998:6) sees, ‘informal practices as an essential feature of any real, 
functioning social order’ (in our case an institutional setup). I demonstrate it through an 
empirical account of the informal policy practices of social development practitioners/policy 
entrepreneurs that shape the policy ideas and practices in everyday lives of development 
practitioners. Here I am concerned with the trajectory of the policy theme within aid 
institution, how this is achieved in real life within the aid bureaucracy. How the policy 
happens through the non-profit informal endeavours of various actors I prefer to call social 
development entrepreneurs that go beyond mere altruistic intentions. 
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To develop this view of development through the idea of social development enterprise, this 
chapter engaged with a wide range of literature produced by expert policy analysts, policy 
researchers, policy makers, development practitioners, and civil servants up until the policy 
period under scrutiny (1998-2010).  
 
The overarching framework of the social life of ideas (Appadurai 1995) (policy ideas or 
framework in this case) and the social specific contexts that lead to them and their 
development I have applied an actor-oriented approach to policy formation processes. This 
approach shall help to show that actors are not the passive conductors of the top-down flow 
of policy ideas nor the aid institutions are monolithic. However, both are the active catalyst of 
change in policy ideas within the overlapping and intersecting structures of aid organizations 
and beyond in the recipient countries. Nevertheless, the utilization of ‘solidarity economie’ 
approach shall guide in understanding the nature of intention behind informal activities that 
feeds into the concept of ‘social development entrepreneurship’. The social 
enterprise/entrepreneurial theoretical framework underlines the phenomenon of the social 
enterprise of aid professionals that is aimed towards the social development of poor or public 
welfare, in general, where no profit is intended. 
 
Although the CDA exercises are employed to scrutinize the tendencies of powerful in 
reproducing the inequalities, and the top-down bias is self-evident in analysing the relations 
of dominance, it could also help in analysing the discursive strategies employed in naming, 
framing and interpreting the inequality by the way to legitimize their ‘corrective intervention’ 
in the name of development. While the actor-oriented approaches do help us in revealing the 
social life of development policy practitioners as an active agents within development 
industry, economie solidarie or social entrepreneurship is an approach that helps us 
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understand the rationale that motivates the social policy entrepreneurs rise above the 
officialdom or the iron cage of bureaucracy (Weber translated by Parsons 2005:18). Here the 
term social entrepreneur is used synonymously for the development practitioners and 
professionals from the aid bureaucracy who attempt to shape and influence the policies and 
projects throughout their careers in aid industry without any expectation of monetary benefit 
or equivalent economic value. Further, it narrows down our topic to the specific literature on 
policy change or the evolution of aid policy ideas.  
 
The concept of rational choices made by bureaucrats in Western bureaucracy was looked 
from the lens of the emergent concept of economie solidaire
20
 or social entrepreneurship.  
This exercise was performed to prepare theoretical grounds to analyse the undocumented 
policy practices that shows tendencies of non-profit activities or enterprise by individuals in 
the aid industry or otherwise, which is neither private nor for profit (Hart 2010:15, Defourny 
and Nyssens 2010:288). 
 
 
******* 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
 
 
20 Solidarity Economy 
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Chapter 3 Research methodology and methods 
 
 
3.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter sketches an analytical frame of the methodology applied during the fieldwork to 
achieve the research objectives. This is done by providing detailed information and analysis 
about the research methods applied in terms of the fieldwork, the types of interviews 
conducted, key informants, and institutions chosen and the  overall settings for fieldwork. 
Along with the discussions on the productive key interviews and interviewees that built the 
core argument of the thesis, this chapter also contains reflections on the interviews and 
research opportunities I was denied. It also delineates the limitations of this research as well 
as my interpretation of fieldwork experience, which in turn shaped the research. 
 
3.1.1 Overview of the chapter 
First, I outline the methodological framework as it was implemented in the light of 
exploratory and empirical fieldwork aimed at understanding the policy processes, which are 
normally taken for granted or undocumented due to their mundane nature. This thesis focuses 
on the Department for International Development (DFID) and the policy entrepreneurs within 
in addition to those who were engaged in policy making with DFID during my fieldwork. I 
locate DFID as an autonomous institution situated in Britain’s highly political and strategic 
area i.e. Whitehall, as the research setting for my fieldwork. The first section of this chapter 
discusses the various research methods I employed alongside my first-hand experiences with 
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informants and interviewees. The second section of the chapter discusses my engagement 
with DFID and one of the prominent aid think tanks as an institution through its various 
levels of bureaucracy. In addition, I also reflect on and analyze my communications with 
various policy entrepreneurs and aid institutions in terms of interviews and the research 
opportunities offered to me.  
 
The third section deals with the interviews I did not get to do. There are several factors 
behind these ‘non-interviews’ beyond simply being declined interviews in the course of 
fieldwork. Bureaucrats, politicians, and development consultants represent these non-
interviewees whereas; the reference point of rejection of participant observation is DFID and 
a London-based think-tank.   I look at the phenomenon of the denied participant observation 
and denied interviews as exclusion of an outside-researcher by institutions and their 
gatekeepers. This chapter concludes with discussion on the practical reasons behind positive 
as well as negative experiences from the fieldwork.  
 
3.2 Methodology 
3.2.1 Exploratory research, oral histories and researching the ongoing 
processes of policy formation 
 
This research draws on the creative ways devised by policy entrepreneurs to shape public 
policy. The discussion in the section on “Anthropology of policy”, in Chapter 2, which 
elaborates on public opinion, state attitudes towards the policy, bilateral relations, and the 
role of ideological inclinations of development practitioners serves as a background. Initially, 
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I wanted to look at the reception of policies and development knowledge in aid recipient 
countries like India. However, later developments discussed below turned my focus on the 
informal strategies applied by social policy entrepreneurs involved in one of the leading aid 
institutions from the UK that is Department for International Development (DFID). 
 
 
Even if we were to consider policy-making within UK Aid as a singular phenomenon or even 
DFID as a main aid institution of the UK aid, it would constitute several overlapping and 
intersecting layers of networks, vast numbers of actors and several organizations working 
together.  This should give us an idea of the complexity and size of this entire process that 
constitutes several parallel operations or processes. This is the reason I have limited my study 
focus on a case study of the social exclusion policy framework within DFID, as well as 
various key actors who were directly or indirectly involved in policy practices and project 
level work related to it. The narrowing down of the focus helped me in practically completing 
my fieldwork and doing justice to the main theme of informal policy strategies or practices in 
aid institutions that emerged during research. However, I did take into consideration the 
equivalent examples from projects apart from the case study of social exclusion to strengthen 
my argument that the standard and formal official processes of policy-making are like the tip 
of an iceberg in policy-making. While the unacknowledged or undocumented social 
dimension of these policy processes constitute the remaining bulk of the policymaking or 
policy as a final product. 
 
During the archive research, I identified the timeframe of emergence, traction, and decline of 
the social exclusion policy framework that spanned over the period of 1997 to 2010.   I 
further narrowed down the research topic to the case study of the evolution of social 
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exclusion framework in DFID in a certain timeframe so as to focus on the policy practices in 
terms of key transitions in the course of evolution of the social exclusion policy framework. I 
conducted a couple of pre-fieldwork interviews with former policy entrepreneurs and aid 
bureaucrats. One of the interviews was with a former senior bureaucrat from the DFID and 
another with a DFID senior social advisor from South Asia who was quite cooperative. By 
virtue of their association with DFID policy and programmes in South Asia and the UK, 
introduced me to many other relevant contacts. 
 
Additionally, I also draw on material not directly related to the empirical case of social 
exclusion framework in the DFID but related to policy practices or aid industry in general. 
This material builds on the information shared by the counterparts of SDAs (Social 
Development Advisors) from DFID and how they intervened in the policy implementation 
processes in similar contexts. This is included due to the related modus operandi of the 
protagonists; the policy entrepreneurs had similar characteristics. For example, these 
characteristics include - influencing the policy outcomes, briefing politicians, lobbying, using 
their agency, expertise, and insights in the wake of the humanitarian crisis and eventually to 
use policy framework to empower and benefit the grassroots communities. These practices 
are identical to the ones used during the traction of social exclusion framework in DFID. I 
used policy White papers, mission statements, and working papers, in addition to independent 
and commissioned studies conducted up until the present day to make my point. I also 
audited four sessions of evidence presentation in parliament by DFID officers to ministers 
from the opposition during meetings of the Select Parliamentary committee on international 
development in the month of November and December 2014 (during which I got to observe 
and speak with the bureaucrats from various DFID country offices, especially South Africa). 
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One of these bureaucrats introduced me to his former colleague who worked with him on 
DFID’s South African office.  
 
The overall research design of this project took a qualitative approach. The research is 
exploratory and historical in nature. It involved gathering historical data on policy from 
online and physical archives, such as the online DFID National Archives
21
 and the British 
Library of Development Studies at the Institute of Development Studies, Brighton (BLDS-
IDS). I visited DFID online archives and related offices like Independent Commission of Aid 
Impact to access their archives in order to study the publications and database. I searched for 
the documents and the data that is related to the development of social exclusion policy and 
its implementation. The policy documents I studied included the policy literature, White 
Papers, mission statements, reports, evaluations, and Working papers, in addition to 
independent and commissioned studies conducted up until the present day.   
 
Given the prominence of civil servants and bureaucrats on various organizational levels in the 
DFID and INGOs, the data collected during this research shed light on the socio-political 
constraints experienced during the formation  of social exclusion policy as well as the 
implementation of the policy in past. That is, it looked at the “actual production” of policy 
models in a socially specific context (Mosse 2005b, 2011:12) while underlining the social, 
institutional and political factors that make actors take or forbid to take various policy 
decisions. The empirical data I worked out applied to broader development policy discourses 
and larger institutional structures that play a crucial role in policy-making and dissemination. 
These policy entrepreneurs engage with various levels of the aid projects. On one hand, the 
                                                             
21 Available on : http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/*/http:/www.dfid.gov.uk/ 
Accessed on 29/10/2015 
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recollections, testimonies, and first-hand experiences of these policy entrepreneurs working 
as bureaucrats, advisors and development consultants from these INGOs, provided with 
insight into the interplay of interests, biases, and values translated by socio-culturally situated 
main actors into international policy regimes. On the other hand, the analysis of findings shed 
light on the politics of policy decisions and political constraints faced during the “happening 
of policy” or policy in practice (Mosse 2011a: 2004). The testimonies and recollections of the 
policy entrepreneurs from their semi-structured interviews were triangulated with 
contemporary development, publications, and similar accounts hinted towards by other 
informants.  
 
The Data was obtained by means of oral history interviews, and semi-structured lengthy 
interviews, many of them in two or more sessions. These interviews were more of the oral 
histories of their lived experiences and narratives of what happen then in retrospective.  The 
recollections of the project and oral histories was shared by the policy entrepreneurs who 
were engaged with social exclusion related projects and especially policy from its initial 
stages (that is, the formative, implementation and advocacy stages) to the present day. This 
entire exercise was aided and supplemented by the analysis of references from the policy 
literature and closely related documents. It also included recording the narratives of policy, 
policy processes, policy practices, class distinctions, political and social perceptions and other 
related experiences of people and incidents involved that shaped the social exclusion policy 
framework in the UK.   
 
The criterion applied for sampling the key interviewees was as follows. Initially, I chose the 
one who were involved with the social exclusion policy directly in its first stage for initial 
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interviews. Later on, I utilized snowball sampling to connect and contact the professional 
networks of development professionals directly engaged in the social exclusion policy in its 
various stages. I requested the key informants to recommend other most relevant informants 
from their professional and personal acquaintances and updated the list as per the significance 
of new informants to the study (Bernard 2006: 193).  
 
My fieldwork was to be conducted in the London office of DFID and its partner INGOs, like 
Action Aid and Christian Aid with its bureaucrats in their respective offices from London and 
around. However, I could not get access to the interior of DFID head quarters or one of its 
main satellite think tanks and subsidiary aid organizations. I explain and discuss the potential 
reasons and observations thereof below. Nevertheless, many high profile DFID bureaucrats 
and Labour politicians denied me interviews, despite their initial willingness I was 
methodically avoided in the course of communication. I was implicitly denied the entry into 
the top aid institution and its think tank. It was a form of exclusion, an exclusion of a 
researcher by the sceptical institution and ‘precautious’ gatekeepers. The reluctance of 
gatekeepers to give me the access to the organization was one reason. At one point in time, I 
thought that I would be without crucial information. However, I changed my perspective and 
decided to incorporate my exclusion, or denial of interviews, implicit refusing of access to 
key institutions as non-interviews. I started quizzing and interacting with the informants who 
were positively co-operating, about the potential reasons behind the implicit non-cooperation 
on the part of some key informants and institutions. As a result, they came up with several 
potential reasons in the light of their own prolonged close association with ‘aidmen’ and 
‘aidwomen’ and firsthand experience in the aid industry. Such a reliance on their part enabled 
me to further delineate the powerful and often invisible discourse that the actors were 
immersed in as well as it helped me to analyze the non-interviews. 
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Later on, I changed my research strategy and decided to engage specifically with those who 
had formerly worked as DFID bureaucrats, aid-managers, policy makers, and experts from 
INGOs like Action Aid and Christian Aid and International Development Institution like 
DFID. In addition, I sought to engage those who have worked in India on projects related to 
social exclusion as well as those who played a key role in the traction of the social exclusion 
framework in DFID. 
 
 I did in-depth semi-structured interviews with them. Semi-structured  interviewing is said to 
be effective in projects where we are dealing with high-level bureaucrats and people with the 
tight time schedule (Bernard 2006: 212). As this research is about past policy and historical in 
nature, the information I looked for was very likely to be collected through recording the 
recollections and lived experiences of those who were involved in the policy and related 
events and activities. The length, depth, and nature of my rather prolong semi-structured 
interviews with open-ended questions later made me think and treat that information in terms 
of oral history interviews.  
 
‘Oral history is the systematic collection of living people’s testimony about their own 
experiences. Oral history is not folklore, gossip, hearsay, or rumour. Oral historians attempt 
to verify their findings, analyze them, and place them in an accurate historical context’22 
Whereas, structured and semi-structured interviews involve certain format of limited 
questions that restricts the potential flow of information from  the interviewee in the case of 
oral history interviews you encourage and let the narration flow through the spontaneity of 
interviewee.  During oral history interviews, you slightly nudge or guide the informants about 
                                                             
22 Available on:  http://dohistory.org/on_your_own/toolkit/oralHistory.html#WHATIS  Accessed on 22/06/2016 
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the on-going discussion, rather than leading them hence the form or technicality of the 
interview is avoided while letting the informant describe what it was like and how did they 
live the experience. Most of the oral history interviews were conducted with former DFID 
civil servants and social development advisors. These were retired DFID bureaucrats or 
development professionals. I realized that they were quite enthusiastic to share their 
professional experiences and anecdotal events they were part of during their career as 
international development professional. During the oral history interviews, sometimes they 
use to call in to their home while other times we use to meet in some park or coffee house or 
university common rooms in central London. I conducted some oral interviews on phone and 
Skype also.  However, I also did structured and unstructured interviews with few informants 
as they had other engagements and limited time. The tape-recorded interviews were both 
structured and unstructured.  
 
While interviewing Action Aid and Christian Aid officials and development practitioners, I 
used a similar set of questions that I used for the DFID people with little variation. This 
helped me in comparative analysis and triangulation of the information between working 
bureaucrat and retirees, such as narratives of policy, subjective experiences of institutional 
politics and problems they have faced while working on policy-based projects. This was 
aided by oral history and semi-structured in-depth interviews, archives study for policy 
papers and related documents in the parliamentary archives in the UK (which were available 
online). During this pre and post-research archive study, I kept in mind the inter-
organizational coalitions and networks among official members of the organization which is 
deemed to be more crucial for the agency than the formal organization to which these actors 
belong (Long and Long 1992:23; Eyben 2005:2).  
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Initially, I corresponded with at least ten development professionals that included former 
DFID bureaucrats, academic consultants, and policy makers to start with. Later I contacted 
more after I obtained email consent from people from the above-mentioned institutions. I 
interviewed mostly upper and intermediary actors, i.e. experts, policy makers, consultants, 
aid managers, senior bureaucrats and NGO and INGO staff from the UK. This included 
development practitioners, social development advisors, governance advisors, academic-
professionals and policy makers who have dealt with social exclusion policy. At least five 
informants were living outside the UK. Hence, I did telephonic and online interviews via 
Skype with them.  
 
Additionally, as per the conditions of my informed consent form, it was pertinent on my part 
to protect the identity of my high profile key informants who have been directly involved in 
the informal policy processes mentioned in this thesis. Therefore, I took efforts to maintain 
anonymity about the projects and offices they have held during the time frame of the policy 
theme under study by changing the names of the informants and the demographic locations 
they were active in. However, in some places in my thesis I deemed it essential to refer the 
institutions involved by their original names so as I can contextualize their words and actions 
of still anonymised informants accordingly. Where the information in the dissertation is 
directly from my informants, I acknowledge them by putting their (pseudo) names in 
parentheses. A full listing of all my informants’ pseudonyms can be found in the list of 
pseudonyms of informants. 
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3.3 Research methods 
3.3.1 Critical discourse analysis (CDA)  
 
In the European context of development policy, the phenomenon of development is viewed as 
a discourse (Karagiannis 2004:5). Discourse, as defined by Foucault (Weedon 1987:108), 
refers to “the ways of constituting knowledge, together with the social practices, forms of 
subjectivity and power relations which inhere in such knowledge and relations between 
them”. Discourses are more than ways of thinking and producing meaning. They constitute 
the “nature of the body, unconscious and conscious mind and emotional life of subjects they 
seek to govern” (Weedon, 1987:108).  
 
Discourse analysis in anthropology started as an ethnography of speaking or ethnography of 
communication, it has also been aimed towards analyzing the structures of meaning and 
intention "beyond the sentence" (Fairclough 2003:6). However, the CDA exercise scrutinizes 
the context and sub-text of the text so as to understand the objective inherent in the statement 
made, language spoken or text written (Fairclough 2003:6). In our case, this is how the 
socially excluded were defined or institutionally constructed. If we replace the psychological 
aspect of the body in the definition by Weedon (1987:108) offered above, with physical and 
hence social, economical and political dimensions of the human body, we could see the logic 
behind what necessitated the CDA of social exclusion framework.  
 
In this case, the purpose of the CDA is to reveal the discourse specific social, ideological 
(Dijk 2006:353-54) and cultural aspects of social exclusion as a conceptual framework with 
the aid of various CDA tools in two different contexts. Again the aim of the entire exercise is 
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to look at the ascriptive contribution of variously located actors in their socio-political 
context to the two definitions of social exclusion. CDA aims to achieve this by explaining 
various discursive techniques used to create the discourse and its broader frame. Critical 
discourse analysts have analyzed terms like empowerment, gender, civil society, 
discrimination, and poverty as well as various kinds of speech, text, and images represented 
in the literature produced on global development intervention endeavours (Sachs 1992; 
Cornwall and Brock 2005; Batliwala 2007; Eyben 2011). The discourses on development and 
underdevelopment produced by academics, development professionals, international aid 
agencies and international development think tanks like Overseas Development Institute and 
Institute of Development Studies have been the focus of study as well (Chambers and Alfini 
2010; Batliwala 2007). However, here I will look at the variations between two versions of 
the conceptual framework of social exclusion. I will underline the similarities and distinctions 
in between the versions during its various locations and objectives it was perceived to be 
designed for.  
 
CDA stands for the deconstruction of a concept or idea or a dominant presentation by 
critically analyzing the three important parts that they constitute: genre, style and the 
discourse (Fairclough 2003, pp.123-133). It is pertinent to keep in mind the centrality of text 
analysis to discourse analysis that moves its focus from specific texts in the order of 
discourse, what according to Fairclough (2003:4) is “the relatively durable social structuring 
of language which is itself one element of the relatively durable structuring and networking 
of social practices.” 
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From this point of view, there is not a single discourse of social exclusion. Rather, there are 
as many discourses as there are texts those are produced in their peculiar political, regional, 
social context at different junctures of time. However, there are still the text specific recurring 
elements an order of the ideas in the discourse of social exclusion that trickled down to the 
definition of the latest one.  
 
3.3.2 Actor-oriented approach and undocumented practices 
 
Following the CDA treatment of the policy framework, I wanted to apply similar theoretical 
methods to deconstruct the context specific narratives and policy discourses woven by the 
development professional. Postmodernist theory holds development phenomenon and 
cognate processes of project and policy knowledge production as a monolithic and 
hegemonic process. The deconstructionist approach did not help much in making sense of the 
lived experiences and the informal actions and intentions of development agents going 
beyond the organizational forms and order (Gardner and Lewis 1996:24-25).  
The post-development deconstructionist theory perceives development as a hegemonic and 
homogenizing phenomenon with neo-colonizing effects (Escobar 1995, Sachs 1992). This 
theory has two shortcomings. First, it neglects the agency of the development agents and the 
constructive role that development may play in the countries with weak governance and 
fragile infrastructure (Sande lie 2004, Pollard and Street 2010:3). The second, the bias of 
hegemony in the post-development deconstructionist approach towards development does not 
help in interpreting the changes development institutions undergo or the informal attempts of 
insiders to better the policy and development practices directed towards poverty alleviation 
(Gardner and Lewis 2000 :16-17).  
74 
 
 
Given these shortcomings, I was drawn towards the actor-oriented approach to aid me in 
understanding the informal practices and social development entrepreneurial spirit among to 
the development agents. Long (2001:14).  observes that "the advantage of an actor-oriented 
approach is that it aims to grasp precisely the issues of lived experiences through a systematic 
ethnographic understanding of the ‘social life' of development projects from conception to 
realization as well as the responses and lived experiences of the variously located and 
affected social actors." Moreover, the actor-oriented approach's emphases "the agency of 
actor assumes that, although some people have more power than others, there are not deep 
structures that constrain the actor or the less powerful, enabling them to contest, challenge, 
negotiate and capture" (Eyben 2004:23). This theme emerged during my fieldwork 
concentrating on the agency and roles played by key actors and development agents in 
shaping a specific policy framework. However, I found a logical affinity with the actor-
oriented approach combined with discursive analysis for my research in two different 
contexts i.e. to understand the policy formation practices and the framing processes i.e. 
conceptual formulation of policy.   
 
 
3.3.3 Various types of data 
The majority of data I have collected is qualitative in nature. Other than, the data derived 
from primary resources through online and physical archives from DFID, ODI, and IDS, 
most of the data is based on my observations and participations in events organized by 
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organizations like BOND,
23
 and Parliamentary Select Committee and Independent 
Commission for Aid Impact. It is also based on oral history, semi-structured and extempore 
or unstructured interviews, narratives, discussions, and informal conversations with various 
informants I have recorded or noted manually. I have also used selective datum from 
electronic mails, electronic communications with the informants in making points for their 
reluctance to reciprocate or cooperate. Besides the tape-recorded structured and unstructured 
interviews, I have also taken notes on the informal and parts of unplanned or off-record 
conversations that I had later incorporated in the thesis without divulging the identity or any 
revelation of the person. The notes included the remarks, off-record statements, observations 
of various settings, phrases used, value-laden adjectives, metaphors and allegories used in 
passing. Therefore, the data I have accumulated could be classified into off-record and on-
record data. While the aforementioned data is off-record, the on-record data I gathered is in 
the form of recordings of semi-structured and structured interviews, printed literature, 
electronic documents, aid-impact reports, Parliamentary papers, ICAI papers, evaluation 
reports, commissioned research papers, working papers and White papers. The on-record data 
also includes the recordings of telephonic interviews and Skype interviews and notes taken 
during interviews. 
 
Since my strategy to enter the DFID premises or as a last recourse at the least to shadow key 
DFID bureaucrats in their day -to-day work did not materialize, I resorted to hanging around 
where I could hope to meet professionals from the UK Aid in general and DFID in particular. 
While hanging around the DFID premises,   Parliament and Hansard buildings, I often 
stumbled upon some of my informants in informal settings such as coffee houses, cafes, 
                                                             
23 BOND is the UK membership body for non-governmental organizations (NGOs) working in international 
development 
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public parks, restaurants, and diners. Of course, everyone was referred or introduced by 
somebody and acquainted to me from some event related to the development industry.  
Although most of my interviews were semi-structured, I did have informal discussions with 
two or more people many times from development industry in the cafe or canteen in the 
premises of these buildings. I followed the casual interactions, impromptu discussions, and 
elaborations of those around on the topic of my interest rather than leading them. These 
conversations usually followed my formal introduction, or after someone introducing me to 
the potential informants. Nevertheless, I shared my research interest and picking up relevant 
bits of information from the ensuing discussions.  
 
3.4 Entering the field 
 
In the first phase of my fieldwork, I wanted to get access to physical archives of the 
Department for International Development (DFID), UK so that I could study the official 
correspondence between the Ministry and DFID bureaucracy. I wrote a formal request to 
DFID inquiring about access to its physical archives. However, I was told that most of the 
DFID documents are online – as per its ‘transparency’ policy – and thus I was suggested that 
there was no need for me to access the archives as everything is online. I was able to access a 
number of documents, such as White papers, Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, 
departmental Evaluations, Reports, and policy papers (DFID Publications
24
). However, I was 
not able to find any past official correspondence or proceedings and communication between 
DFID office and the Ministry, which is what I was really interested in. Meanwhile, I learned 
about DFID’s electronic document and records management programme called QUEST. On 
                                                             
24 Available on: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications?departments%5B%5D=department-for-
international-development last Accessed on : 12/03/2015 
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request to access to it, I was told that only DFID employees can have access to it, not an 
‘outsider’. This was my second experience of ‘implicit exclusion’ as a researcher. I sought 
guidance from a senior researcher and they told me about the Right to Information (RTI) 
something they did during one of their research. I considered filing an RTI, but I did not want 
to look desperate or to alarm the DFID gatekeepers as my request regarding participant 
observation of DFID was in process. Therefore, I quietly let go of that option. 
 
 
3.4.1 The Daunting DFID  
 
My own speculations and habit of connections and comparisons between incidents, 
experiences, and institutions during fieldwork attracted my attention towards the inter-
institutional relations of Legislative assembly and DFID. The history of UK aid has also been 
the history of changing relations between parliament and DFID, which, were subject to the 
political party in power. Labour has been quite liberal and experimenting with international 
development to the extent that it restructured a subdivision of Foreign office into a cabinet 
level department giving it relative autonomy. However, the Conservatives have been more 
reserved about this entire idea of international development for the sake of global poverty 
reduction (informant David, Rebecca).  
 
Although, state, bureaucracy, and related institutional structures are normally hierarchical in 
nature they are pulsating with the flow of overlapping and intersecting ideas. The nature of 
this flow of ideas is non-linear but interconnected and beyond the physical range of the 
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organizations (sees Chapter 4). The organizational structures have their own aims to achieve 
which are guided by their internal policies. The organizational structure regulates the internal 
mechanism of control, delegation, and authority within any organization. Therefore, the 
stakeholders in authority are realigned through changes within the structure. Nevertheless, the 
structure serves the organization philosophy or internal policy through different factors and 
actors according to the objectives they have subscribed to. However, even these objectives 
are not static but are changeable and they change as per the change of the power in the center 
and the priorities of government in power. The accession of a new political party can entail 
the change in the departments, change of the administrative powers and processes, change in 
authorities, and change in administrative landscapes according to the political preferences and 
ideologies of the party in power. The shift in policy agendas is not immune to these changes. 
 
 
The policy shift influenced by overarching polity and ideology reflected in the work culture 
and over the modus operandi of DFID under different political rule (Informants: David, Neil, 
Caroline). If we study the flow of power and division of authority in the organization chart of 
DFID, we can see the descending hierarchization of power and authority between two 
institutions. Legislature represented by a cabinet-level minister, parliamentary secretaries, 
and couple of other ministers who oversees the rest of DFID’s civil administration with the 
help executives further divided into subdivisions that perform certain jobs like policy making, 
finance, governance and running DFID offices in different aid recipient countries.  
 
A cursory look at the DFID organization chart shows us a higher place of political/legislative 
offices on the top of executive and administrative officials further branching into parallel 
symmetries of sub-divisions of various country chapters of DFID and divisions of policy, 
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economic and governance. The sitting MP, i.e. Secretary of State for International 
development and Permanent secretary followed by other parliamentary secretaries, directors, 
and acting directors of various divisions of DFID sheds light on the ascending flow of power 
and descending flow of authority. This decentralization of power may seem to be in tune with 
the spirit of the democratic political system, however, the power of decision-making narrows 
down with the narrowing authority. To the level of our protagonist social development 
advisors, governance advisors, and policy entrepreneurs, there is less space to take decisions 
or to mend policies or practices. These organizational structures and power hierarchies are 
not a monolith, but part flexible and part rigid and those who are with tacit knowledge of how 
networks and interest groups work can make the most of it (Informants: Marlyn, Rebecca, 
and Larry ). As a couple of examples from my fieldwork, illustrate in this chapter. However, 
the point is the intra- and inter-institutional interactions that influence the internal workings 
have political underpinnings as well as the flow of information back and forth the networks 
situated in organizational structures. This aided by political pressure results in the resistance 
to outside inquiry, which was not an exception in my case. The common thread of unanimity 
on resistance to outside inquiry runs through these intertwined institutions wherein the 
superior institution regulates the subordinate. The relative autonomy or freedom is subject to 
the internal policies and politics of ruling party at any time (Informants: Caroline, 
David).However, this does not mean the researcher would not get a helping hand from 
insiders and gatekeepers, but it also depends on upon the perseverance and connecting to the 
right people (fieldwork observation/heuristic notes). 
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Fig. 1.1 The DFID Organization Chart  
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DFID’s London headquarter is housed in Whitehall. The department was relocated from the 
rented offices next to Buckingham Palace to an unused government freehold at 22 Whitehall 
in 2013. Whitehall is an area around Westminster that houses most of the government 
buildings of political and strategic importance in Britain. The concentration of other buildings 
and offices of political and military importance around it could assess the strategic salience of 
this area.   
 
The ‘establishment’ – usually used as the synonym for state activities and infrastructure – is a 
vague term, but if we have to exemplify something tangible akin to the term, this area could 
be closest urban and visual signifier. The government buildings in Whitehall, from south to 
north, include HM Treasury, HM Revenue, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 10 Downing 
Street, Cabinet Office, Ministry of Defence, Office of the Parliamentary Counsel, Department 
for Energy and Climate Change and 22 Whitehall i.e. the Department for International 
Development
25
.  
 
The DFID building is divided into three storeys that have undergone refurbishment and 
conservation plan of historic buildings with contemporary architecture. The Whitehall 
building complex 22-26 are covered with a glass atrium and old elevations has been removed 
so as to house open office floors to the light-filled space. As we step into the building, we are 
greeted by at least three security personnel guarding the main building entrances, i.e. main 
entrance, inner building entrance, and small passage stairs on the extreme left.  A reception 
counter is in the center of the main entrance hall with a large front sitting arrangements for 
visitors and outsiders to wait before they are called upstairs or inside the building. This was 
                                                             
25  Available on :http://www.hok.com/design/service/renovation-restoration/cabinet-office-22-26-whitehall/  
Accessed on 28/06/2014 
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the place where I mostly used to sit while visiting the DFID office ‘externally’, and one that 
has the biggest visual impression on my recollections. 
 
Like most of the Cabinet-level, buildings in Whitehall the architecture of 22 Whitehall too 
exude the air of serious bureaucracy that signifies the core of the British establishment. 
However, this was not same with its old building or office culture as some informants 
recollect. The new DFID office has heavy security features those with reception as well as 
security check that issues pass for access to the interior of the main building. In my case, the 
condition of the full-time attendant to escort me into the interior was used besides the security 
pass.  
 
DFID’s moving its offices to Whitehall was a decision of the neo-coalition government led 
by the Conservative party. It was claimed to have saved taxpayers' millions on expensive rent 
and overheads. More business-like performance and efficient use of office space and flexible 
working practices were expected from those that worked in the department. However, the 
‘real' concerns of the Conservative party about giving more autonomy to the International 
Development department in the past as well as the present are not hidden. In the course of 
fieldwork, different sources have repeatedly hinted at the unacknowledged intention of the 
Conservative party, in particular, to keep the International Development department well 
within the jurisdiction and administrative proximity of the Foreign Office (informant). One of 
the main reasons is to keep DFID bureaucracy and the activities of UK Aid under constant 
check (informant). In official language and as per DFID press release on the moving of the 
DFID office, it was ‘a decision taken by the department’s Ministers and the Permanent 
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Secretary to sit closer to their teams
26’ (DFID 2013). This building evaded my every attempt 
to be a part of its everyday life as part of participatory research. 
 
 
3.5 The Cooperative Informants 
 
The social background and political convictions of informants influence their actions in 
important ways. In this section I describe these convictions and the ways they informed the 
interview process and my relations with them. 
As many as fifteen of the social development entrepreneurs who belonged to DFID, Action 
Aid, and other INGOs, with few (least three to four) exceptions,  grew up in  middle-class 
family background with progressive but principled parents. However, only a few of my 
informants could maintain their activist vigour and reformer's zeal while working in aid 
bureaucracy. Those that could were able to do so due to their involvement with ideologically 
inspired social circles. Majority of the informants had at least a degree in some or other 
discipline from the social sciences. Some of the policy entrepreneurs had either one or both of 
their parents in academia and some informants had a father who worked as colonial officers.  
 
The father of key informant who successfully advocated for social exclusion policy taught in 
a reputed institution of higher learning in the UK. This informant credited his disposition 
towards helping the poor or making a real difference in the lives of poor to his father's 
teachings. Another informant, who hailed from a lower middle-class background, did her 
degree from a not so renowned university and she experienced secondary treatment due to her 
                                                             
26 Available on: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/office-move-savings-from-dfids-relocation-to-whitehall 
Accessed on: 28/06/2014 
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lower class status and gender, credited her leanings to her evolved consciousness of solidarity 
as a member of a "have not" community and as a woman working in the development 
industry. I could see a common thread of solidarity and selfless commitment towards the 
cause of poverty alleviation utilizing one's position, power, and resources in hand, running 
beneath all these informal policy practices or efforts. Of course, these informants were 
receiving their wages or remunerations like the rest of their counterparts and they would have 
rather not pursued their passion at the cost of losing their job in adverse situations. However, 
what made them different was their passion for "doing one's bit for poor" within the confines 
of formal organizational set up while networking with people across aid industry and 
developing countries. Of course, their passionate behaviour did win them clients and earn 
them commissioned work and economic opportunities due to their endeavours and they could 
see the connections but they also discerned between making profit out of it and doing actual 
work for the cause of poverty alleviation.  
 
Dan was an independent consultant he was a believer. He had huge experience and vast 
network of the development practitioners, aid professionals, and civil society organizations 
from all over the world. However, he had very few friends in the UK who would freely 
associate with him due to the religious undercurrents behind his commitment to helping poor 
communities. However, I found him very understanding, experienced, and pragmatic. I 
benefitted immensely from his ‘wisdom’.  Many times these social development 
entrepreneurs (both male and female) experienced  indirect resistance or verbal punishment 
for their informal policy practices at the hands of their conformist colleague, such as joking, 
derisory remarks, ridicule, (indirect) excommunication,  and name calling behind their back.  
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Marlyn was another informant who was incredibly cooperative. She had prior work 
experience as a development advisor and researcher in South Asia. Moreover, she showed 
many signs of empathy with India and with its population. This was probably due to her 
childhood memories of India during the last days of colonial rule when her father was 
commissioned in India. Later in her professional life, she got an opportunity to work in India 
among its subaltern populations. By virtue of her direct involvement with local activists and 
social movements, unlike many expatriate development practitioners, she was tuned into the 
ground realities and social plights of impoverished in South Asia. 
 
I found less resistance and more cooperation among the retired bureaucrats. Moreover, my 
informal and formal sessions with these former or veteran employees had a cathartic effect on 
them. For instance, most of the informants who were retired from their active jobs from the 
DFID were actually delighted and eager to speak with me about their experiences related to 
my research topic. They used to savour the experiences and memories of the situations and 
circumstances they lived while sharing the information with me. I could feel their joy, 
satisfaction, anguish, frustration or feeling of worthiness reflected in their words, expressions, 
chuckles, enthusiasm, and laughs while describing various events and anecdotal incidences as 
if it all happened in the recent past. In the process of recollecting their memories, they were 
emotionally charged but positive and cooperative so much so that some of them voluntarily 
offered to meet me for further interview sessions giving me adequate, time to record the oral 
history interviews. However, I was fortunate enough to formally interview as well as hang 
around with some of the key informants during their free time and be a part of their social life 
to some extents. At such time, besides informal discussions of their lived experiences in the 
aid industry. I did oral history interviews with those who gave me the opportunity to meet 
them more than once.  
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The above information summarizes the social, educational, ideological characteristics of 
Marlyn, Judith, Dan, John, Ryan, Larry, Rebecca, Alice, David, Ray,  Jim and Alex and 
many others informants who were quite helpful to me and who made my research project 
possible. Moreover, compared to their reluctant counterparts the abovementioned social 
policy entrepreneurs were quite convinced and confident about the utility of social scientific 
inquiry into the phenomenon of international development for better-informed aid practices. 
 
 
3.5.1 Gated aid communities, and surviving the fieldwork “exclusion”  
 
In these days of ‘transparency’ buzz (Cornwall and Brock 2005), ‘audit culture’ (Strathern 
2000), and wider democratic accountability on the part of the state and its various institutions, 
the cold shoulder I was receiving was an unusual experience of my own exclusion. Being an 
erstwhile social activist and untouchable caste background covert and overt exclusion were 
not new for me.  Moreover, my lived experiences from India and abroad made me more 
sensitive about any kind of ‘othering’ or ‘exclusion’. However, such experiences in a 
bureaucratic set up from the liberal and democratic British society at the hands of non-Indians 
were unnerving and disenchanting. Being an Indian who always cherished the liberal and 
democratic values of West in general and the UK in particular it was like breaking of an 
ideal.  
 
 Some of the prospective key informants and organizations central to my research repeatedly 
declined series of my interview requests during my fieldwork. This made me think about my 
own exclusion as a researcher. I was baffled as I was dismayed. I did receive a couple of 
denials initially, but a series of later refusals by key informants was a shocker to me. On top 
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of this, I received what could be described as the ‘cold shoulder treatment’ by premier aid 
organizations from UKAid
27
, which was also discouraging. In the back of my mind, I already 
started speculating and making connections of related events and likelihood so as to grasp the 
situation. First thing first came to my mind was my ethnic origin as a non-white male trying 
to study an institution of political-economic importance from the Europe. The bilateral 
relations and mutual political-economic relations between this institution and country of my 
origin, where this organization is active in development efforts, were also one of the 
assumptions that coloured by perceptions of my own exclusion as a researcher. My 
speculations were not unfounded. The first thing that came to my mind was that this has 
happened in the wake of my appeal for participant observation in DFID. Another occurrence 
was that all of these ‘prospective’ interviewees were in some way or another, directly dealing 
with my research topic in the past during the period of the Labour government and shifts in 
political power. In addition, these potential interviewees had also worked in close 
coordination with officials of Indian government and leading policy entrepreneurs and 
development practitioners from Indian sub-continent. An afterthought that reminded me of 
the defensive role of Indian DFID employees in publication rebuttal followed by the 
publication of Mosse’s controversial book ‘Cultivating the development’ consolidated my 
doubts. Not only the key actors from the DFID, office, UK but their counterparts from Indian 
office of DFID were also reluctant in involving in my research. Surprisingly, I found out that 
many of them were trained anthropologists. Often the interview denial used to be followed by 
‘detailed online conversation' on research topic and ‘(failed) implicit negotiations' on the 
phone or otherwise on (topics) what we shall speak about. I was intrigued by the potential 
reasons for these denials. I might have ignored this phenomenon, but it seemed to be another 
                                                             
27 UKAid is an official nomenclature adopted by UK Government for British Governments to publicly 
acknowledge the development programmes funded by the UK taxpayer.  
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way of investigating the workings of power throughout aid organizations and their dealings 
with the enquiring public.  
 
The critical analysis of such behaviour of aid institutions, bureaucrats, development 
practitioners, and politicians with an external inquiry will shed light on the range of the 
factors and phenomenon involving individual behaviour in an organizational setup. In 
addition, such an analysis will highlight how ‘closed' organizations reflect their insecurities 
that produce the cultures of secrecy and bunkered aid (Duffield et al. 2008, pp. 25/26). 
 
As I have accounted for earlier, while I was working on my research design I decided to use 
the ‘snowballing’ method so as to get the most relevant informants for my research 
interviews and further help during fieldwork. Being an ‘outsider-researcher’, I took this 
decision with an expectation that I will get the benefit from the goodwill of my potential 
interviewees. It was my assumption that I might also be introduced to some gatekeepers from 
UKAid, so as to facilitate my entry into DFID for participant observation, a thought that 
proved a mirage for me during my fieldwork.  
 
Soon I realized that I was being ignored by the DFID, by those who were dealing with 
requests like mine, by the policy directors and their subordinate officials. I planned to 
approach a higher authority in DFID. I wanted to make a positive and strong case of 
convincing DFID of the potential benefits of my research to them. In order to do this, I 
obtained a strong recommendation letter from a former ‘senior’ bureaucrat. By virtue of their 
training as an anthropologist, they were quite empathic and co-operating towards my 
research. They kindly wrote a letter for me that underlined the potentials of ethnographic 
knowledge for the ‘learning processes’ for aid institutions, highlighted how it could be 
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helpful for the efficient delivery of development. I sent an email to the head of profession for 
Social Development at DFID followed by the recommendation letter (16/01/2014). I waited 
and waited for a response, but nothing came; not even a one-liner. 
 
Therefore, I devised another strategy I decided to frequent to the Whitehall and Westminster 
area that had DFID building and other buildings like Portcullis house where many key 
development professionals and potential key informants were supposed to find or come for 
their official duties such as giving evidence and presenting their side of testimonies to the 
peoples’ representatives. I frequently visited Whitehall and Westminster, and thus I happened 
to meet a couple of whom I was trying to get hold over regarding the opportunity of 
participant observation in DFID. One of them was Ron. He is what could be described as ‘top 
brass’, the one dealing with  policy and global programmes of DFID, whom I was sending 
emails for months without any reply. I was frustrated, as I wanted to meet him in person for 
more direct communication. However, he did not care to reply my half dozen emails in past. 
Fortunately, I came across Ron in Parliament. When I saw Ron in the corridors of the House 
of Commons, I knew that I had to meet and speak with him no matter what it took. I knew 
that I would have my chance when he was scheduled to provide his evidence in front of the 
parliamentary select committee on International Development. While he was talking in 
Parliament, I found his secretary, who informed me that after the session in parliament he 
would join some signatories in the tearoom. I waited outside the Parliament room for over an 
hour. As soon he finished his evidence, I followed him to the tearoom. After five to six 
minutes of waiting, I smilingly moved towards him formally introducing myself to him while 
shaking his hand. After hearing me say my name, Ron said, ‘Did I meet you earlier’? 
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SB: No probably, I sent you a couple of emails. In addition, that is why my name 
might have sounded familiar to you. I sent a request to you regarding participant 
observation in DFID Office. 
Ron: Oh, yes, I remember now, so how is your research going? What are you doing 
here (he had a slight expression of surprise on his face as he was least expecting me to 
meet there)? 
SB: I was auditing some of the International select committee proceedings as a part of 
my fieldwork. 
Ron: O well done! How can I help? 
SB: I have sent you a couple of emails requesting an internship, but to no avail. I 
would be obliged if I could get the opportunity to do participant observation in DFID 
office. 
Ron: Ummm... what do you want to ‘observe’? 
SB: I wish to study the work culture, communication, interaction, and decisions 
taking activities on policy levels. 
Ron: Oh, well, that is daunting (he laughed). Shrikant, it is very hard to think people 
take decisions in real time. It is very complicated procedure. However, I will speak to 
my office people and see what I can do. I will have to think how we are going to fit 
you into it. Please send me an email refereeing to today’s meeting and I will come 
back to you.  
Ron sounded genuine in his assurance, but I did not feel the convincing pulse and certainty in 
his tone. I requested him again in an earnest tone to consider my case and we parted our 
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separate ways. A couple of things could not escape my observations during our conversation. 
Ron's familiarity with my name proved that his secretary or the related person in reference to 
my request must have approached him. Secondly, although he was right to say about the 
policy ‘decisions' not been taken in real time, through my participant observation I was 
anticipating much larger learning about the work culture of the DFID, he had an idea about. 
His unease to my project ‘participant observation' belied his utterance ‘...though I will speak 
to my  ...people’...I will have to think’. 
 
I sent a reminder email to Ron the next day, referring to our meeting in the parliament. 
Unsurprisingly, it took him a month to reply to me. His private secretary wrote to me on his 
behalf expressing the inability of DFID in offering an internship while unfailingly 
complimenting me with “best wishes” for my future research endeavours. A standard 
expression of courtesy in the wake of any such denial sounded hollow to me that time. 
Nonetheless, at least I got a reply this time. I understood that the office was extremely busy, 
but what was beyond my cognizance was the sheer negligence of a formal inquiry or request 
and the non-accommodating behaviour on the part of the institution. I speculated that this 
may be true of any governmental department, more so with the DFID.  
 
3.5.2 Nobody likes to be observed, not even a ‘goldfish’! 
 
Dan was a former senior civil servant who had served DFID in the past. He now works as an 
independent development consultant with his own consultancy. He is in his late sixties and is 
one of the more outspoken and most cooperative informants I came across during my 
fieldwork. He is a clearly a believer who is committed to the broader cause of global poverty 
92 
 
reduction. He has more than two decades of first-hand experience in UK Aid intervention in 
South Asia.  
Dan and I were sitting on the terrace of Somerset House while sipping our first coffee of the 
day. It was a sunny day, at least during the time we sat there. We were talking about the 
changing work cultures of UK Aid organizations throughout the years. It is then that I 
confided with Dan. I said:  
Dan, my experience with aid bureaucracy has been terrible. What could be the reason 
behind these top brass officials from DFID literally neglected my email requests and 
discouraged my attempts for ‘participant observation’ or sometimes did not even care to 
reply me at all? 
Dan replied:  
Usually ‘we’ tend to keep away from the ‘problematic’ requests so as to discourage the 
applicant in the first place. Hence, we ignore them. Besides our really busy schedule, with 
external meetings, the huge amount of emails we receive works as a handy excuse in such 
cases. Mostly our daily official routine work of senior bureaucrats is divided into inter-
institutional meetings, writing reports, briefing to superiors and receiving briefings from 
junior officers. 
‘But... but... what makes the researchers ‘problematic’?’ I questioned him rather impatiently. 
Dan answered:  
We [bureaucrats] all feel a kind of responsibility towards the institution we work with and 
in the back of our mind; we know we are accountable to the ‘higher ups.’ Especially, 
these day citizens have been questioning the utility of foreign aid and there is a kind of 
unrest among the taxpayers. Ministers and state secretary are quite sensitive to any kind 
of negative publicity. Moreover, you don’t want to expose your office or institution to 
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unwanted scrutiny either by a researcher or by any third party. Nobody wants a problem; 
nobody likes to be observed, not even a goldfish, do you? It is more stressful if it happens 
to be an independent researcher. (He chuckled) 
The self-explanatory Cartoon strip of Gilbert from Ross Eyben’s Oxfam blog pdf:  
Stuff happens 
 
                                                                    (Courtesy from Ross Eyben’s Oxfam blog post28) 
On a similar note, another informant, Ryan, who was then a senior researcher revealed 
another dimension of the potential reasons behind the closed behaviour of DFID. He said this 
behaviour alludes to the “Whitehall factor”. He elaborated: “Becoming a part of Whitehall 
must have caused changes in the organizational culture of DFID.” By “Whitehall factor” he 
meant the kind of closed work culture from the Whitehall area where DFID was relocated. 
Ryan expanded: 
Especially when your office shares space within the area like Whitehall then it becomes 
challenging because the work ethics and culture of such politically strategically intensive 
and powerful workspace encroaches the ways of the new institution. It is kind of 
contagious. You end up emulating the organizational culture from the rest of the area; it 
                                                             
28 Available on : https://oxfamblogs.org/fp2p/stuff-happens-the-risks-of-a-results-agenda-guest-post-from-
rosalind-eyben/ Accessed on: 1/12/2015 
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becomes kind of indirect compulsion. Likewise, the relocation of DFID building in 
political–strategically important surroundings had its serious implication and influence on 
the self-projection of the new office and inadvertently on its inhabitants.   
Recollecting the days before DFID moved to Whitehall area, nostalgically he said:  
Then the ambiance within the DFID office was quite liberal, there was less political and 
less internal pressure on the employees. Nor were there such check mechanisms. People 
can argue and had the liberty to innovate, contribute, and be proactive in their approach 
and activities towards poverty alleviation program. All they have to do is to convince 
their bosses and pose the right arguments. Those were the days of understanding and 
consideration. 
A former senior bureaucrat and eminent development professional consultant, who asked to 
remain anonymous, was quite pragmatic in his approach towards analyzing the cold shoulder 
phenomena by top dogs from the DFID, he said:  
“Inquiries like yours, or potential studies that dig into the past policy phenomenon that is 
linked to present policy shift, there is a good possibility that might picture the incumbent 
or former political actors in black colour. The potential exposition might involve taking 
sides or justifying either former political power or oppose those who are in power. 
Whatever is the outcome this would cause a conflict of interest and goes against the grain 
of vested interest, career wise, institutional responsibility. How do you think the range of 
bureaucracy would react to the scrutiny of the government in power that put the ‘police 
under inquiry’ on the back stove? For instance, I would not like to be identified with my 
(off record) statement in reference to the above- mentioned context as this might ruin my 
relations with Labour or Neo-coalition government, political actors. So what I would do, I 
would not entertain you in the first place.” 
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During my second attempt to get access into DFID a new idea came up, it was suggested by a 
well-wishing former researcher. I proposed to do “shadowing” of the head of Social 
Development in DFID for a period of a week or two. The idea was that I would follow a 
senior DFID bureaucrat observing her official schedule and nature of work. It was a middle 
path between doing two-month long participant observation and doing an interview for a 
couple of hours. It was a promising idea. Accordingly, I drafted an email supported by a 
strong recommendation letter from a senior bureaucrat. In addition, my recommender offered 
to speak on the phone, as she knew the head of social development personally. I sent my first 
email followed by a gentle reminder to the lady after a week.  However, initially I did not get 
a response. However, after two months passed, I received an email that said I could 
“interview” Bella from the Asia division and Indian chapter. I had not asked for this 
particular interview. Nevertheless, I grabbed the opportunity.  
 
During the interview, Bella did not offer much. When I mentioned my request to shadow a 
bureaucrat or policy at DFID, Bella told me she was aware of my request but DFID was not 
comfortable with the idea of me shadowing. She said that the policymaking is a complicated 
procedure that could not be comprehended by shadowing. In addition, Bella hinted towards 
the work pressure on the employees that makes it difficult to accommodate a researcher for 
participant observation. This reflected DFID’s anxiety on giving me access. 
 
Throughout these experiences, I could see patterns of behaviour emerging: ignoring, 
convincing excuses, delaying, and non-communication, a kind of inhibition or unease, 
postponement, the excuse of the busyness of DFID bureaucrats. 
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For one reason or another, DFIDs intention to keep me away was obvious. First the 
‘deliberate cold treatment’ meted to me on the part of DFID (i.e. delays in answering back 
my email or not replying at all); second the so-called reasons of (in) security (?) policies of 
heavily ‘double (security) gated' DFID offices in Whitehall that did not allow ‘outsiders’ in 
the inner premises of DFID. No outsider were allowed inside without being accompanied by 
a DFID attendant (the excuse that was offered to me in the beginning), and therefore not 
having enough human resource to meet my research request. Thirdly, there was a condition 
laid that you need to have an appointment to meet someone from inside every single time.  
 
Even if you get an appointment the ‘insider' mostly preferred to meet you in the sitting 
arrangements in the porch where the sofas were arranged on the left-hand side of the main 
entrance to sit, wait and speak with the outsiders rather than in their office or chamber inside 
the main building. Hence, it could be said that researcher or non-researcher was welcome till 
threshold but prohibited from entering the interior. This displayed a contradiction in terms of 
DFID’s internal policy regarding giving access to outsider researchers. It was like saying, 
“you can come to my home and sit on the porch, but you cannot have the further entry”. The 
porch was the limit of DIFD’s formal conviviality. They seem to be okay with qualitative 
interviews of their officials on their own terms but researchers and non-researchers were 
excluded from entering into the interior of the office building. 
 
During these bouts of failures and successes in acquiring the interviews and access to the 
physical archives and main office of DFID I realized one thing: an aid organization is like 
any other formal bureaucratic organisation.  And like any other big organization it can 
mislead the researcher into assuming it is more of a closed system, hence difficult to know, 
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but it may be as easy or as difficult to know as any other kind of organization or social 
system (Eyben 2005:2). During my interviews with a couple of researchers who tried to study 
large organizations like the World Bank and DFID, I found their experience identical with 
mine. These institutions behaved in similar ways with them as well. I would not use the word 
‘lucky’ however, some of them were quite creative and resourceful in their approach 
probably due to their earlier acquaintances and familiarity with the institutions under study.  
 
3.5.3 The satellite ‘think tanks’ 
 
In the aftermath of bitter disappointment from DFID, I started searching for significant 
alternative venues for participant observation. I was looking for an institution that could 
enable me to study the multifarious contexts of policy and its related processes in an aid 
organization. After brainstorming and discussion with a senior researcher, I selected one of 
the top London based UK aid think-tanks. I was told that this think tank encourages 
researchers and supports intellectual engagements with policy research. This think tank is 
well known for its research in development that has influenced the policies and practices of 
the DFID.  
 
I chose to contact this particular think tank because they were already conducting an 
independent research project on the policy processes. I emailed Sandy, the director of policy 
and research. He was a trained anthropologist himself and had been in various positions in the 
World Bank and DFID prior to joining this think tank. The career trajectories of many of its 
employees were characterized by their flow in and out of the DFID, World Bank, and other 
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prominent aid institutions. Later on, I realized that this is one of the important characteristics 
of the career course of most of the people working in the aid industry. 
 
I did not want to miss this chance, so I secured a recommendation letter to send Sandy from a 
top social development entrepreneur and a seasoned development practitioner called John.  
John is a senior and seasoned development practitioner who is well known among 
development circles for his straightforward and terse style of communication. Importantly, 
John was a close acquaintance and former colleague of the director of the abovementioned 
think tank. I wished to seek help in conducting participant observation. Yet it took me two 
months to get a proper interview with Sandy. Despite an agreed appointment, once Sandy's 
emergency medical appointment cropped up and another time his personal assistant went on 
his annual leave without organizing our next appointment. Sandy's personal assistant, Robin, 
was a peculiar character, seemingly busier than his own superior was. He had an unusual way 
of communicating the message. First, he will confirm the appointment and then send me an 
email at the last minute telling me about the exigency or change in plan. If I call him, he 
would not pick up the phone but will email me for sure. I had no way to understand whether 
it was mismanagement or an avoiding technique to discourage my advances in the first place. 
It was frustrating. 
 
Anyway, at last, the perseverance paid off and I got to speak to Sandy. Sandy sounded quite 
cheerful and was an articulate person. He inquired about my research agenda in a way one 
wants to confirm what was heard or known about me. In a friendly way, he also asked me 
about my supervisors and told me about his when he himself was a doctoral student once. 
Thereafter, he directly addressed the topic of participation observation. In his opinion the 
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orthodox participant observation would not really work in present building the institution was 
housed in, ‘People are busy and we also don’t really own much common space in the down 
time,’ he said. He informed me that ‘most of the researchers work here 10 hours a day and 
they have only a coffee machine. It’s not the place you can work around’ he informed me. He 
expressed his concern: “It’s more of a contract driven delivery organization, so I can’t 
imagine how you would conduct participant observation.” Sandy suggested:  
You can do the qualitative interviews and people are happy about that. But orthodox 
participant observation, to be honest, would be a waste of time. You will spend an awful 
amount of time looking at people and going up and down in the building. 
This friendly warning was a kind of implied denial but not fully. I reiterated earnestly about 
the importance of the ethnographic touch essential for my research and requested for some 
way out. I appealed to him indirectly in the name of our disciplinary solidarity. After a while, 
he came up with the middle solution. He informed me that there are two teams working on 
two different projects at the time. He suggested that I send an email explaining my research 
interests with a CV attached so that he can include me in with one of the most relevant teams 
as an intern. Sandy said, being an intern and working as a part of it will give me an 
opportunity to understand the ‘know how' of the work and office culture more than just 
through being a passive observer. And he was right. In addition, he warned me, “I will have 
to ask the teams that if they are comfortable with this arrangement. If not, I won’t be able to 
help.” I agreed and promised him to do as he directed and we concluded with parting thanks. 
 
The following day I drafted an email with an updated CV attached and sent it to Sandy. Ten 
days passed but there was no reply. I sent him a reminder and still received no reply. A month 
passed, I sent him another reminder, but no response again. I enquired with his personal 
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assistant, but he was quite too. The second month passed, followed by a kind reminder to no 
avail. Once again, I was left at bay without any recourse to knowing any confirmed outcome 
but a bunch of possibilities. However, taking the cue from Sandy's words the near most 
possibilities hinted towards the potential ‘unease' or ‘disapproval' on the part of the research 
teams. Even the second option suggested by Sandy about the qualitative interviews was to no 
avail. I contacted the relevant leading members of the team individually. Although they were 
kind enough to reply me and I even spoke to one of them, the meetings or interviews never 
materialized: the same lame excuses, the same neglect and delays –an implicit exclusion of 
an outsider researcher. A retrospective perusal of a related email correspondence and notes 
taken indicate that the work pressure, overall reluctance to be part of research other than their 
own (despite the common research interest) and a kind of apathy towards young researchers 
might have been responsible. Interestingly enough, these teams constituted mostly by the 
development researchers who were trained in anthropology and other social sciences.  
 
 I witnessed two extremes of collaboration and exclusion between policy entrepreneurs and 
think tank researchers who also happened to be social scientists themselves. On one hand, my 
entry into the core networks and introduction to prominent key informants was facilitated by 
‘activist-anthropologists’ and, on the other hand, some of my own disciplinary kin from 
development think tank were not happy in accommodating or collaborating with me. 
Probably the ‘anthropological gazers’ from ‘a contract driven delivery’ aid think tank were 
not comfortable with the idea of themselves to be under the ‘anthropological gaze’. Perhaps 
they just did not want to share their take on ‘our’ common disciplinary grounds. As I 
mentioned above, probably ‘word of mouth’ about me was reaching quicker than my email. 
However, my exclusion had thinner and subtle connotations than obvious reasons. 
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In reference to the ‘ignoring' by the above-mentioned think tank, a senior civil servant Bill, 
now based in Thailand, commented:  
These think tanks are like a satellite of dominant aid institutions and UK Aid. They 
revolve around it tethered with the unseen cords of ‘intertwined’ ‘internal and 
international policies’ and policy networks at any given time.  
On the one hand, the recommendations and observations by Harry Jones and Mendizabel’s 
(2010) in their report on ‘DFID ‘s learning from its allies, does talk about DFID’s formal ties 
with ODI. However, on the other hand, ODI claims to be an independent think tank on issues 
of international development.  This reminded me of the words of a pioneering policy analyst I 
met in the past, who hinted towards the phenomenon of strategic political and physical 
proximity of the office and internal policy deliberately maintained by the London think tank 
with the main institutions of UK Aid like DFID. Another characteristic being the movement 
of the bureaucrats, policy makers and development practitioners from one aid institution to 
another and back. For instance, many of my high profile informants and former employees of 
DFID had worked in World Bank, and then in DFID and other times in one of the top think-
tank or vice-versa. On the one hand, the movement of these officials could be seen as part of 
their career trajectory, but it actually results in widening of the networks. Moreover, it 
facilitates the creation of new networks or interest groups, inter-institutional interaction and 
cross-pollination of ideas across the range of institutions (elaborated in Chapter 4, section I). 
On the other hand, this explains the correlation and the reasons behind the similar pattern of 
behaviour meted to me by politicians, DFID, and its satellite think tank. A few more 
informants with little difference in other contexts repeated the patterns of rejection and the 
reasons thereof discussed above during my fieldwork (Informants: Ray, Bill, David, Neil, and 
Harris). 
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3.6   Reluctant civil servants and porous organizations 
 
In the context of my research that sought to look into policy processes within DFID, the 
political influence of coalition government led by the Conservative Party was weighing 
heavy. New rules brought in new policies and new terminologies. Out of the dislike for the 
Labour political ideology, the conceptual frameworks, and policy terms used by Labour in 
DFID were also changed or replaced. This was augmented by the change in time and 
relocation of the workplace to the heart of Whitehall, which resulted in a change in the 
organizational dynamics of the DFID. Despite its autonomous status, DFID was now 
considerably circumscribed putting its employees under pressure through various check 
mechanisms like inter-institutional performance checks, public accountability, mandatory 
briefing, internal reporting as well as reporting and evidence sessions before parliamentary 
select committees. Now the dominant theme within the  UK aids sphere and its efforts to 
eliminate the world poverty was ‘value for money(aid)’ so the issue of accountability or 
getting value for each and every penny of UK aid was hanging on the head of the entire DFID 
bureaucracy ( based on discussion and information noted during fieldwork). 
 
 It is in the light of above political changes and developments the following section has to be 
understood. My ‘non-interviews’ were conducted with a range of DFID bureaucrats, 
politicians, and development professionals.  Here by ‘non-interviews' I mean the interviews 
those I could not get to conduct due to various reasons. I have included the most relevant 
representative examples. This section will elaborate on the information on the potential 
reasons behind ‘not getting' to do the interviews.   
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3.6.1 We are talking, but I am not speaking to you! 
 
I was speaking with Linda Janson, a DFID bureaucrat in a quiet corner of a cafe in the crypt 
of Saint James Church in Piccadilly, London. ‘This is not a formal interview, you know? This 
is an off-record conversation… we are talking, but I am not speaking to you', Linda chuckled. 
‘You are right,' she said, ‘the researcher-friendly and creative work culture of DFID is no 
more; it is now a closed and inaccessible organization’. Linda expressed her concern:  
It is not ‘international aid organization’ anymore; it has become an ‘aid corporation’ 
nowadays. Now ‘we’ mean serious business, we mean ‘value for money’. You know what 
I mean. This may change with the change in power, for better or worse. Of course, even 
before, it (DFID) has its own reservations, but it had more freedom and less restriction. 
We had liberties and more room for expression of ideas and we all knew it, including our 
superiors. Now we are all under tremendous pressure, work wise, you know! We are 
accountable to our instant boss as well as to the ministers of our department. Therefore, 
when you are working in such ‘tight’ conditions you tend to be in good terms with your 
(all) bosses, you do not take risks. You do not accept challenges. You feel ‘more’ 
responsible for your own long-term ‘professional progress. Moreover, you don’t do not 
give ‘interviews’ you know what I mean? (Fieldwork informant)   
Linda’s account resonates with the sentiments of several other key informants I interviewed. 
It was more reflected in the language of DFID under Conservative rule. The language of 
‘value for money’, ‘making every penny count’, ‘making sure every penny is well spent’,  
‘the value of the each penny paid by English taxpayer'   in the name of global development 
and poverty alleviation.   This change was reflected more into the common language in its 
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essence with the policy shift in DFID coalition government
29
 (DFID 2011: 4) and later under 
sole Conservative rule
30
  (DFID 2015: 9). 
  
3.6.2   ‘A’ political Jim 
 
Jim was a policy and propaganda director at an international development organization. 
Always meticulously dressed like any showman or TV presenter, he had a streak of an ‘actor’ 
or ‘skilled stage presenter’ about him. The nature of his job made him mostly travel away 
from his office either teaming up for charity campaigns or collaborating with other aid 
organizations on policy-related issues all over the world. A former social development 
advisor introduced me to Jim by virtue of their fieldwork together in India when Jim was 
working with DFID. Although she referred me to Jim, she intimated me about his self-centred 
character and least enthusiasm for change or challenge when it comes to going out of the way 
for ‘getting things done’. She said:  
We have some colleague those who love the 10 to 5 nature of the job. They like media 
exposure and authority they get to strut in developing countries by the virtue of their job 
more rather than the essence of it. He is one of those ‘professionals’. 
Jim's personal assistant Tina was corresponding with me on his behalf. In answer to my first 
email seeking an interview with Jim, Tina explained about his tight schedule and assured me 
that he would reply soon. In the second email, she asked me to give her some more 
information about the focus of my research, the type of questions so that Jim can go through 
                                                             
29 Available on: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/67584/BAR-
MAR-summary-document-web.pdf, Accessed on: 12/11/2015 
30 Available on: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/478834/ODA_strategy_final_we
b_0905.pdf , Accessed on 12/11/2015  Accessed on : 12/11/2015 
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it prior to the interview with me. Therefore, I sent her the information needed, consent forms, 
and waited for her reply. Tina replied to me after two weeks saying that Jim is going through 
the material sent by me and as soon as she gets his reply, she will let me know. After a week 
or two, I received another email from Tina. She informed me that Jim thinks ‘he would not be  
able to shed any light on the policy related question, the probe that seeks to know about the 
political dimensions of his involvement and side tracking of the social exclusion policy', 
which implied that I will have to move on. I replied positively with an explanation on the 
practice of ‘anonymity' of informants, researchers have to maintain and hence, even if Jim 
shares something I would not be disclosing his identity or publish anything without his 
consent that would harm him. However, as it was reflected from their last reply that Tina and 
Jim were not convinced. Probably they made up their mind. I received an email from Tina 
after a month seeking apologies for Jim’s inability in finding time to meet me due to his 
‘immense’ pressure of work. Nevertheless, they did not forget to wish me luck for my 
research endeavours (From fieldwork data). 
 
3.6.3 ‘Busy’ consultant Gail Featherstone 
 
Gail was another key informant/interviewee on my list whom I could not interview or speak 
to. She is a former civil servant, currently working as an independent development consultant 
and an innovative thinker. Moreover, she was commissioned to write an evaluation report on 
a key policy framework of the UK Aid in the past. This made her quite relevant interviewee 
for my research project. Hence, I was searching for her. However, after she left the civil 
services and started her own consultancy I could not find her whereabouts. In the first place, I 
could not get a hold of her current contact details. All those available contacts online were 
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defunct or not in use. In this situation, one of our common friends who herself is development 
professional came to help.  She had her personal email id. After a couple of emails, Gail 
replied to me, ‘Sorry!  My (consultancy) work in recent times has been much more gender 
specific and less on wider social exclusion, apart from the obvious overlaps. Please accept my 
apologies!’  I was persistent. I emailed her back. I said ‘I do understand your situation, but I 
would be immensely grateful if you could please spare some of your valuable time even 
discussing the overlaps of topics’. The reply came:  
 
This is coming at a really bad time for me. I have returned from leave, have a huge 
backlog, and need to prepare for a field trip in 10 days. Therefore, unless you can wait 
until mid-November, I’m afraid I just will not have time to engage.   
 
I said to myself, ‘Well, I won’t mind. I will wait till November’. November arrived and I sent 
a reminder email to Gail. However, we were not ‘destined’ to meet. Probably my email 
reminders were lost in her ‘super-busy’ schedule. Alternatively, avoiding the interview was a 
necessary kill from her ‘priorities’ point of view. 
 
Months later during an ‘off-record’ discussion with a common friend Peter (a former DFID 
bureaucrat) I come to know that it was a deliberate ‘pragmatic’ move on the part of Gail. She 
did not want to involve into the social exclusion chapter again. She did not want to mess up 
her relationship with the present government or DFID as speaking too critically would have 
alarmed her colleagues and prospective employers who played a critical role during the ebb 
of the policy under scrutiny. Her involvement with the current government as a consultant 
commissioned to work on gender issues in the conflict-ridden areas placed her in the wrong 
position to discuss the role of the present government in sidetracking the relevant policy 
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themes and effective frameworks like social exclusion from the broader UK Aid policies to 
which she was the witness.  Gail is a full-time independent development consultant. ‘A lady 
with a chequered career spanning nearly two decades in development industry behind her, 
‘she knows her moves' Peter reflected. ‘She is a creative development practitioner with a 
wide network of good acquaintances all over and she knows how to maintain them’. ‘All 
over, you mean?  I asked, ‘I mean all over, from Downing Street to DFID, and the World 
Bank to European aid organizations’ Peter informed me. This was the reason she was not 
comfortable in agreeing to an interview from the start (Informant Peter). 
 
3.6.4 ‘Non interviewing’ the politicians 
 
Pierson (1993) in his collective review of three monographs on policy, feedback, and political 
change argues that ‘policy produce the politics, and it is not the other way around' (1993: 
595). Quoting E.E. Schattschneider, Pierson remarks that, ‘new policies create a new politics, 
the policy is not the result of political forces' (ibid). 
 
The point I am trying to make here is the inevitable role of political actors and their 
engagement with the rest of the bureaucracy in implementing or underplaying policy themes 
and policy frameworks favoured by leading political parties. However, policy or I in no way 
mean to say that there is no room for manoeuvres and mutual influencing of various 
stakeholders and actors involved that shape the eventual policy product processes. I am just 
trying to underline the importance of political actors, and personal and professional factors in 
the policy processes. 
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In the following section, I am going to narrate my experiences with political actors while 
attempting to obtain their interviews. This will shed light on why I decided to pursue them 
and what was their response to my research endeavour. Overall, I tried to contact four 
politicians in the course of my fieldwork. My selection criteria were based on the direct or 
indirect involvement of these political actors with the life course of social exclusion 
framework and related policy processes in DFID and beyond. I was particularly interested in 
their collaborative efforts with DFID actors towards implementation or rejection of the 
above-mentioned policy framework. I was interested in looking at informal efforts and ad hoc 
teams, which form across networks beyond their immediate working spheres when the 
objectives and topic of interest coincide.  
 
3.6.5 The gentleman MP and the league of yeomen 
 
I was following a former Labour MP due to his prolonged involvement with the Department 
for International Development by the virtue of positions held during the timeline of my 
research topic i.e. the life cycle of the Social Exclusion Policy in DFID. I thought if time 
permits, I should conduct an oral history interview with him.  Not only because he was 
holding key positions in the Department of International Development at the time, but he also 
had played an important role in raising questions and political lobbying in British Parliament 
for the policy on  implementation of social exclusion as a DFID policy theme to reduce 
international poverty (informant Marlyn). 
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I found his contact details on his personal website. However, I could not contact him online 
as I did not belong to his constituency. Hence, I decided to call him on the telephone number 
provided. Out of two landline options, I chose the Westminster line that guaranteed my 
access to them.  On the phone, it was suggested by the attendant on the other side to write an 
email explaining my research topic and intention. I emailed them accordingly stating my 
intentions along with a brief introduction to my research topic. The next day I got an abrupt 
reply from the parliamentary assistant to the MP, ‘expressing regrets and seeking apologies 
due to ‘packed diary‘. 
 
With due modesty, I replied ‘I wonder if there are any possibilities of appointment in the next 
or next to next month. I would be obliged to have this appointment, even if it is after six 
months as I have just started my fieldwork'. Within five minutes of my email, I received an 
answer: ‘Apologies, XYZ'. This was one of the most unexpected and most ‘terse' replies I 
have ever received. 
 
After what I was told about the yeoman's service of this MP towards the cause of global 
poverty alleviation, even if it was in a limited way - I was expecting not only a positive 
response but also at least half an hour interview from him. As per my information, it was 
during his third term as Minister and Secretary of State for International Development the 
above-mentioned MP aided by his Undersecretary teamed up with a senior bureaucrat from 
DFID to mobilize resources in support of tackling social exclusion, the main impediment in 
the achieving of MDGs (Millennium Development Goals). This gentleman was not ready to 
entertain me at all and indeed Harris was a ‘gentleman' MP well known for his own keenness 
towards the maintenance of his ‘good' political image as well as his ‘good' relations with 
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opposition party MPs. As per an off-record conversation with an insider, ‘the reason behind 
his reluctance in giving me audience or the interview was somewhere in his cautionary 
measures and his amiable ‘political' personality' that stopped him providing any information 
about his political opponents. He was not willing to give away any information about his 
involvement in the abovementioned feat or against his fellow politicians from the opposition 
or their party's political participation in sidetracking the Social Exclusion Policy.  This 
reminded me of a second email I sent to Harris about my potential interview questions. My 
questions were focused on as/symmetries of colonial legacies in the personal and professional 
lives of those dealing with the development industry and the reasons and roles of a new 
government in the scrapping of the ‘well functioning' international development policies 
launched by the Labour government and his particular take on it.  
 
3.6.5 Sam Sayer a politician with a social conscience 
 
Sam was another MP who implicitly denied me an interview.  His classic act of ‘activism’ of 
lobbying for the cause of the global poor in British Parliament on behalf of DFID made him 
of interest to my research. His personal initiative in coordinating with a senior social 
development practitioner from DFID and proactively achieving the success would have been 
a star example of my main thesis. As per my informant, ‘he was the man of profound social 
and moral conscience’ (informant Marlyn).  But to my dismay, he showed reluctance in 
meeting with me or even giving me any kind of lead in a telephonic interview. He wanted to 
avoid me by giving the excuse of his extremely busy schedule despite my flexibility about 
time convenient to him. Most probably, the reasons behind his denial were the same as that of 
MP Harris. Both of them were professional politicians quite engrossed in active politics. Both 
were uninterested or unwilling to help a research student at the cost of spilling the beans, 
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which could go against their personal and professional interests as well as the party interests.  
There is no doubt that they had an ‘activist- ideological' dimension in their personality, which 
we can derive from their ‘noble action' in parliament (informant Marlyn). Probably, because 
of ‘some kind political or commonsensical code of behaviour' they did not want even 
positively to be recognized for their yeoman service (an off-record conversation with an 
informant). 
 
3.7 Discussion 
The challenges in researching aid organizations are characterized by the positionality, 
relationships, power and educational status of the researcher, which often limits the extent of 
their entry and access to aid organizations and insiders (Eyben 2005:1). For the  researcher, it 
is important to consider both what they want to know and  why they want to know, as this 
might bring them into touch with both those who are too protective of the inner working (of 
the organizations) or those who are the champions of change in the organizations (Crewe and 
Young 2002:7). While researchers in academia and NGOs often see themselves as 
championing radical causes, staff within bureaucracies tend to resist fundamental challenges 
to the status quo (Buchnan-Smith 2003:3, Crewe and Young 2002:7). However, as Eyben 
(2005:3) observed, and I have experienced during my fieldwork, this can cause internal 
complexity as "good relations with one set of actors might be detrimental to securing access 
to another set”, which often results in implicit refusal to access or rejections of any initiative 
by researcher. On the one hand, the administrative and political power invested into the aid 
institutions may overwhelm the researcher. On the other hand, their position of power and 
their research aim can give them an advantage over the organization under research. With 
112 
 
men dominating aid organization, most policymaking structures leave different degrees of 
room for manoeuvre (Crewe 2014). 
 
 An overview of the above chapter underlines range of potential analytical engagements with 
the exclusion meted by its staff or gatekeepers while allowing the research cooperation and 
the implicit rejections of participant observation and denial of interviews. In the light of 
circumstantial development and potential explanations of the behaviour of the institutions 
determined by their individuals, we can underline the roles of formal and informal networks, 
or the comparative cost (risks) or the stakes involved, work pressure and overarching 
institutional policies towards the outsider researcher. Here I would like us to bear in mind 
what Douglas said (1987:9), that “institutions are not living beings, but are inhabited and run 
by human beings”. Hence, when I say institutions, I mean the people who are dictated by the 
political and economic ideas entrenched with organizational objectives and philosophies. In 
addition, those political and economic ideas, in turn, have their origins in the social, political 
and economic values internalized by individuals who create those institutions or work within 
the organizations. 
 
The reasons behind the above-mentioned exclusion can be divided into two categories. The 
first includes the face value of excuses offered and the related actions of the reluctant non-
interviewees. The colleague and counterparts of the aid workers who denied me interviews 
elucidated the second reason.  Whereas,  the excuses offered by the former indicate the 
‘formal' or ‘political correct' way of behaviour in everyday social life, the latter later hints 
towards various factors such as institutional pressure, fear of political repercussions and 
potential adverse effects on the personal stake.    
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 A noticeable shift was observed in the entire liberal mood of the DFID work culture as an 
organization, transitioning from relatively open to a closed institution, which is reflected in 
the institutional approach of DFID. This is also shown in the behaviour of the hierarchy of 
bureaucrats in the wake of my endeavours to get access to DFID as well as in a major think 
tank. Moreover, it was visible in the circumscribed movements and actions of its employees 
and consultants who were under constant check and work pressure that hinted towards the 
reason behind the reluctance of the non-interviewees (especially those who insisted on 
keeping their conversation off the record). 
 
Conversely, their counterparts and former colleagues, who candidly spoke to me, were not 
under the obligations of bureaucratic bounds or responsibility. They were relatively free from 
any fear of backlash or picking-up by the political establishment. This strength or freedom 
could be attributed to their retirement status as well as the strength they have gained through 
their pragmatic insights about the inner working of the development industry. This sentiment 
was lacking in many of those who denied me an interview and who were in the middle of 
their careers as development practitioners. Many of them were working independently as 
development consultants. Although many activists-bureaucrats or consultants had vested 
interests between DFID and the government, they also held the conviction that this kind of 
information or research was complimentary for effective policy practices and learning 
processes of DFID. They suggested that it would eventually enhance the efficiency in 
development intervention in the general.  
 
The non-interviews by politicians show us their perception of and tendencies towards 
politically correct behaviour. As the maxim goes, “in politics there are no permanent enemies 
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and no permanent friends.” By avoiding me, they were avoiding any potential controversy or 
unease. It also indicated mistrust towards young researchers who might be an academic 
maverick trying to carve a niche for themselves. It might be said that, as the Labour party was 
in opposition, any information that might go against the Conservative should benefit the 
Labour’s claim of giving more efficient government and policies. However, an off-record 
discussion with an insider who was a private assistant to the top brass of DFID told me, 
“there is nothing like policy shift, it’s just changing the bottle with same old wine inside”. An 
informant who was previously a senior bureaucrat at the DFID further confirmed this. 
 
The behaviour of my informants who were mostly development professionals and aid 
bureaucrats, cannot just be understood alone by their busy schedules, organizational culture, 
work-pressure, intensive check mechanisms within the organization, or influence of politics 
in the center. Their behaviour also had strong underpinnings of self-interest, professional 
survival strategies, or instincts, and cautionary behaviour that springs out of calculated 
guesses in the competitive workspace. Hence, it could be concluded that the self-interest 
driven priorities that ensured one’s future professional gains were one of the prominent 
reasons behind the avoidance of interviews with me. The phenomenon of cooperation among 
development practitioners trained in anthropology and researchers with a social science 
background in my research could be analyzed in the following way. The activist 
anthropologists, development practitioners and policy makers or bureaucrats could be divided 
into three groups. First, are those who are in office and still co-operated, second are those 
who were not in the office and co-operated and third who were in office and were unwilling 
to cooperate. The interviewees belonging to the first category were what could be termed as 
an activist anthropologist/sociologist type of policy entrepreneurs. The interviewees 
belonging to the second category were those who had not stake or no fear whatsoever from 
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the establishment or the institution they once worked with. Those who were in office and did 
not co-operate did so sometimes due to their work pressure, and sometimes, to avoid any 
complications in the wake of their sharing information as their stakes of income as the 
government consultant, politicians and civil servants involved were much bigger than their 
commitment to research.  Some informants denied me interviews and they did so out of fear 
of potential backlash or simply to stay away from any potential controversy.  
 
******* 
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Chapter 4   How do the (aid) policy themes evolve ? 
  
‘beyond a focus on planning, agencies and governmental or non-governmental interventions, 
planistrators and peasants, there lies the whole field of policy which does not emanate from 
such agencies, and is unlikely to be written in policy documents of the type used by such 
agencies, and has altogether different boundary conditions.’ 
                                                                                                              -Apthorpe (1996b:166) 
 
Section I.  The progression of social exclusion policy framework: 
 A case study 
 
 
4.1 Policy in the ‘air’   
 
Following my rather naive question in the flow of discussion, "where do the policy ideas 
come from?" Rebecca (informant) raised her head and pretended to sniff in the air. She 
smilingly replied, "They are in the air, they are all over. The policy ideas come from the air.” 
Puzzled, I asked her, “What do you mean by ‘in the air’?” She answered, “Policy themes and 
ideas are all around us. They are in print media, electronic media, academia, conferences, 
workshops, market, day to day life; they are everywhere, you name it.” Rebecca was quite 
right about the mundane origin of ideas, in general, and, policy ideas, in particular, prior to 
117 
 
attaining the glamour or buzz in the development industry. Production or initiation of the 
policy ideas is not limited to the sphere of politicians or policymakers. 
 
However, as Peirson (1993:8) states it, policies are not merely the product of politics; they 
also produce politics, which, in a circuitous manner, are manifested through policies. Policy 
themes and policy ideas are converted into analytical or conceptual frameworks before being 
developed into formal agendas. Hence, policy themes or policy frameworks could be called 
‘conductors of policies’. Most likely policy themes and policy ideas can be compared to 
pollen grains; some floating in the atmosphere, some stuck to the feet of bees, birds, and 
some into and on the back of flowers, leaves, and blowing in the wind stream. Pursuing this 
analogy, we can say that like pollen, policy ideas too float into the social, religious, and 
political spheres, literally every walk of human life. Print media and electronic media are the 
main catalysts that widen and intensify the movement of these grains of policy ideas, which 
may be cross-pollinated, transported, and communicated by a range of individuals, networks 
that themselves are affected by ideological, political, and economic factors (based on 
discussion with informants Rebecca & Marlyn). It is like Arjun Appadurai's (1998) notion of 
the ‘social life of things'. Here, we are considering the journey of ideas, and how these ideas 
become an entity due to various external and underlying factors. Obviously, many ideas may 
coalesce to produce a thing, such as a framework or a policy, and there are several narratives 
of these journeys.   
 
In this dissertation, the main points I focus on are based on the evidence available in reports, 
the literature and from my informants – from French to a wider European context, to the 
more localized context of the UK and DFID (Department for International Development), 
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ending with a more global remit. It will be made clear that policies do not evolve in a 
systematic or linear way, such as (i) identification of problems, (ii) brainstorming, (iii) 
planning to tackle the problem, (iv) finding solutions, or working out the solution (Shore and 
Wright 1997:12). The evolution of a policy could be said to be a series of the unpredictable 
and unpremeditated journey of ideas and concepts originating from mostly unpredictable 
sources. Neither do the policy themes originate from systematic official-bureaucratic mode of 
production characterized by the top-bottom flow of ideas and order that culminate into final 
policy product. However, there are multiple undocumented policy processes in action, which 
are never spoken or written about in policy literature. This chapter highlights those unofficial 
processes through the case study of ‘social exclusion policy framework, by looking at the 
undocumented policy practices that shaped the ‘social exclusion policy framework’ from its 
origin as conceptual analytical tool to assess ‘new form of poverty’. 
 
The evolution of the social exclusion framework (SEF) in DFID is no exception to this. This 
chapter is based on oral history and semi-structured interviews as well as my archival 
research conducted in the IDS archives, an online repository of DFID documents, discussion, 
and correspondence with a French micro-economist along with contemporary civil servants 
from DFID regarding the origin and evolution of the social exclusion framework. 
 
The concept of social exclusion as an analytical framework was adopted by DFID so as to 
understand the underlying reasons beneath the failures to reduce chronic poverty from 
developing countries despite decades of development intervention. Tackling social exclusion 
was considered an essential first step so as to reduce poverty and remove the significant 
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obstacles hampering the achievement of MDGs (Millennium Development Goals) 
(Informants Bella, Marlyn, Rebecca, Gaynor and Watson 2007). 
 
 I have divided this chapter into two main sections. The first section describes and discusses 
the evolution or life course of social exclusion as a policy idea culminating in an aid policy 
framework and later undergoing dramatic contextual change. The second section highlights 
the process of framing and de-framing of social exclusion as conceptual-analytical 
framework in various institutions and under myriad actors. The reason behind dividing this 
chapter into two sections was essential to conjoin the two logical and intertwined steps that 
almost every policy framework undergoes. These steps that evolve in real life policy 
progression and process of policy re-framing are explained and described in this chapter. As 
the aforementioned exercise warranted elaboration and space, hence I decided to split them 
into section I and II to keep the consistency and follow the research storyline.  
 
Therefore, the first section sketches the evolution of the social exclusion framework while 
underlining various twists and turns it took during the journey from a remote countryside 
parish of France to the corridors of UK aid and international development. The following part 
deals with the origin of this idea in the small French parish while tracking its role in the 
European Commission's endeavour to analyze the causes and concept of poverty ‘a new'. The 
second subdivision of this will highlight it with an introduction to the heart of British power 
in Downing Street by the way of electoral politics, followed by its entry into WDR (World 
Bank Report) 2000 eventually ending in DFID. However, the non-linearity of SEFs 
progression and its conceptual evolution shaped, influenced, and appended by a multitude of 
actors and factors makes it more dramatic journey for this policy framework. This 
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documentation rather than remaining a mere description of the life cycle of a conceptual 
framework of policy helps to see  and deconstruct the dominant discourse of top-down policy 
implementation or the presumed monolithic nature of development industry from a realistic 
angle. Moreover, the practices that produce policies will reveal the evolution of policy 
framework under study. This research will show how policy ideas are adopted from the wider 
social-political milieu later to be reproduced and evolved at the hands of policy practitioners 
rather than some political or bureaucratic caucus. 
 
4.2. A brief history of social exclusion as conceptual framework (SEF)  
4.2.1. The context of the policy 
 
I will provide a brief survey of the conceptual origin of SEF and its entry into the environs of 
Downing Street. The survey will offer insight into the dramatic journey of this celebrated 
idea that, like many others, has its origins in social movement sprang from uncommon 
endeavours of common people in everyday life rather than simply the initiative of a 
bureaucrat sitting in an office. Moreover, this section will map the life course of the social 
exclusion policy framework in DFID and its international policy context of development 
endeavour to reduce poverty. 
 
My first impression of ‘social exclusion’ as an analytical term in the context of DFID’s 
international development intervention was quite simplistic yet logical. I assumed that SEF 
was specifically devised by DFID to address the social handicaps and marginalization faced 
by communities who are subjected to caste, religious discrimination, and stigma. My 
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perception was based on my personal background as an anti-caste activist and a member of 
the community conventionally considered one of the lowest social rung in the traditional 
Indian social hierarchy. However, as I started going deeper into my exploratory research 
about social exclusion policy in general and in the DFID in particular, entirely different 
picture of the conceptual evolution emerged, offering quite an exemplary sight of how a 
policy idea come into being. The gradual development of this idea, called social exclusion, is 
constituted of individual efforts of committed individuals with conviction in their ideologies, 
visionary politicians; awaken academics, self-motivated development practitioners, activist-
social scientists, and people who want to make a difference in day-to-day lives of the poor. 
 
4.2.2 From the humble parish in France 
 
The unilateral or linear propagation of a policy idea or framework that dominates the 
common perception of policies in general and development policies employed by certain aid 
institutions, in particular, is very misleading (Sutton 1999:9, Jones 2009:11). Such a 
perspective often shows us the tip of the iceberg, concealing a lengthy past and the 
tumultuous forces underlying the policy process. These processes could be termed as 
pollination and cross-pollination of ideas, grafting and implanting of concepts, and their 
adaptation and reformulation in socio-culturally distinct contexts. The journey of social 
exclusion is one of them. Usually, the credit of the concept ‘Les Exclus' (Excluded) is 
attributed to a French politician Rene Lenoir, who wrote a report on social policy Les Exclus: 
Un Francais sur Dix (Excluded : One French in Ten) while he was Secrétaire d’Etat a 
l’Action Sociale of the Chirac Government in France. However, the actual father of this 
concept who inspired Rene was a Polish priest who used this word for his parishioners 
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excluded from the social mainstream due to various issues. The original concept of social 
exclusion was part of ATD (literally mean All together for dignity) Quart Monde (Fourth 
World or Fourth Estate
31
), an anti-poverty association started by a Polish priest, Father 
Wresinski, in 1957 with destitute families camped in a small impoverished French parish, 
Noisy-le-Grand. This project transmuted into Church based projects for the marginalized 
communities later to become known as Mouvement International ATD
32
 Quart Monde
33
. The 
citation of Rene Lenor in this section is in reference to the context of his abovementioned 
report, written in 1974, as this is the first formalized or documented use of this term and thus 
could be seen as the formal source of ‘social exclusion’ as a concept. 
  
French General Planning Commission (Commissariat general du Plan) published a number of 
studies in 1992 and 1993, engaging with the phenomenon of exclusion and social exclusion 
(Castillo 1994:614). The current Planning Commissioner, Jean-Baptiste de Foucauld 
influenced social exclusion and several other policies in post-1960s France (Silver 1994:533).  
Moreover, Foucauld exerted enormous sway on the constitution of France and the post-1960s 
social and political movements in France. Michael Foucault’s critical, analytical exposition of 
culture, religion, historical-political and social institutions from France and Europe along 
with other theorists (Peters and Besley 2014:101-4) ushered what could be described as the 
postmodern era. Foucault spoke about and analyzed the phenomenon of the social construct 
that later Bourdieu talked about in terms of symbolic violence (Silver 1994:538). The 
conceptual formulation of social exclusion that talks about non-economic dimensions of 
deprivation owe a lot to the Foucauldian analysis of class, state, church, its mechanism and 
                                                             
31 On the lines of First estate, Second estate and Third estate. The terms used during the French revolution.  
32 ATD stands for All together for Dignity 
33Available on  http://www.atd-quartmonde.org/ATD-Quart-Monde-la-memoire-des.html,  Accessed on : 
12/08/2014 
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myriad ways of operations through language, text, and discourses (Burchell et al 1991). 
These philosophical and theoretical contexts, lead by the ideas of Foucault, of the social 
exclusion concept was in many ways the outcome of the original French belief in the 
republican social contract. The idea of the social contract was based on the French notion of 
solidarity that compelled policy makers and contemporary politicians develop a response to 
the economic, social, and political crises in the 1980s in France as well as in other European 
countries (de Haan 1999:15). The concept of social exclusion was rounded enough to cover 
the varied aspects of ‘exclusion' that existed in mainstream society. The policy emanated out 
of the phenomenon of social exclusion was solution to the growing disappointment and 
disenchantment out of the failure of postmodern, post-industrial French state. The French 
policy focus on social exclusion highlighted the problems of unemployment, poverty, and 
marginalization of the urban masses and the social apathy towards their destitution (Silver 
1994). Moreover, SEF (social exclusion framework), on the one hand, drew the philosophical 
support from the French political and academic circles.  This was partially due to French 
dislike towards what was perceived as an English approach to income-based poverty analysis 
and solution on deprivation with its association with church-based charity (de Haan 1999:2, 
Silver 1994 :540-1). On the other hand, the French idea of the Rousseurian republican social 
contract beneath the overarching notion of solidarity was the motivating force behind the 
upholding of social exclusion policy in France polity and society (Silver 1994:543).    
 
Ironically, the root idea of Les Exclus as a conceptual term before its accommodation in 
French political discourse had its origin in the church as well. However, the social exclusion 
framework helped understand the multidimensional and relational aspects of chronic poverty. 
It helped uncover the causal relations among the different dimensions of deprivation in the 
form of exclusion from the state protection, family support, and the ‘rupturing of social 
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bonds’ (de Haan 2011:7). As Silver (2007:4) puts it, social relations, institutions, and 
imagined identities of group, belonging constitute the social cohesion, integration, or 
solidarity, which creates a social bond. Further, social exclusion also prohibits full 
participation, from social life, denying access to information, resources, sociability, 
recognition, and identity, attaching self-respect and obstructing the capabilities to achieve 
personal development (Silver 2007:10). The characteristics of the conceptual framework that 
underline the non-economic factors underlying marginalization and frequent destitution was 
preferred in France compared to the traditional dominant income-based analytical framework 
to analyze poverty and its repercussions.  
 
Later on, the  social exclusion  concept evolved and become comprehensive from 1970s since 
its first pronouncement as a policy framework in French political discourse up to the late 
1990s.  If we comparatively analyze the initial definition of social exclusion and the one used 
for social exclusion in DFID policy literature it seems that the former looks along with a class 
of substance abusers, misfits, and delinquents.  While the later included the unemployed, the 
intermittently employed, migrants, and those who would be excluded due to their religious or 
sexual orientation. It became more comprehensive and became an instrument of integration 
of even racial and ethnic groups and migrants culminating in the full-fledged Ministry of 
Urban Affairs, an arm of the French government to fight "urban exclusion" (Linhart 1992  
cited in Silver 1994).  
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4.2.3 Social Exclusion Framework in Brussels  
 
The social exclusion framework got recognition in other European countries through the 
advance of the European Commission. One of the main reasons behind the SEF getting 
currency in the European Union (EU) was the reluctance prevalent among its policymakers 
towards conventional economic analysis of poverty. The dominant conventional analytical 
paradigm stressed the income-based poverty compared to SEF, which helped reveal the 
social-cultural and political dimensions of deprivation. The former French president of the 
European Commission, Jacques Delores, promoted this concept in connection with the 
poverty programmes of the EU at the beginning of the 1990’s (Ziyaudden and Kasi 2009:24). 
Delores held number of positions earlier in his career. Those positions included serving as the 
Minister of Economics and Finance (1981-84) in France, the head of the French social affairs 
department of the General planning committee before being appointed General Secretary for 
Permanent Training and Social Promotion, and also associate professor at the University of 
Paris-Dauphine (1974-79) and director of the research centre ‘Work and Society’. Equipped 
with an academic-theoretical base, and practical insights from the offices he held in the upper 
political echelons in France academia and politics, Delores applied his economic and social 
understanding of French social problems and solutions to that of European countries while 
strengthening the European Union. This was concurrently unfolding with series of 
developments, including the mainstreaming of the notion of the ‘social' in the EU in terms of 
the problems of unemployment and poverty prevalent in Europe in the wake of post-1980s 
economic and political crises. In 1989, the Commission of the European Communities 
pronounced its concerns regarding its action program relating to the implementation of the 
Community Charter of Basic Social rights for Workers (1989). This was followed by the 
Council of the European Community's decision to establish a medium-term community 
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action programme concerning the economic and social integration of the economically and 
socially less privileged groups in society. The Council of the European Communities later 
resolved to tackle social exclusion, resulting in "Resolution of 29/9/89 on combating social 
exclusion". In 1990 a survey of Employment in Europe was published by EU, followed by 
Eurostat Rapid Reports from the Statistical Office of the European Communities produced 
the data on Inequality and Poverty in Europe (1980-1985).  
 
Inspired by French experiments in ‘community observatory', the European community 
observatory was created in 1990 by the Commission of the European Communities, 
Directorate General V (Employment, Social Affairs, and Industrial Relations). The first 
annual report of the European community observatory was published in 1991 by a group of 
independent experts coordinated by Graham Room from Bath University. Referring to the 
French example, this report endorsed the utility of observatory as a decentralized social 
action so as to reveal the developments unfolding at the local level and strategies being 
adopted by different social actors. The grassroots feedback was supposed to contribute to 
coherence in policy planning at the national level. The White paper published by European 
Commission 1993 on Growth, Competitiveness, Employment did not overtly speak about or 
uses the term social exclusion.  This was despite an earlier publication by the EU declaring a 
strong intention to combat social exclusion and to work towards a Europe of solidarity by 
intensifying the fight against social exclusion and fostering integration (EU's first annual 
report and study were published on 1991 and 1992 respectively).  
 
Nevertheless, the ‘social' element with its issues such as unemployment, non-schooling, and 
the lack of health facilities started to permeate into day-to-day proceedings of the EU. The 
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EU, while informing the Council of European Communities and European Parliament 
concerning its priorities – in the context of the World Summit on Social Development held in 
Copenhagen from 6-12 March 1995 – decided to promote specific principles and objectives. 
As the Summit marked the first UN Conference dedicated to the social development, the 
three themes EU chose to discuss in World Summit were employment, poverty, and social 
integration. These themes and related objectives were based on principles of human rights 
and democracy and integration of social and economic policies. The EU objectives were 
divided into multilateral and bilateral objectives. The EU objectives were shaped by the 
necessity to widen the social security networks and provide the resources for social 
development. So as to enable those who are falling out of the mainstream due to the lack of 
schooling, housing, basic health facilities, jobs and equitable access to the market be included 
with the gradual development of social protection systems (EU Commission report 1991). 
The EU objectives had a strong undercurrent of reciprocity behind aid and inter-linkages of 
international trade regulations along with the obligations of donor and aid recipient countries. 
The former sought to ensure that the globalization and international trade work for poverty 
reduction and social development and while the later sought to ensure compliance with ILP 
agreements on the freedom of association, on child labour and forced labour and facilitation 
of social integration (EU Commission report 1990a). This was guided by the EU's 
expectation that the World Trade Organisation would make sure that international trade 
should contribute to the social development in reference to the inequity within middle-income 
countries, particularly for women from these countries. Secondly, the EU multilateral 
objectives anticipated that the policies recommended and financially sponsored by the IMF 
and World Bank would include social development. Thirdly, the EU sought the guarantee of 
international free movement of capital within a legal framework so as to help the 
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development of poor countries and modernization of the East (Council of European 
Communities 1992). 
 
On the note of bilateral objectives, EU protagonists wanted the World Social Summit (WSS) 
and its organizing body, the UN, to secure reciprocal undertakings from aid recipient 
countries to ratify and comply with the above-mentioned multilateral agreements. This was 
supposed to be done in terms of priorities for job creation and poverty alleviation in 
cooperation programs for development between the EU and its partners along with including 
these goals in their domestic policies (WSSD 1995). In addition, the EU prioritized the 
granting of aid and trade preferences to countries that are serious about social development 
strategies. It was stated that EU should use its aid and cooperation instruments to support 
African countries, in particular, to gain a stronger foothold in global trade to promote 
investment growth. Similar bilateral objectives were advanced for Central and Eastern 
European countries in transition. Nevertheless, more focus was recommended on the social 
dimension of development with the push of programmes designed to support the economic 
and political reforms in these regions (Council of European Communities report 1992). 
 
The growing prominence of the paradigm used to analyze the social causes of chronic 
poverty and other forms of marginalization faced by a remarkable section of socially 
excluded overlapped with the mainstreaming of the social development agenda in UN 
endeavours to address the global poverty. The flow of both ideas and people must be taken 
into consideration in trying to understand the co-emergence of these phenomena. The 
movement of policy makers, development practitioners, economists, and senior bureaucrats 
from within Europe to UN offices in Europe along with the bureaucratic and academic 
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communication of ideas played a role in the simultaneous emergence. Further, the location of 
UN offices is another dimension that will help us understand the cross-fertilization of ideas 
and the emergence of some and the sidetracking of other concepts. The EU and UN 
knowledge development and management departments and DFID think tanks, particularly in 
the context of its proactive interference during the WDR 2000, show how the flows of policy 
themes or policy paradigms are circular and dramatic in their creation. It is also notable that 
in the late 1980s and early 1990s the EU emerged as one of the major donors of ODA 
(Official Development Assistance) during, the World Bank as was a trendsetter and key 
player in international development intervention, and the British Department of International 
Development underwent a process of organizational change under the New Labour 
government. This trajectory or the ideography of the policy themes offers a glimpse into the 
journey of the new social paradigm of poverty analysis in the corridors from national poverty 
alleviation programme to international development. 
 
The United Nations Department for Policy Coordination and Sustainable Development 
organized the World Summit on Social Development (WSSD) in Copenhagen in 1995. This 
was the first major UN conference specifically on social development issues, closely linked 
to a series of high-level meetings intended to reshape the UN development work
34
. The   
official introduction of the WSSD Copenhagen declaration, stated a ‘groundbreaking' 
agreement made with global leaders. This agreement was about their ten commitments to eradicate 
absolute poverty by a target date, support full employment, promote social integration, achieve 
equality, ensure structural adjustment, resource allocation to social development, universal education 
and primary health care and strengthening cooperation for social development for social 
development through the UN. The ten commitments and targets set by the UN to accomplish 
                                                             
34 Available on: http://www.earthsummit2002.org/wssd/wssd/wssdintro.html Accessed on :19/2/2015 
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social development on global scale reflects the influence of the on-going social exclusion 
debate and the mainstreaming of the ‘social’ into the world of global development that was 
previously dominated by economic dimensions of poverty analysis in Europe. Clert (1999: 
178) argues that WSSD was a key event in the development of social exclusion policy. She 
summarizes the conclusion of the World summit into policy three themes associated with 
combating social exclusion: (a) a call for the protection of rights and for more democracy in 
general (b) respect for differences and value  ‘diversity’ (c) the re-introduction of ‘social 
justice’ on to the development agenda, which is consistent with the need to ‘reduce   poverty’.  
 
The WSSD was followed by papers commissioned by the ILO (International Labour 
Organization) which emphasized the utility of social exclusion as a relevant conceptual 
framework and its intensity as a discriminatory phenomenon (Lipton 1996)
35
. This 
culminated in the formation of Strategies and Tools against social exclusion and Poverty, the 
global programme (STEP). STEP applied two-pronged policies in relation to social exclusion 
and related social anomalies. It dealt with the extension of social protection to the excluded 
and integrated approaches to social inclusion. STEP combined different types of activities 
including studies and research, the development of methodological tools and reference 
documents, training, the execution of field projects, technical assistance for the definition and 
implementation of policies and the development of linkages with various actors. This was 
carried out within the Social Security Policy and Development Branch of the ILO (Estivill 
2003). The WSSD declarations and commitment to the issues of global social development 
were summarized into the International Development Targets (IDTs), the forerunners of the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). However, besides the significant goals of global 
developments incorporated in World Summit and the IDTs those were transfused into MDGs 
                                                             
35 http://www.ilo.int/wcmsp5/groups/public/@ed_emp/documents/publication/wcms_123434.pdf 
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were partially unfulfilled and had uneven policy impact across developing countries (Sumner 
and Tiwari 2010:2&13). 
 
4.3.1 Social Exclusion Framework at Downing Street 
 
The entry of Social exclusion policy into 10 Downing Street is no less dramatic than the 
development of this idea itself. Long before it became a ‘pet’ policy theme for the Labour 
government, this concept was adapted out of the serious intention to voice the concerns of 
those who were out of sight and out of the mind of mainstream politics and policy makers in 
the Britain. It was also partially the outcome of the brainstorming of Labour leader John 
Smith and his party think tank. Hence, the British Government's domestic policy of tackling 
social exclusion to provide social justice has an interesting political context of ‘internal 
politics’ and informal policy entrepreneurial initiatives behind it. 
 
In the wake of the Labour party's electoral defeat in 1992, there was a lot of work going on in 
the mid-1990s in order to develop a manifesto for the 1997 elections, which meant to serve as 
the basis for the creation of a ‘new' Labour government. John Smith, Labour MP took an 
initiative in organizing a brainstorming session about the party's defeat and to chalk out the 
election strategy for ‘new' Labour (Haddon 2012:3). This was not only to get leverage among 
the electorate but also to appeal and attract the traditional labour vote bank as well as the 
‘new' middle class that emerged from the working class. It was also mean to account for the 
fragmented, unorganized working class of British society (Haddon 2012:5). Moreover, given 
the general aversion of people towards the nomenclature and categorization as poor, the terms 
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social justice and social exclusion were more palatable in the British context. Hence, the 
language of social exclusion was applied to mend the gap as well as raise an agenda to "chalk 
out the renewal strategies for Britain" (IPPR report 1994). This enabled the repositioning of 
the conventional face of Labour while giving a new dimension to social welfare politics. 
Thus, Labour and its think tank, under the leadership of late MP John Smith, decided to 
highlight issues to do with the lack of employment, homelessness, teenage pregnancy and 
truancy as a matter of social justice (IPPR report 1994). A Commission on Social Justice was 
appointed to produce a report on poverty and social exclusion in the UK that stressed on the 
dire need to address poverty and marginalization in British society. Poverty was considered to 
be the consequent failure of the state to impart social justice and exclude a large chunk of the 
population from the British society (Haddon 2012:5, IPPR 1994). 
 
John Smith commissioned the Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR) to produce a report 
on the state of social justice in Britain. IPPR produced the final report called Social Justice: 
Strategies for national renewal on 10th January 1994 (IPPR 1994). The report was said to 
have “set out the groundwork for a national strategy to tackle the problems of economic 
under-performance, social division, and malaise that plague the UK. It has become the classic 
text in social and welfare policy”.36 This report by the Social Justice Commission was a key 
element in the thinking of people who wrote the manifesto for the Labour government. This 
manifesto talked about poverty in the UK as a social injustice. It planned and proposed to 
build renewal strategies for Britain and its underclass to bring them into the national fold. The 
writers of the report researched and referred the most relevant literature and alluded to the 
theoretical framework of social exclusion and deprivation that was debated in contemporary 
                                                             
36 http://www.ippr.org/publications/social-justice-strategies-for-national-renewal 
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France and Europe in the 1970s and 80s in reference to the issues of poverty then (IPPR 
1994:3-5).  
On a theoretical level, the Commission report as well as the Labour party manifesto stressed 
the non-economic factors of deprivation and took into consideration the non-economic based 
analysis of poverty, highlighting the social, cultural, and political causes of exclusion against 
the economic criteria applied by the earlier Conservative government (An informant from 
London-based think tank).  Later the sudden death of John Smith in 1994 brought the new 
leadership of Labour to Tony Blair. However, the Labour manifesto on social justice for 
people agenda shaped so painstakingly by late John Smith did pay off in the national polls. 
On top of the disillusionment with Conservative rule, in the subsequent elections in 1997, 
Labour swept the electorate and came into power with a landslide victory (Haddon 2012:5).  
 
4.3.2   Social exclusion as domestic policy framework in the UK 
The Social Justice Commission played crucial role in introducing social exclusion in Britain’s 
upper policymaking echelons.  The setting up of a Commission and its resultant report on 
“renewal strategies of Britain” were said to have been part of a well-planned attempt on the 
part of the Labour think tank to attract their traditional voters plus the unorganized lots of 
Labour supporters (Haddon 2012:4-6). The fragmented mass of labourers away from the 
organized one that used to be the backbone of Labour needed to be accommodated in 
Labour’s new manifesto. After the formation of the Labour government, Peter Mandleson, a 
close aide of then Prime Minister Tony Blair, took the initiative in creating a social exclusion 
unit in the heart of Government in 1997 (Hills and Stewart 2008:11). This step was very 
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much an attempt to show the genuine commitment of the Labour Party towards its election 
agenda and promises to the poor section of the nation as much as its labour force. 
 
However, the Social Exclusion Unit (SEU) brochure published in 2004 reads, “the SEU was 
set up by the Prime Minister in December 1997 and was initially part of the Cabinet Office 
that later on moved over to the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister in 2002”. The SEU was 
active till 2004 and was reported to work under the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister, in 
agreement with ministers, was said to decide the direction of the unit’s work and its specific 
projects after consultation with officials and stakeholders. The SEU approach was based on 
preventing social exclusion, ensuring the mainstream service delivery for everyone and 
reintegration of those people who were seen to have fallen through the net (SEU report 
2004
37
). At the same time, there was lots of reporting going on, on poverty and various ways 
of looking at poverty, including a generational focus on adult, old people and looking at 
different geographical counts were employed by various think tanks, academia and policy 
institutes throughout  the UK (SEU report 2004). An annual report on poverty in Britain was 
published which generated a lot of debate about the potential best measures and what kind of 
labour market interventions would work.  
 
SEU's commitment in tackling social exclusion, primarily through research and the 
development of projects to deal with social exclusion was reflected in its operational 
practices, which drew extensively on commissioned research, longitudinal studies and 
                                                             
37 Social Exclusion Unit Government media Brochure  (2004)Available on:  
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http:/www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/media/cabinetoffice/social_exclusi
on_task_force/assets/publications_1997_to_2006/seu_leaflet.pdf  
Accessed on :20/12/2014  
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empirical research. Further, the SEU had a number of outreach activities for the socially 
excluded through collaborations with local authorities, businesses, and the voluntary sector.  
Within the government, the SEU had close ties with various departmental officials and 
ministers from within Whitehall aided by appropriate government committees (SEU report 
2004). 
SEU commissioned or conducted various projects and research. These projects included 
empirical-statistical studies-surveys of problems like truancy and school exclusion, rough 
sleeping, teenage pregnancy, and unemployment that go hand in hand resulting in the 
consequent exclusion of individuals and social groups (SEU report 2004). Since its inception 
in 1997 till 2004, the SEU published 29 reports on the five above-mentioned major areas. 
 
In 2006 the SEU merged with the Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit and thus started being 
called the Social Exclusion Task Force (SETF). The new Social Exclusion Task Force that 
was part of the Cabinet aided the government in policy analysis and in offering strategic 
advice on issues of social exclusion in the light of research conducted by SEU on problems 
concerning the fallout of groups and communities from safety networks.
38
 However, in the 
wake of a power change at the centre, the SETF was abolished in 2011 by new coalition 
government i.e. Conservative-Liberal Democrat, and was absorbed into the Cabinet 
committee on social justice (Hansard /Commons Debates 2011).
39
  
                                                             
38 Available on : 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20090114000528/cabinetoffice.gov.uk/social_exclusion_task_force.a
spx,   Accessed on 8/11/2014 
39 Available on: 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmhansrd/cm111214/debtext/111214-0001.htm 
Accessed on 15/11/2014 
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Later on, this very framework of social exclusion was adopted, internalized, and iterated 
within the domains of UK Aid, a process that has its own story, as I will show in the next 
section. In short, it is clear that the origin of the policy or the policy processes of social 
inclusion are non-linear and chaotic. 
 
4.4.1   Social Exclusion Framework (SEF) in DFID 
 
The SEF in DFID may be divided  into two phases or timelines: first its emergence and 
framing during 1997- 2000 and second during the period of traction, i.e. 2002 to 2010. These 
two phases are interrupted by DFID's engagements with the procedures involved in the 
making of the WDR in 2000, wherein UK aid in general and DFID, in particular, has played a 
crucial role in influencing the content and theoretical outlook of the World Bank towards 
global poverty. It was an awareness of UK academia and development practitioners that made 
it possible for the social paradigm of poverty analysis, i.e. the social exclusion, to make its 
way into the WDR and eventually into international development endeavours (discussed 
below under the section 4.5.2). 
 
Policy ideas are all around us, as if they are in the ‘air’. They are present in mind, in 
discussions, in print media, electronic media, conferences, workshops, seminars. They are 
present as an idea or theme in the minds of various people as per their information, 
knowledge, disciplinary training convictions, experiences and ideological beliefs that they 
adhere to or think to be logical, rational and suitable to their situational response to the 
circumstances they face or react to (Informants Rebecca, Alex, Ray). However, only the ideas 
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those get consensus, support, and backing  from the network of key actors and, well-placed 
powerful people, are the ones that get traction. For a policy idea to see the daylight or rise to 
prominence, it needs to have crucial support, consensus, and timely backing by the key 
actors. In the case of ideas that become policy approaches, policy themes or conceptual 
frameworks, the full cycle of these processes involve the social dimension of the dialectical 
process of agreement, disagreement, argument and persuasion on various levels of polity, 
bureaucracy, academia, literature and media that eventually produce the policy framework, as 
we shall see in later chapters. In the case of the social exclusion policy or analytical 
framework in DFID, the very policy approach of social exclusion has undergone similar 
processes, which is the focus of the following section. (Informants Rebecca, Alex, Ray). 
 
One of the informants who had a career spanning a quarter of a century in the international 
development industry, its various think tanks and academia in the UK and Europe – shared 
his perspectives based on his first-hand experiences in the development industry with me. He 
is an economist by training, but a convert to an interdisciplinary understanding of the 
dynamics of poverty, policy analysis, and analytical paradigms. He was, you could say, the 
social development (policy) entrepreneur type of person. While talking about his take on 
British domestic and international development policy, he said: 
While working with DFID, I have always emphasized that the British government should 
have a consistent policy across its domestic and international aid sphere. You cannot put 
development in a completely different box; it has to have links with what is happening in 
the donor country (informant John).  
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His (informant John’s) stand was based on his pragmatic way of “comparisons of 
circumstances, societies, connections of ideas and convergence of themes”, ideas, paradigms, 
and networks and individuals, all put to use by him for through his passion for international 
development and policy work. His modus operandi and informal efforts become instrumental 
in introducing the conceptual framework of social exclusion to DFID.  
 
4.4.2   The Cinderella department  
 
Other than the intellectual and pro-active policy contributions from social development 
advisors, the launch of the Social Exclusion Framework in DFID is characterized by the 
influential regime and maverick modus-operandi of  the  lady cabinet minister for 
international development who was perceived as “strict, strong and principled” amongst 
contemporary DFID bureaucrats. Among other things, the minister was very serious about 
DFID’s commitment to the achievement of International Development Targets (IDTs), which 
she made very clear to the DFID officials from her first day in office. A remark on the 
chemistry between the minister and DFID bureaucracy by a Governance advisor is quite 
telling: “The (DFID) people full well knew what their minister wants from them and the 
minister was astute enough to understand who can do what”. 
Interestingly, during the distribution of departments in the aftermath of the election victory, 
the minister was not very happy that the “international development department” was 
assigned to her. According to one of my informants, she wished to have something that was 
perceived to be more important and substantial. However, on the advice of her female 
counterpart from the opposition, who persuaded her that “she can contribute more 
139 
 
substantially to global poverty alleviation”, Therefore the minister agreed to take on the 
DFID. “This lady minister meant serious business,” as a governance advisor for DFID, told 
me. “There was a good combination with the minister and its newly formed autonomous 
department that reflected the changing moods of UK aid,” he added. Nevertheless, among the 
‘top’ political people in her party and as well as seasoned mandarins, DFID was considered 
“the Cinderella department”. Whether it was tongue-in-cheek English humour, gender bias or 
the playing out of machismo, power, and politics- it is still open for analysis and 
interpretation (Marlyn).  Hence, the ‘fairy mother’ i.e. the patron minister, with their chief 
social development advisor and an increasingly large number cadre of social scientists, were 
determined to make a difference in international development.   
 
4.5   WDR 2000 and the DFID politics behind influencing the World Bank 
  
The story behind the making of World Development Report (2000) has an important message 
for understanding the progression and trajectory of the social exclusion framework. The 
evolution and progression of the social exclusion framework are parallel to the paradigm 
change in the policies, practices and the architecture of UK aid as well as World 
Development reports. Moreover, it also gives us an idea of how much the social exclusion 
framework influenced or shaped the WDR in terms of imparting the analytical framework to 
understand the underlying causes of chronic poverty and relevant solutions thereupon. The 
WDR, and its making and active involvement of DFID in it, overtook the attention from 
social exclusion that was resonating in the corridors of Downing Street and DFID. However, 
the fact remains that the European Commission was one of the active participants in the 
debate on the role of the social exclusion framework in understanding the marginalization of 
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certain groups. The European Commission had also submitted a memorandum to the World 
Summit on Social Development (WSSD 1995). This will help us to understand the movement 
of ideas like water that finds its ways through creeks and cracks. In this case, the idea found 
its ways through, various channels of networks and organizations through its 
communications, interactions, and voluntary attempts to coordinate. 
 
The importance of the DFID’s role lies in influencing institutions, like the World Bank, that 
have been trendsetters in terms of international trade, finance, development cooperation and 
the production and management of development knowledge. This entire episode reveals to us 
the processes of harmonization of UK aid with the broader policy priorities of the World 
Bank and United Nations while influencing the philosophical and paradigmatic core of 
poverty related ideas dominant in the World Bank (informant Alex). Nevertheless, it shows 
us the foresight of the UK aid in general and particularly DFID’s proactive initiative in 
influencing the thought processes in the World Bank and the International aid community by 
contributing to the very analysis of global poverty and its causes. The role played by English 
development practitioners and development experts in forging new ways of development 
cooperation is what could be called ‘the new aid agenda’ (King and McGrath 2004:4). Also, 
this move of DFID to mobilize its human and economic resources to influence the WDR has 
had   long lasting effects on the following decade of international development aid. It was an 
astute and pragmatic investment that no other European country foresaw (informant Alex). 
The paradigm changes that took place in international aid were characterized by the 
development, co-operation, and formulation of six international development targets, along 
with a new architecture of donor coordination. This was done under the auspices of the 
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Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) that called for the 
harmonization of aid (King and McGrath 2004: 2, Eyben 2002). 
 
4.5.1   The World Bank and WDR 
 
The World Bank is one of the 70 years old twin organizations fathered by the Bretton Woods 
conference. Its purpose was to regulate the world economy in the wake of the global 
economic slump following the Second World War. The World Bank today has expanded 
from a single institution to a cognate associated group of five-development institution. The 
World Bank, originally called the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 
started as a facilitator of post-war reconstruction and development, and fared well till the 
present times with one of its current key objectives of global poverty alleviation
40
 (World 
Bank Online archives). The World Bank, with its headquarters in Washington, DC, works in 
close coordination with its ancillaries, such as the International Development Association, the 
International Finance Corporation (IFC), the Multilateral Guarantee Agency (MIGA), and the 
International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID)
41
. 
 
The World Bank has undergone many changes organizationally as well as operationally since 
its inception. However, from the point of view of a change in objectives the key 
transformations came under the presidency of the former US Defence Secretary, McNamara, 
in 1968 when the “war against poverty” became a slogan of the World Bank (Kenneth and 
                                                             
40 Available on : http://www.worldbank.org/en/about/history  Accessed on  11/08/2014 
41 Available on:  http://www.worldbank.org/en/about/history  Accessed on  11/08/2014 
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McGrath 2004:20). Other changes took place in 1996 when the then President James 
Wolfensohn announced a change in the way the Bank would accomplish its mission of 
reducing world poverty by being a knowledge bank rather than a financial institution (Cohen 
and Laporte 2004:1).  It is argued that this was done to uphold the waning importance of the 
World Bank as a donor institution while dependent countries looked for better options and 
some recipient countries turned into donors themselves (informant David).  
 
However, the importance of the World Bank in the field of global development or global 
poverty alleviation is indisputable. From a conventional perspective, the World Bank and the 
IMF are deemed as the key arbiters of authoritative information on development-related 
knowledge. The data produced by the flow of information in these institutions provides 
information for research in development establishments all over the world ensuring the 
control and regulation of the development knowledge (Harper 1998:10). The knowledge 
production international institutes like IMF also annually produces the topic wise statistical 
reports and papers, training, and workshop aiding development research in development 
institutions, academia and non-academic research institutions (Harper 1998:142-50). These 
institutions also work on the paradigm of maintenance for the legitimizing of neo-liberal 
reforms and ideas for poverty eradication (Broad 2007:702).  
As per the Open Knowledge Repository website run by the World Bank Group, the World 
Banks World Development Report (WDR) is published annually since 1978. The report 
collates and analyses the economic, social, and environmental state of the world in the 
timeframe of any given year. Generally, these reports provide in-depth analysis and policy 
recommendations on specific and important aspects of development including agriculture, the 
role of the state, transition economies, infrastructure, health, and poverty. A range of 
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multilateral and bilateral international organizations, national governments, scholars, 
researchers, civil society networks and policymakers use it to aid their decision-making 
processes and consolidate their study conclusions on global poverty (OKR 2014). 
 
The financial clout of the World Bank as a leading donor and globally-leading think tank 
means that it holds a special position in the international development industry. This 
privileged position is maintained, through World Bank’s power to define and interpret terms, 
concepts, issues, and phenomenon dealing with international development strategies and 
analysis. This entails that World Bank publications are taken seriously, and that all other 
institutions need to take its terms and terminologies to be the yardstick for the rest of the 
development industry (Jakobit 1999:5) This ‘development speak’ and its jargons do not exist 
independently. They are conceptualized and polished in the think tanks of the World Bank. 
Development literature replete with these terms and terminology is its playground. The policy 
literature, occasional white papers, and WDR are its vehicle that disseminates and circulate 
ideas among the inhabitants of the "aidland" (Apthorpe 2011:2). Aidland is an allegorical 
term for the "much wider form of development industry" employed by Apthorpe (Mosse 
2011:2). This phenomenon culminates in the World Bank's procedure what Broad (2007:700) 
calls the knowledge management or knowledge administration. 
 
The entire knowledge management enterprise of the World Bank falls under the broader 
practice and praxis of “normative administration or paradigm maintenance” (Broad 
2007:706). The politics of normative administration or knowledge management can be 
understood from a Foucauldian perspective. Moreover, DFID’s efforts to influence the WDR 
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could shed light on the usage of literature and discourses of global poverty and poverty 
alleviation as a device to exert power and regulate entire aid industry. As Cornwall and Eade 
(2010:1) observe, “the function of newly coined terms like social capital and buzzwords is to 
sustain, legitimize, and justify the policy disguising the political-institutional agendas of 
international development institutions” (Harrison 2010 : 257). The following story and 
developments shared by some of the key informants and insiders of WDR sheds light on the 
formal and not so formal circulation of ideas and movements of people. As Mary Douglas 
argues: "its people in institutions those who talk, act and react, not the institutions. 
Institutions cannot have minds of their own” (1987: 9).  
 
4.5.2   Social Exclusion framework in the World Bank 
The World Development Report (WDR) is an annual World Bank report, which aims to chart 
the current thinking on an aspect of global development. This report highlights one topic in 
each issue from the development field while providing specific indicators of world 
development on issues such as global health, education, gender inequality, or poverty. 
Poverty has become a recurring theme at the beginning of each decade since 1980. Even the 
WDR 2000/2001 was focussed on ‘Attacking Poverty’ (WDR 1999). 
 
The WDR 2000, which is also called Poverty WDR, broke new grounds in many respects. It 
engaged scholars, experts and social scientists outside the World Bank while preparing the 
report. The WDR team was commissioned two years prior to when the report was due, during 
which a number of background papers were produced from a variety of external 
organizations and thinks tanks. Meetings, workshops, and seminars were held across the 
145 
 
world so as to contribute to the report. Electronic platforms, such as the internet, were used to 
discuss directly with thousands of poor men and women from all over the world in an attempt 
to understand real-world development measures based on people's lived experiences and 
livelihood strategies, an exercise never done before on this level in any international 
development enterprise (analysis based on literature review and archive research). DFID, 
with its think tank and institutes like IDS and New Policy Institute, joined hands with the 
World Bank to record the online testimonies of poor people as well as to provide expertise on 
poverty. Its then director Ravi Kanbur insisted that the empirical pieces of evidence and real 
life testimonies of the poverty-ridden made sure the team members of WDR conduct the field 
trips to accumulate first-hand information during the preparatory period (informant Alex). 
 
Moreover, WDR 2000 was controversial because of the team director, Ravi Kanbur, resigned 
after its publication, citing personal reservations regarding the emphasis of the main 
messages of the Report (Wade 2001). The report was an outcome of massive direct 
communication and discussions with thousands of poor men and women from 60 countries, 
with researchers reaching out to first-hand testimonies in the poverty-stricken regions of the 
world (informant Alex). As Diane E. Ray
42
 notes:   
Research for the WDR went beyond the walls of the World Bank, beginning with discussions 
with more than 60,000 poor women and men in 60 countries, in order to understand poverty 
from the perspective of the poor themselves. In 1999, a three-month electronic discussion 
took place regarding the main themes of the WDR. In January 2000, a consultation draft was 
                                                             
42 http://www.worldhunger.org/articles/books/ray.htm The reasons thereof were also published in his 
presentation (Kanbur 2001) that highlighted the ‘nature of disagreements on the economic policy, distribution, 
and poverty' fundamental to the World Bank's analytical frameworks as a finance institution (Wade 2001). 
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posted on the World Bank's website, and a month-long public electronic discussion of the 
draft followed. 
In London DFID with its think tank, IDS and institutes like and New Policy Institute joined 
hands with the World Bank in recording the online testimonies of poor people as well as to 
provide expertise on poverty-related propositions to be included in WDR 2000. The online 
web page on WDR 2000-1 was set up to facilitate e-conferencing, evidence presentation, 
testimonies and discussion on WDR 2000 first time in the history of WDR preparation.  
 
The World Development Report 2000, which is also called Poverty WDR, broke new 
grounds in many respects. This WDR was the first to completely focus on ‘attacking the 
(global) poverty' rather than mixing other social issues and agendas. It was different in terms 
of engaging scholars, experts, and social scientists beyond the World Bank while preparing 
the report. It was significant in terms of using the information technology for gathering the 
data and evidence and for mainstreaming the social-analytical paradigm into the World Bank 
that was dominated by paradigms of economic –statistical analysis.  The WDR groundwork 
was complemented by the use of the internet for e-conferencing by virtual  face-to-face 
meeting between the WDR team, poor people, activists, and grassroots volunteers from 
around the world.  The WDR team was commissioned two years prior to the due report, 
during which a number of background papers were produced from the variety of external 
organizations and thinks tanks. Meetings, workshops, and seminars were held across the 
world so as to contribute to the report. The team director Cornell professor and economist 
Ravi Kanbur insisted that the empirical evidence and real-life testimonies of people from 
poverty-ridden communities are must. He personally looked into the matter to make sure that 
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the team members of WDR should conduct the field trips to impoverished areas of the globe 
to accumulate first-hand information during the preparatory period (informant Alex). 
 
However, the involvement of the aid organizations, scholars, and experts other than World 
Bank worked both ways. This involvement influenced the WDR and other stakeholders 
ideologically, strategically, and technically eventually contributing to the broader spectrum of 
the aid paradigm. This mutual process of influencing shaped the aid industry not only in the 
following decade from the perspective of development objectives, but also in the ways that it 
understood the non-economical causes of poverty. Economic analysis as the dominant 
paradigm to understand the root causes of poverty was to large extent overwhelmed by a 
social analytical paradigm – that is to say, the class-based analysis faded from the picture 
(analysis based on discussion with related informants).  
 
‘Kanbur, formerly the Chief Economist of the Africa region for the World Bank and Cornell 
professor, was brought in to lead the WDR team by Chief Economist Joseph Stiglitz. 
However, during this period in the 1990s, DFID itself was undergoing major organizational 
and international policy level changes.  DFID took this opportunity to mobilize its intellectual 
and economic resources for influencing the WDR 2000-1. DFID was far more successful in 
its timely move and foresight compared to German, the French and Dutch donor organization 
(informant Alex).’  Through its Trust fund, DFID invested in organizing and co-sponsoring 
conferences, seminars and workshops on poverty, social exclusion, poverty paradigms, all 
while tactfully reiterating and embedding DFID’s take on poverty analysis in ongoing WDR 
discussions and debates ( Alex). In addition, DFID co-sponsored conferences with SOAS 
(School of Oriental and African Studies), the University of Sussex, and the University of 
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Oxford. It also joined hands with London-based and other think tanks throughout the UK to 
achieve its objective to influence the WDR. These conferences and seminars tried to 
collaborate with the WDR so as to contribute its ideas, understanding and root causes of the 
poverty (Informant Alex and Larry). DFID’s take on non-economic factors of poverty was 
one of the major contributions to the WDR. The significance of this analytical framework to 
understand the structural and political factors underlying poverty were akin similar to the one 
of social exclusion. This concept included non-economic factors and causes such as social 
status, location, cultural attributes, the social discourse of deviance and marginalization 
aggrieved by their discrimination and exclusion due to age, addiction, sexual orientation and 
religious or ethnic identity etc. This is reflected in the WDR Report 2000 at its very 
beginning as the key objectives or three pillars of poverty alleviation are deemed to be an 
opportunity, empowerment, and security of poor people (WDR 1999). 
 
The WDR “influencing campaign” was  run by DFID in coordination with its think tanks and 
social policy entrepreneurs. These efforts were spear headed by DFID through Ravi Kanbur, 
a former World Bank economist, to include the ‘social structural’ dimensions of poverty in 
the WDR. Although the degree of mutual effect was not equal and World Bank was 
influenced more than the DFID was influenced in return, this complete exercise was not one 
sided. It had mutual effects. Not only the World Bank knowledge processes were influenced 
by DFID but at same time, the UK government also tried to accommodate and attune with the 
broader social agenda of the WSS and UN(refer to section 4.9).  On the one hand, before 
WDR 2000 the flow of information, the regulations and control of development industry 
seem to be a top-down or linear process. On the other hand, this entire episode also signifies 
the paradigmatic harmonization, the "harmonization of development knowledge, production 
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and management" and dissemination processes within and outside the World Bank. 
Nevertheless, this process was later claimed to aid the effective processes of aid delivery, 
which results from alignment and mutual accountability across its subsidiaries like DFID, 
OECD, SEDA, and recipient countries. (Paris declaration 2005:11:12). However, in the later 
case, a holistic picture does not hint towards the top-down influence or the flow of 
"knowledge as power” as Foucault perceives it (Gordon 1980:104-108). What I mean to say 
is in the later case the World Bank as the international dominant economic institute seems to 
be influenced by an English aid institution and its coterie. 
 
DFID was successful in contributing and influencing the WDR from the point of view of the 
theoretical framework of poverty analysis, inclusion of poverty indicators and alleviation 
parameters in the WDR 2000. In this episode development practitioners, from DFID and 
poverty analysts-anthropologists from IDS played a very important role. This could be 
viewed as the classic act of policy entrepreneurship as well as social development, diplomacy 
that I will further discuss in the following sections. 
 
4.5.3 The second traction to SEF in DFID 
 
The second phase of the SEF (social exclusion framework) in DFID started in 2002. This 
phase was initiated by the arrival of Marlyn (informant), a new social development advisor 
(SDA) in the Asian divisional desk in DFID, with prior work experience in South Asia. 
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While working with DFID Marlyn regularly received letters and emails from civil society 
organizations, activists, and NGOs working for communities suffering from the caste 
discrimination. In light of her experience and communication with grassroots activists from 
India, she started brainstorming on the repercussions of caste-based discrimination on the 
issues of women’s health and mortality in South Asia in general and India in particular. The 
proactive efforts of Marlyn not only gave a new lease of life to SEF but also set a classic 
example of successful policy entrepreneurship within DFID that blended an anthropologist-
activist and civil servant in one.   
 
Social exclusion as it was established on the empirical grounds by some key researchers (de 
Haan 2011:2) was a pragmatic policy framework that did not withstand the political notions 
or limits of the development interventions in recipient countries. The new government found 
it politically problematic. Social exclusion as a key policy framework was in use till 2010. 
Later on with shift in the power and the accession of the coalition government led by the 
Conservative party, this conceptual framework was sidetracked and kept on back stove.  An 
off record discussion with an insider from DIFD offered an interesting perspective on how 
the politics of policy changes. In answer to my question, “why was the social exclusion 
framework replaced by newly elected government,” he replied,  
“No, the content of the policy remains same; it is only the name that has been changed; now the focus 
is on gender rather than the ‘poor.’. It is not more than a symbolic change. It was a kind of ritualistic 
change after the accession of the new government. Earlier ‘social-economic’ policy was replaced with 
the policy of development through economic growth and market reforms...” 
This information did not come as surprise to me, but it did highlight the ‘complementary’ 
phenomenon of  framing, reframing and replacing of the concepts and the policy frames from 
development industry that goes on year after year so as to procure the rationale for 
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‘development intervention’ or the purpose of life to ‘development industry’. This is how the 
concepts like empowerment, sustainability, participation and social cohesion become 
buzzwords and fuzzwords giving new lease of life to the mission development ( Cornwall and 
Eade 2010: 2-6) 
 
4.6 Discussion 
 
Discussion in the section above has tried to lay out the map of the ‘life course' of the social 
exclusion policy framework in the UK. In this attempt, while it explored the origin of this 
concept, it has also tried to chalk out the ideological and political evolution of this analytical 
concept in Europe in terms of its trajectory from a humble French parish to the corridors of 
international aid in the World Bank. 
 
The dramatic journey of this policy theme can be couched in the theoretical propositions of 
Appardurai (1984) who perceives the ‘social life of things' through the movement of ‘value' 
they are invested with. It can be safely said that the life course of social exclusion is nothing 
but ‘social life of an idea' that underwent many theoretical changes with its progression from 
national to international level, eventually to get enriched in its multifarious content and 
context. 
 
However, this entire exercise offers us with finding that would help to clear a couple of 
misconceptions regarding the dominant discourse around the origin and formation of policy 
concepts in general and aid policy ideas or concepts in particular. In addition, this study also 
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sheds light on common notion around policy formation in the bureaucratic institutions.  The 
general perception or dominant discourse around the origin of policy ideas and policy-making 
processes presumes that it is a linear and top-down evolutionary process in bureaucratic 
setting, where few people on the top decide and determine what later becomes a policy. 
 
On the contrary, in reference to the life course of DFID’s social exclusion policy framework    
above section shows that this policy idea had quite mundane origin in everyday life or social 
movements in French village.  In addition, this policy concept was continuously framed and 
reframed by multitude of intermediary actors and epistemic communities from aid 
bureaucracy and beyond as per their ideological and political convictions. Nevertheless, on 
every new geographical and institutional level myriad social, political, and cultural factors 
influenced and moulded this policy framework to meet the new requirements in new contexts 
of international development.  
 
How the social exclusion concept was de-framed and re-framed with every new geo-political 
contexts and institutional requirements will be discusses in section below. 
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Section II: The framing and de-framing of Social Exclusion   
framework  
 
4.7 Policy theme as a “frame” work  
 
Ray was the third person I interviewed after I completed my archival research at the IDS 
library. Like many of my key informants, he is an eminent development professional. He 
works as an independent consultant, visiting professor, and keynote speaker for workshops 
and seminars on aid policy analysis all over the world. Despite his retirement, due to his prior 
engagements, I could only get hold of him after a year since I first contacted him. I got his 
appointment in the month of November 2013. We decided to meet at the School of Oriental 
and South African Studies (SOAS) common meeting room. After the formal introduction of 
self and my (working) research agenda, in a naive attempt to impress him, I blurted out, “In 
light of my desk research so far I can see the emergence of policy themes, and analytical 
approaches to poverty precede the framing part of the policy”. I meant to say, “…precede the 
knowledge dissemination part”. In response, Ray looked a bit amused. He repeated the word 
“precedes” with a questioning look on his face and said, “The frames do not precede the 
policy ideas. On the contrary, the policy ideas come out of from the frames themselves. May 
not be explicit, but everything comes from frames, stays within frames and is reframed. 
Framing is a continuous inescapable process. He stressed.”  
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I was little embarrassed and dumbstruck for a moment. In an attempt to regain my poise, I 
asked him, “Would you please simplify what is the policy frame?” He directed his finger 
towards a painting hung on a nearby wall and said to me:  
Look at it; it’s like the frame of portrait over there, when you look at it, it shows us a picture. It focuses 
on the picture. But while looking at that picture what it omits or what it keeps out of our mind is the 
rest of the wall, the other pictures, the windows, the tapestry the decoration on the ceiling and all the 
entire room that is a common room in this university. However, the other things that the frame 
excludes, due to the focus on the framed picture, are pertinent to understand the wider context of the 
picture itself. So this is the way of looking at while analyzing the policy ideas or policy approaches or 
frameworks.  
 
He was right. I thought out loud, "If we say the policy doesn't come from framing we are 
nipping the processes of understanding in its bud.” Moreover, as Ray said to me, “the point 
there is not to stop the process, but to go with it… and to see where it comes from.” 
Furthermore, he indirectly suggested that I should look at the policy objective or what the 
conceptual framework of the policy wants to achieve. He said, for policy analysis, we should 
always ask for what purpose. Why was there an emphasis on poverty alleviation or in my 
case social exclusion? What else does it hide? It was quite an instructive and illuminating 
moment. I promptly added an important note in the "wisdom" section of my heuristic notes.  
 
4.7.1 Overview of the section II 
 
This section situated within the literature on the ethnography of communication aims to 
analyze the processes of framing policy themes within the policy and research division of aid 
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bureaucracy. Whereas the first half of this section is dedicated to non-formal dimensions of 
policy framing in reference to four cases, the second half engages with the critical discursive 
exercise of naming and framing the policy with the help of analytical (CDA) devices.
43
 While 
the first part sheds light on how the variously positioned actors frame the policies according 
to their pressing priorities in reference to the context of the four narratives, the second part 
attempts to de-frame the social exclusion policy framework using   two representative 
conceptual definitions of social exclusion frameworks.  
 
The intention behind this entire exercise is to go beyond the formal frame of the policy and 
deconstruct not only the policy practices but also the policy framework that was used to 
rationalize the development intervention at different times. For this purpose, I have selected 
two definitions of social exclusion in the course of its transition. While the four narratives 
illustrate various extra-official processes of policy framing and the de-framing the two 
representative definitions of social exclusion framework shall decode or unpick the policy 
frame. Here the first is the original French definition and the second one is most recent 
definition, used by the DFID during its international development policy intervention for 
poverty eradication. The reason behind choosing these two definitions was their different 
political, social, and spatial contexts that allowed me to assess the alteration and expansion in 
the nuances of the concept in different contexts. These two definitions are also representative 
definitions that will help us to juxtapose the changes that meted to the definitions while 
applying the same concept in the national and international context. In the national-regional 
context, as the French social-analytical policy concept was  employed to deal with internal 
                                                             
43 This is partially a linguistic analysis of selected text hence the linguistic analytical devices are applied towards 
that end to de-frame the social exclusion policy framework 
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poverty induced by the processes of social exclusion, and second as DFID’s policy 
framework was used to tackle poverty on the international level.  
 
This exercise aims to decode and deconstruct the “development speak”, as Cornwall and 
Eade (2010: viii) denotes it to signify the lingua franca of development or “language used to 
compose” the policy framework. In a nutshell, this section exemplifies the processes of 
framing the policy in the everyday life of aid bureaucracy. In addition, it decodes the policy 
frame with the help of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). This chapter argues that the 
specific and esoteric use of language legitimizes the development interventions, while, the 
final content of the policy is resultant of contentions, negotiations, and consensus formation 
on policy themes, among distinct actors in different political, social entrepreneurial scenarios. 
 
4.7.2 What is framing and naming? 
 
In aid policy formation, framing and naming are complementary processes.  Specific terms, 
processes, issues, and phenomenon are picked up for attention and named in such a way in 
order to fit the frame constructed for the particular situation. The combination of these 
processes constructs the issues of framing and naming the social problem in a new light. 
However, new descriptions of problem do not come as a part of the solution to the earlier 
problem, but they evolve independently as new characteristic of situations that come into 
prominence (Apthorpe 1996:24). 
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To verify the above-mentioned phenomenon, Apthorpe suggests that, "the emancipatory 
reading of development discourses requires the re-framing, re-reading, re-numbering, and re-
coding of terms and terminologies in hand" (Apthorpe 1996: 18-19). To use this approach 
would necessitate deconstructing the conceptual framework of social exclusion.   
 
In the present case of the social exclusion conceptual framework, the CDA will help us to 
take into consideration, beforehand, the political developments and social processes within 
DFID and prior to the emergence of the social exclusion framework. Social exclusion as a 
conceptual framework is the product of an overarching paradigmatic shift and the theoretical 
challenge posed by social-anthropological approaches. The multi-level advocacy of the 
social-analytical supporters in, DFID in the wake of the Labour government’s anti-poverty 
programmes, on the lines of their election manifesto, created a positive environment for the 
flourishing of this approach. Even in the broader European context, in terms of poverty 
reduction programs, the economic approach for poverty analysis and social policy was 
receiving growing criticism. This was because the rigid economic approaches predominantly 
attributed the causes of endemic poverty to income-based poverty (pers. comm. with 
informant David, Arthur) rather than a broader yet deeper sociological understanding of 
poverty.  
 
In addition, in those days, DFID bureaucrats, called Social Development Advisors (SDAs), 
were strategically mainstreaming the social into international development (Eyben, 2003:879-
80). Wherever opportunity arose, they were propounding the importance of looking at the 
political and structural causes of the poverty. These SDAs argued that the non-economic, 
social, and structural factors, rather than mere economic factors, are causing poverty 
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(informant Rebecca, David, and Judith). Also the emergence of the social exclusion 
framework in the UK aid coincided with the growing influence of bureaucrats trained in 
social sciences in DFID, which was until then dominated by economists of all hue and colour, 
who would move between IMF (International Monetary Fund), WB (World Bank) and DFID 
(Rebecca, Marlyn, Ray). However, once the social exclusion framework received traction in 
DFID, the complex procedure of “framing” discourse around social exclusion began. 
 
In the light of the theoretical discussion above, it would be relevant to look at what the 
findings tell us about the role of political, institutional factors and development professionals 
as actors have played in shaping, influencing, and framing the framework of social exclusion 
in the everyday life of DFID. A brief overview given in the section bellow shed light on the 
political and institutional changes that DFID was undergoing and how these changes 
influenced and shaped its work culture. Three narratives follow this observation on everyday 
life processes of policy framing in DFID by key informants. 
 
4.8 The changes that shaped present DFID 
 
 
As one of the key informants stated it, “It was in the late 1990s when the organizational and 
bureaucratic set up by the UK aid was undergoing a major change.” The ODA that earlier 
used to provide technical assistance and expertise to the developing countries by sending 
trained human resources was now transformed into a full-fledged autonomous institution, 
namely the Department for International Development. Moreover, Labour coming into power 
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after 18 years of conservative rule characterized this period. With an increase in autonomy, 
the quality and quantity of UK aid to the poor country were also enhanced and increased. 
Another important change that took place was the vigorous mainstreaming of the “social” 
paradigm of analysis into the DFID.  This was started on a small level, even before the fall of 
the conservative government in the centre under the Chief Social Development Advisor. At 
that point, international development was not in the centre stage of politics as it was seen as 
less relevant or important and hence there was no scrutiny or restrictions, hence more 
freedom for innovation. This worked to the benefit of those who had a social entrepreneurial 
spirit. There was a lot more scope for idiosyncratic DFID bureaucrats with social 
development entrepreneurial zeal, like Rebecca. However, there was lot more scope for 
different ideas within DFID than ODA (informants). The factor of “less importance” of ODA 
gave more freedom to those who wanted to contribute to social causes. The entire institution 
was much less hierarchical. Rebecca had a small group of SDAs at her disposal who were 
committed to giving preference to social analytical methods of poverty analysis and 
development interventions. Moreover, Labour government’s coming to power was a positive 
change for Chief Development advisor and other lady SDAs, now instead of being considered 
“Miss Dalit” or, “Mrs. Marginal,”44 they were seen as important to the whole aid agenda. To 
begin with, this change put social development in the center. The number of SDAs was 
growing in DFID and its various chapters all over the world. The first White paper written 
after the 1997 election on the topic of international development had lots of input from these 
SDAs all over the world, including the then Chief SDA. This change was concerning the 
prevalence of gender issues in development and flow of aid channelled towards a project on 
gender in development. This laid the groundwork for social exclusion as a framework to enter 
in DFID (fieldwork informant).  
                                                             
44 Mrs. Marginal was a nickname given to a Social Development Advisor because of her concerns for the 
marginalized and socially excluded communities compared to poor in general among her counterparts in DFID.  
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As this narrative informs us, the UK aid was not only undergoing political but inter and intra-
institutional changes. These changes were directly and indirectly triggered by the broader 
paradigmatic changes in the field of poverty analysis. On the note of paradigmatic change or 
transition, it would be relevant to discuss the broader post-modern, geopolitical developments 
that resulted in the contemporary political-social repercussions. These political-social and 
economic repercussions were related to the disenchantment of people with the possibility of a 
welfare state, and the response to this was especially felt in intermediate and lower strata 
societies across Europe and Globe (Gardner and Lewis 1996:1-3). The academics, 
intellectuals, researchers, sociologists, economists and contemporary critics from the 
mainstream regimes of knowledge were also critical and looking for theoretically and 
empirically sound analytical conceptual framework of poverty analysis all over European 
think tanks and academia (Room 1995:3-4). The policy entrepreneurs and researchers from 
UK Aid think tanks and British universities were too not untouched of these waves of new 
thought, which is also reflected in the narrative above.   
 
Understanding and remembering this broader context is important for deconstructing the 
process of framing of social exclusion policy, which will consequently, give us a realistic 
idea about how the policies are framed. How are various forces and undercurrents shaped into 
a final product? The final policy product is unquestioningly assumed to be an outcome of 
political, state governance and compliant hierarchies of administrative bodies. However, this 
flawed view of policy not only distorts the reality but strengthen an unhealthy opinion about 
democratic and administrative inner workings. On epistemological and ontological levels, it 
obscures a truthful understanding or interpretation of social processes of change and status 
quo in social and political institutions. 
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4.8.1 The non-official processes of policy framing 
 
Going back to our topic of concern, so far we have identified and evaluated the broader 
political and paradigmatic reasons behind the emergence of social exclusion as a concept in 
Europe. However, in reference to our research context, we are yet to discuss the implicit and 
unofficial processes and practices that are involved in the formation as well as framing of a 
policy concept or framework. Institutions are not automated mechanical structures but rather, 
“sets of rules and norms that exists within and between organizations” (Crewe 2014:673) 
inhabited by and operated through the set of individuals called office bearers or bureaucrats.  
This makes but essential to focus on the role of international and national politics as well as 
the role of actors, interest groups and networks of professionals across and within aid 
bureaucracy behind the framing of policy concepts or frameworks. Jones (2009:5) underlines 
the linkages between knowledge and policy in development while exploring the role of power 
in the policy process that coalesce around intertwined relations of institutions, actors and 
networks and discourse. Further, he recommends researchers to focus on two key areas of 
practical insights that link knowledge with policy: the production of knowledge and the 
processes that involve investing the (policy) knowledge with individual and collective voices, 
disciplinary knowledge, empirical insights and ideological dimensions (Jones 2009:6).  
 
Harper (1998) and Broad (1987) both underline the necessity of international development 
organizations to consistently produce and reproduce development discourses anew in order to 
create international political consensus, legitimacy and, the justification for humanitarian 
causes of poverty alleviation or developing the underdeveloped. This explains the undying 
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waves of imperative framing and reframing, naming and renaming of various policy 
frameworks, ideas and themes arising time and again in the ocean of global development. 
 
The context specific framing and re-labelling of communities and countries subject to 
development renders them amenable to development intervention by international 
development institutions. Consequently making the development industry resilient (my 
unpublished paper). This is achieved through the mechanisms of “technology and innovation” 
or “knowledge management”, (Broad 2007:701) euphemistically called “knowledge sharing” 
and “knowledge adaptation” in top international corporate development institutions like the 
World Bank (WB), International Monetary Fund (IMF), and DFID. 
 
The development language which is used in policy papers, reports, briefs and aid projects is 
replete with the buzzwords, catchphrases and what is called fuzzwords striven all over the 
development literature. The deconstructivist and discursive analytical approaches have been 
prominently used for understanding the use of buzzwords, exposing fuzzy words and 
development jargon that emits the promises for a better tomorrow and make-believe images 
of the possibility of poverty eradication by international development intervention (Cornwall 
and Eade 2010 p: viii). However, if poverty forms a prerequisite for development, then the 
development speak (Sachs 1992) and the terminologies of poverty, provide a pretext for 
development intervention or tools of governmentality
45
. For example, social exclusion as 
social phenomenon already existed prior to its theorization or conceptualization as a 
                                                             
4545 The term governmentality is applied here, as it is understood in (Burchell, et al 1991:2) wherein the meaning 
of government is understood as ‘the conduct of conduct’: that is to say, a form of aiming to shape, guide or 
affect the conduct of some person or persons. Available on: 
https://laelectrodomestica.files.wordpress.com/2014/07/the-foucault-effect-studies-in-governmentality.pdf 
Accessed on: 15/12/2015 
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framework within the aid industry. However, the very act of conceptualization or framing of 
social exclusion gave a new lease to the development industry that nearly exhausted its 
efforts of global poverty reduction at that juncture in time. The adaptation, modification, and 
transition of the social exclusion concept from a local initiative to the global framework 
amply prove this. However, the deconstruction or critical discursive analysis of the social 
exclusion framework can eventually help in providing practical insights into the building 
blocks of social exclusion as a phenomenon by highlighting the factors and actors those have 
been excluded from the basic frame. 
 
This section will attempt to interpret the undocumented policy framing practices in order to 
deconstruct the phenomenon of the framing of the social exclusion policy framework in the 
light of the findings as well as the abovementioned insights.   
  
4.9 Achieving coherence with World Bank vocabulary 
 
A relevant example I came across during fieldwork relates to the recollections of an 
informant named Ryan, a former senior DFID bureaucrat and a European economist who had 
worked with WDR 2000 team. These forthcoming exemplary episodes are closely related. 
The first example shows us how policymakers are conscious about the political pressures 
from above and how they express their concerns about coordination or harmonization of 
terminologies with top economic institutions like the World Bank. The second example is 
about how defiant social development practitioners or social entrepreneurs prompted, by their 
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disciplinary and ideological convictions, strategically defy the dictates of political and 
administrative authorities. 
 
The following incident happened during the first phase of a social exclusion themed policy 
framework in DFID in 2000. It shows us how policy language and terminologies are 
deliberated, calibrated, collaborated, and internalized during the policy framing processes. 
This is done sometimes by authoritative decrees and sometimes through giving off-record 
instructions. One day, out of the blue, a high profile meeting was summoned in the (old) 
DFID headquarter building. This meeting was especially for the social advisors and 
employees who did work related to policy development and research. A cabinet level 
Minister was going to give a policy briefing on the “dos” and “do not(s)” concerning the 
publication of future literature. This was an unusual official occurrence as no one was 
formally informed or intimated beforehand. Interestingly, the informal aspect of this meeting 
speaks volumes about how the processes of policymaking are mired with complexities, 
continuities, and discontinuities. Ryan, who was a governance advisor, overheard an informal 
chat between his colleagues (SDAs) about the special instructions been given to them on the 
"maintenance of coherence" in the language of policy papers in accordance  with the broader 
international development targets (IDTs) led by the UN and prioritized by the World Bank.  
A special intimation was given to maintain coherence and consistency with the language and 
terminology of the World Bank. The implicit hint also indicated that the series of papers, 
reports, and workshops would be produced in due time by DFID and its think tank shall take 
care of it. 
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However, the issue of instructions to SDAs by an insistent politician created an issue. It took 
a toll on the patience and diplomacy of the SDA and some governance advisors who were 
finding it difficult to convince the Minister that "the stone is set rolling and it will gather the 
moss”.  This statement was in reference to the cautions of coordinating and calibrating with 
current "development speak" of the World Bank that has already been taken duly and 
therefore "not to worry”. These complexities around the framing and drafting of policies 
highlight the gap between the finally printed forms of development policies as it is perceived 
in the world outside "aidland," how the policies happen through the everyday practices within 
aid institutions. This incident shows how the international institutions, policymakers, and 
politicians are equally concerned about the use of selective terms and language of policy 
drafts or literature that frames or pronounce the policy.  On one hand, this incidence tells us 
about an entire implicit process or policy practices that involve social development advisors 
as key actors who constructs and convey the policy frames and themes (which I will discuss 
in Chapter 5). On the other hand, the concern to achieve coherence in development speech
46
 
between politicians, policymakers, and think tanks does resemble an unofficial effort.   
 
4.9.1 The issue of politically ‘incorrect’ terminology 
 
Another instance, from the DFID, is about a standoff between the Chief SDA, the Permanent 
Secretary, and then Cabinet Minister of International Development. This deadlock was 
caused due to the objection of the Permanent Secretary (a veteran mandarin) to the usage of 
certain terms signifying human rights approach in the policy papers. It was eventually solved 
                                                             
46 a term used for development jargon by Sachs (1992: X) 
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by negotiations in social entrepreneurial spirit by the Chief SDA and her team of SDAs in 
collaboration with the Cabinet Minister. 
 
This incident took place in the old DFID head-office during the preparations of the set of the 
key introductory papers that DFID sought to publish after adopting social exclusion as one of 
their key frameworks. This paper embedded social exclusion as one of the key causes of 
chronic poverty that not only causes people’s failure to enjoy their human rights but also 
hampers the achievement of IDTs. However, DFID’s stance on social exclusion or poverty as 
a violation of human rights made the Permanent Secretary uneasy. The distraught Permanent 
Secretary took it quite seriously (Informant Rebecca). He found it politically incorrect for an 
international development agency to use this term while intervening for poverty alleviation. 
He thought using the ‘human rights’ approach was as good as meddling into the political 
terrains of those countries and thus affects the bilateral relations, hurting the prospects of 
bilateral trade negotiations between the UK and those countries. This caused a big debate in 
the Policy and Research Department at DFID. This matter reached to the then Minister for 
International Development. Eventually, after many discussions and negotiations, the Chief 
SDA devised a way out of it. The Chief SDA, in coordination with her team of SDAs 
systematically reframed and rephrased the entire argument of DFID in terms of poverty in 
developing countries, giving it a positive slant. Social exclusion was switched to social 
inclusion and a rights-based approach was highlighted in terms of participating, obligation, 
and inclusion. With this, the matter was closed (Informant Rebecca and Caroline).  
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This example gives us an idea of how the finalized policy frame is the product of scores of 
unforeseen twists and turns during which a variety of factors and actors situated in the 
interstices of aid bureaucracy frame and mould   the policy through the process.  
 
4.9.2 Framing the policy concept 
 
Framing and naming have more profound, preparatory and overarching functions of 
constructing a problem to achieve (Apthorpe 1996:18) that preceded the creation of 
fuzzwords to spread fuzz and buzzwords to spread the buzz. Therefore, one can say that 
framing and naming are the building blocks of the dominant development discourses, and the 
buzzwords and fuzzwords decorate, aid and carry them forward to gain legitimacy, 
acceptance and justification without explanation (Cornwall and Brock 2005 p:iii).  However, 
the phenomenon of framing and naming should be understood separately from the 
phenomenon of creating buzzwords and fuzzwords. Buzzwords and fuzzwords work well 
because they are strategically ambiguous, and thus are seductive and appeal to our common 
sense so much so that even to the regular critical mind they sounds too obvious to challenge 
or question (Cornwall and Brock 2005p:iii). Nevertheless, not all policy framework always 
get smooth sailing, sometimes the analytical strength of the policy framework makes it 
difficult to be carried forth in international political domains where bilateral relations are 
prominently based on mutual economic interests. 
 
For example in DFID’s case, the tackling of social exclusion within developing countries 
entailed training the socially excluded how to use administration and the state to secure their 
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rights to decent living (PACS
47
 Working paper Theory of Change 2011). In this campaign, 
civil society was also one of the key stakeholders. However, in international development, the 
intervention to tackle social exclusion could have stepped over the blurred line or limit of 
political interference in the recipient country, which is technically a foreign country with its 
own autonomy. It could be seen as transgressing the diplomatic boundaries of nation states. 
The new coalition government in the UK led by the Conservative party was not ready to take 
this risk “due to the most critical focus of this framework on the underlying and often 
politically sensitive causes of poverty and exclusion” (Haan 2011:2). This type of 
precautionary tendency is reflected in an insider’s account above in the section on the 
processes of policy framing. 
 
Here a quick observation on comparison regarding between the receding of once celebrated 
concepts like “social capital” and “sustainability” and the diminishing recognition of the 
social exclusion concept in the aid industry would not be uncalled for. Terms like 
empowerment, social capital, gender equality and sustainability lost their currency due to 
their inherent theoretical weaknesses whereas social exclusion was sidetracked (de Haan 
2011:15) or put on the back stove (an informant from DFID). For instance, the first usage of 
“exclusion” and “solutions” proposed thereupon by Lenor (1974) in modern France, or DFID 
in its policy paper that intend to reduce poverty by tackling the social exclusion as a post-
modern social phenomenon (2005:1-2) hints towards the strength of this conceptual 
framework (de Haan 2011:7-8). This was essentially a political statement with reformative 
intention. Therefore, the social exclusion framework was neglected by later political regime 
due to its theoretical and analytical strength to reveal the social structural, political, and 
                                                             
47 PACS (Poorest Areas Civil Society Programmes) Available on : 
http://www.pacsindia.org/sites/pacsindia.org/files/Theory%20of%20change-1124B-forweb.pdf, Accessed on 
28/5/15 
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relational factors of deprivation (de Haan 2011:15). The difficulty on the part of the new 
coalition government to handle the theoretical-empirical strength of SEF that exposed the 
political, structural causes beneath the poverty in developing countries made it unattractive 
for the conservative government (informant Arthur, David, John). 
 
 In DFID’s case, the tackling of social exclusion within developing countries entailed training 
the socially excluded how to use administration and the state to secure their rights to decent 
living (PACS
48
 Working paper Theory of Change 2011). In this campaign, civil society was 
also one of the key stakeholders. However, in international development, the intervention to 
tackle social exclusion could have stepped over the blurred line or limit of political 
interference in the recipient country, which is technically a foreign country with its own 
autonomy. It could be seen as transgressing the diplomatic boundaries of nation states. The 
new coalition government in the UK led by the Conservative party was not ready to take this 
risk “due to the most critical focus of this framework on the underlying and often politically 
sensitive causes of poverty and exclusion” (Haan 2011:2). This type of precautionary 
tendency is reflected in an insider’s account above in the section on the processes of policy 
framing. 
 
From the point of view of framing the policy and usage of language to construct, a policy 
Apthorpe (1996:20) observes that, “the chief function of any political term is to marshal 
political support, wherein, some terms are quite obvious while the potent ones are covert and 
imply strong undercurrent of power relationship.”  While such term executes the function 
                                                             
48 PACS (Poorest Areas Civil Society Programmes) Available on : 
http://www.pacsindia.org/sites/pacsindia.org/files/Theory%20of%20change-1124B-forweb.pdf, Accessed on 
28/5/15 
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“when the power of professionals over other people is at stake, the language employed 
implies that the professionals have ways to ascertain who is poor, marginalized, sick, 
dangerous or inadequate and to diagnosis and treatment” (Apthorpe 1996:20, informant 
Alex). This phenomenon could be exemplified with the American President Truman’s first 
speech in 1949 (Esteva 1992:1), wherein he used the word “under-developed” for poor 
countries for the first time and proposed a global level solution of “development” for them. 
Truman described that under-developed nations are inhabited by people “who are miserable, 
with inadequate food, victims of disease and their economic life as primitive and stagnant.” 
Truman said, “They are handicapped by poverty and hence a threat both to themselves and to 
more prosperous areas” (Esetva 1992:1-2). 
 
In contrast to “the miserable poor without sufficient food” for Truman, the United States was 
a “pre-eminent nation” that had immense industrial, scientific and technological strength that 
is constantly growing and inexhaustible. Nevertheless, the imperative of redeeming the “less 
fortunate,” by “rescuing them” or at least devising or outlining a plan to uplift them, reminds 
us of the analogy of the “Whiteman’s burden” (Kipling 1899). Thus, the making of “poor 
nations” is in itself part of the formation of the development discourse that is part of the 
strong moral-political-economical imperative justifying “development intervention” at any 
given time. Herein lays the origin or prototype of the later term in the development industry, 
such as poor, endemic poverty, social cohesion, social exclusion, social protection, 
empowerment, poverty alleviation, and much more, as explained in Sachs (1992). The 
patronizing undertone is quite evident in Truman’s speech, which holds the “less fortunate” 
and “underdeveloped” as a threat to themselves. As the craft of policymaking demands, the 
language used in the first place underplays or completely omits the root cause of the problem. 
Here I would say the nominalization of the root cause, the categorization of the poor through 
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equivalence and differences & legitimation for intervention to end poverty has been achieved 
through the speech of Truman.   
 
Apthorpe (1996:24) argues, “poverty framed and named as per economics and mechanisms, 
and poverty framed and named as politics and institutions, are very different theories of 
poverty and likely to lead to different policies.” This is appropriately applicable to the 
formation or emergence of social exclusion frameworks. Also, the interest group behind any 
policy theme speaks volumes about the political significance and grassroots social 
applicability of any policy. As it is the case with the social exclusion policy framework and 
its advocacy by policy entrepreneurs with social commitments. There was political 
sidetracking of the social exclusion framework and ambiguity and non- unanimity about its 
meanings and applications on the part of many development practitioners from the DFID. 
Despite, this neglect, and disarray the framework did not lose its conceptual-analytical 
strength.   Therefore, social exclusion is the frame of the picture that includes many groups of 
people, not just the poor, but chronically poor and disadvantaged due to their systematic 
exclusion from opportunities that are open to others, and close to them due to their race, 
religion, gender, caste, age, disability, and location. However, this frame excludes the role of 
those who have access to social, political, and economic opportunities in addressing or 
perpetuating social exclusion.  CDA in the following exercise helps us highlighting this 
dimension of the policy making as well. 
 
The missing link could be found by looking beyond the picture or frame and asking the 
deconstructivist questions: which community or class has the power to define the socially 
excluded? Are those communities to whom the doors of social, economic and political 
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opportunities are open taken into consideration? Why these opportunities are open to them or 
how do they manage to get access to those privileges and opportunities that are denied to the 
socially excluded? Doing this will not only help us to see if we are on the right path of curing 
social exclusion, but it will also help us in understanding the detailed hidden dimensions of 
social exclusion and thus help inform potential solutions that bring about real change in the 
lives of those at the receiving end. The prevalent frame of the social exclusion approach 
restricts our ability even to think about any possibility of the socially excluded having any 
agency or capacity to see any potential instances wherein any individual or collective attempt 
of overcoming the handicap of social exclusion have been done (Informant Ray, Arthur, 
Harris). 
 
4.10 The significance of CDA (Critical Discursive Analysis) 
 
Discourse analysis in anthropology started as an ethnography of speaking or ethnography of 
communication (Dijk 1985:3). It looked at the structures of meaning and intention beyond the 
sentence. It searched for the context and sub-text of the textual forms of discourse so as to 
understand the objective inherent in the statement made, language that is spoken or text 
written. Using an interdisciplinary perspective, it draws from subfields of linguistics, 
semiotics, sociolinguistics, or pragmatics. CDA includes the studying of language, symbols, 
images, signs, grammar, and conversational analysis. CDA has been used quite constructively 
by critical discourse analysts not to just criticize, but to contribute towards the efficient 
working of the aid industry in the larger interest of the poor. In the context of international 
development, this has been done by deconstructing the speech, text, and images to reveal the 
173 
 
hidden scripts of power, disciplining, legitimizing and consensus creation by the development 
industry done in the name of development interventions.   
 
CDA deconstructs a concept, idea, or dominant presentation by critically analyzing three 
important parts that constitute the concept, its genre, style, and discourse (Fairclough 
2003:123-133). It is pertinent to keep in mind the centrality of text analysis to discourse 
analysis that moves its focus from specific texts in the “order of discourse”, which is what, 
according to Fairclough (2003:4), is “the relatively durable social structuring of language 
which is itself one element of the relatively durable structuring and networking of social 
practices.” 
 
Therefore, it serves our purpose in hand to reveal what “discourse” means. What is meant by 
the term “text”? In the words of Fairclough (2003:6), the “term discourse (as it is widely used 
in discourse analysis) indicates the particular view of language in use that reveals the closely 
interconnected elements of social life it is constituted of”. The term “text” here implies 
“written and printed texts, newspaper articles, also transcripts of (spoken) conversations and 
interviews, as well as television programmes and web pages” (Fairclough 2003: 6). Likewise, 
the exercise of CDA involves the identification of various lingual devices like 
nominalization,
49
 appearances and reality,
50
 legitimation
51
 through rationalization, and 
equivalences and differences.
52
 It is also important to consider how discourse has been used 
                                                             
4949 Nominalization: CDA devise to identify the ways of nominalise an entity without any corresponding reality. 
50 Appearances and reality: CDA term to reveal the difference between what is the reality of subject and how it 
is depicted/attributed in discourse 
51 Legitimation: CDA tool to identify the techniques of rationalization and justification. 
 
52 Equivalences and differences: CDA tool to identify the commonalities and diversions in two different 
discourses of same concept or phenomenon. 
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to construct as well as deconstruct the policy framework under study so as to underline its 
meaning. This is being done to understand the mechanism of framing, naming and classifying 
of social types and their attributes and unification under a single frame, the impression of 
reality that is, in fact, not reality (Apthorpe 1996). For example, devising of rationalization 
helps to create the necessity and legitimizing of development interventions. The role of 
framing and naming helps in creating the discourse of a policy idea or conceptual framework 
within international development establishments, while framing the location of the poor and 
forms and nature of their deprivation. It eventually feeds into the processes of agencies in 
mediating, shaping, and formulating the policy ideas and knowledge.  
 
There are various ways of doing CDA and in this case, I have decided to go for selected text 
analysis. I will do an analysis of the definition of social exclusion as a conceptual tool or 
frame by discussing the processes of framing and naming of the poor and poverty in their 
new forms. There are a number of approaches other than the CDA used to study aid, aid-
policy and policy making in international development. As Mosse states, there are those who 
are concerned with the political economy of knowledge, its relation to institutional power and 
the maintenance of organizational legitimacy focusing on the quality and the accountability 
of the expert knowledge (2011:8). Others focus on the transmission mechanisms of expert 
knowledge covering a wide range of professionals in transnational agencies, firms, and NGOs 
(2011:8-9). Another approach that CDA deals with shifts attention away from the rationality 
of power-disciplining or governmentalizing, towards more ambiguous processes of actual 
knowledge production, to actor worlds and the social life of ideas,  highlighting the 
importance of actor relationships in the shaping and the importance of policy ideas in 
mediating professional relationships (Mosse 2011:10).  
175 
 
 
4.11 Critical discourse analysis (CDA) of Social exclusion framework  
 
Discourse analysts have critically analyzed terms like empowerment, gender, civil society, 
discrimination, and poverty as well as various kinds of speech, text, and images represented 
in the literature produced on global development intervention. Further, the discourses on 
development and underdevelopment produced and reproduced by academics, development 
professionals, international aid agencies and international development think tanks like ODI 
and IDS have been the focus of studies (Chambers and Alfini 2010; Batliwala 2011, Eyben 
and Moncrieffe 2007). However, here I will focus on the first, and the latest definition, in the 
backdrop of the various versions of the conceptual framework of social exclusion. I will do so 
to underline the similarities and disjuncture between the definitions in its varying locations 
and objectives that the definitions were perceived to be designed for. 
From the perspective above, there is not a single discourse of social exclusion. Rather, there 
are as many discourses as there are texts produced in their peculiar political, regional, social 
context at different junctures of time. However, there are still the text specific recurring 
elements and order of the ideas in the discourse of social exclusion that trickled down to the 
definition of the latest one. We are going to take this trickling down into consideration.  
Even after the conceptual journey of nearly 40 years between the two, social exclusion still 
retains its original nomenclature and the core of its meaning. At every new turn, the social 
exclusion framework was reworked, complemented and modified with new qualities, social, 
political categories, new class-categories so as to make it theoretically strong and to give it a 
crosscutting social-analytical, edge which was never intended to start with. The political, 
structural connotations of this framework become more poignant, to the extent of manifesting 
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its original reformist agenda and thus it became politically unpalatable for the organization 
and policy makers from its last destination when the Conservative-led government scrapped 
this framework and put it on the back stove (an informant,) as it supported by de Haan ‘s 
research (2011:20).  
 
These abovementioned different discourses of social exclusion have their separate repertoire, 
often building on other terms and analogies from the original one. The terms and 
terminologies employed signify economic change; represent geopolitical paradigms, such as 
neo-liberalization and the global phenomenon of globalization, which are either attested or 
asserted in reports, discourses, texts, and conversations (Silver 1994:536, Kabir 2005:91).  
For instance, sexual orientation, ethnicity, caste, and religion were not part of the original 
frame of social exclusion to start with; they were added later on during DFID's discursive 
formation in order to accommodate the newly identified victims of social exclusion in a 
rapidly globalizing world with an unprecedented movement of people across borders. 
 
4.11.1 Political context of its origin 
 
In light of the information in hand, we can say that social exclusion was a policy concept that 
rose to prominence in the late 90s as a necessary paradigmatic response to question the 
inadequacy of using economic parameters of measuring poverty or assessing the causes of 
endemic poverty in Europe (Room 1992:3-5). This unease originated in French society was 
also experienced in the UK, and through the European commission studies, resonated in the 
World Social Summit. Given the contemporary raging debates in the ILM conferences, 
177 
 
European academia, in the context of European disenchantment about the project of 
modernity and the failure of the modern state in providing wide and strong safety nets to the 
underclass of Europe, this would be quite simplistic explanation (Informant Alex, European 
Council report 1989a, the European Commission report 1990d). The interesting exploratory 
narration of the journey of social exclusion from France to the European commission, to 
domestic policy of UK government led by Labour to DFID’s reworked model of poverty 
analysis has been discussed previously in Chapter 4. Therefore, we shall limit ourselves to the 
CDA of this policy and its literary course.  
 
4.11.2   Social contexts of its emergence 
 
The original framework of the social exclusion policy (SEP) that was used in France had 
particular religious, social and historical context. The failure of the French welfare state in 
providing an adequate safety net to the weaker sections of French society – those that were 
excluded from mainstream – was the reason cited for the failure of modernity. However, 
subsection 4.2.2 above discusses the social context of the emergence of the concept of social 
exclusion in details.  
In reference to the social life of the SEF in DFID, the extra-official role of policymakers and 
the networks of social development policy entrepreneurs should not be underestimated. 
Nevertheless, this entire thesis centres on the extra-official or non-official policy practices 
conducted by policymakers, policy diplomats, and policy entrepreneurs from the aid industry. 
The span of the networks of development practitioners and policy entrepreneurs is not limited 
to any one particular institution or development organization; it is cast wide and across 
national boundaries and many times goes well beyond the aid industry into civil society 
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organizations and local movement and activists to grass-root people. Mosse calls these 
networks of development professionals or interest groups the epistemic communities 
(2011:22). 
 
4.11.3 Four versions of the Social Exclusion Framework 
 
There are four main versions of the SEF given below, which set the context for CDA. 
However, I am going to analyze only two of them for the purpose of textual or discursive 
analysis, the French version, and the DFID version. This is because the first and the latest 
discursive formations around the concept of social exclusion will be covered and the 
juxtaposition of these two will give us an idea about the changes that it has undergone and the 
reasons thereof. The changes I am going to discuss are related to the change in language used 
and terms applied while defining the socially excluded as a new category of poor in new 
contexts.  
 
4.11.4 The French version of SEF (Social Exclusion Framework) 
 
Much has been written about SEF from the point of view of advocacy due to its analytical-
theoretical strength. The social exclusion framework (SEF) has been recognized as an 
efficient framework that helps make sense of the multidimensional and relational factors 
behind the chronic deprivation and marginalization in different demographic contexts (Silver 
1994, Kabeer 2005, De Haan 2011). In addition, the baggage of cultural and political 
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traditions each version of social exclusion carries is one of the salient features that underlies 
these various versions of social exclusion given below (Silver 1994).   
 
As such, French definition of the SEF that is offered in the Les Exclus: Un Francais sur Dix' 
by René Lenoir (1974) heavily relies on the Republican notion of solidarity. Lenoir talked 
about the “rupture in the social bond” that makes member of society those who are excluded 
fell out of the safety net, which was against the Republican contract of solidarity (de Haan 
1999:6). The number of emergent social issues in post world-war French society, including 
the unmet challenges of unemployment, poverty, and new forms of poverty in the French 
welfare state were in the backdrop of the French SEF. Nevertheless, according to French 
policy makers, the excluded were those who were bearing the burns of unemployment, 
ghettoization and new kind of social problems because of the economic crises of the 1980s. 
They were not the regular poor but rather a new breed of poor (Silver 1994, de Haan 1999) 
produced by the failure of the French welfare state to keep its promises in post world war 
period. 
The Following French version of social exclusion classifies the group of socially excluded 
within the SEF. This definition is borrowed from the original text by René Lenoir, Secrétaire 
d’Etat a l’Action Sociale of the French Government led by Chirac, wherein he had included a 
wide variety of people, other than the conventional poor, that constitute the excluded, in total 
comprising one-tenth of the French population. It includes: 
mentally and physically handicapped, suicidal people, aged invalids, abused children, 
substance abusers, delinquents, single parents, multi-problem households, marginal, 
asocial persons, and other social ‘misfits'-those who fell through the insurance-based 
social safety-net (1974). 
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The above list of the French categories of poor shows us the interpretation of socially 
excluded by French politicians and policy makers. In addition, there is an important shift in 
attitude towards poor or in the perception of the poor; in general, that includes people or 
groups with generally criminal attributes (i.e. substance abusers, ‘misfits' and delinquents, 
and people with a psychosomatic handicap like physically disabled, suicidal, and aged 
people). 
 
4.11.5 The European version of SEF (social exclusion framework) 
 
The European Commission established The Observatory on National Policies to Combat 
Social Exclusion with the intention of studying the underlying causes of poverty in European 
countries in terms of social exclusion (Room et al. 1992). This resulted in the publications of 
a number of reports attempting to understand the policy issues, which lead to a debate 
between European countries on poverty, deprivation, and exclusion. The Observatory was the 
French government’s attempt to identify the causes of exclusion at grassroots. The 
Observatory intended to address the problem of exclusion of employment opportunities 
through an SEF that analyzed poverty-related handicaps in European countries.   
 
The definition of social exclusion process (European Foundation 1995:24), given below, had 
the background of the comparative and analytical consolidated empirical reports and 
theoretical debates produced in France and by European commission publications. It also has 
the context of unease among European policy makers, policy analysts, and academia in 
general for the dominant income based or economic criteria of poverty analysis (Room et al., 
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1992; Silver 1994). The social exclusion framework was preferred due to its capacity to 
highlight the multidimensionality of poverty caused by non-economic such as social 
structural, cultural, and political factors. 
‘Social exclusion is the process through which individuals or groups are wholly or 
partially excluded from full participation in the society in which they live Can be caused 
either by failure to secure employment (exclusion from the labour market) or by limited 
access to benefits of social services. This may be related to an absence of full citizen 
rights.' 
 
4.11.6 The social exclusion as British domestic policy framework 
 
Social exclusion is what can happen when people or areas suffer from a combination of linked 
problems such as unemployment, poor skills, low incomes, poor housing, high crime, poor health, and 
family breakdown. 
(Social exclusion Unit, 1997) 
Above the Labour Government, establish the third version of the SEF as it was used in the 
brochure of the Social Exclusion Unit in 1997. Here I would like to add a reflection that 
Social exclusion as the domestic policy framework of Britain has its roots in the social justice 
commission. The late Labour leader John Smith, MP, set up this commission. This 
commission produced a report that prescribed the “Strategies of National Renewal”.  Later 
this report became a part of the Labour Manifesto that pronounced Labour’s commitment to 
include the groups left out from mainstream or excluded from it due to scores of the UK 
specific social, political, economic reasons (IPPR report 1994). 
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The findings of the Social Justice Commission report were included in the Labour Party's 
election manifesto. Some studies suggest that it was a strategic political move of the Labour 
Party think tank and its leaders in order to attract the traditional vote bank of working men 
now turning into the middle class (Haddon 2012: 4-6)as well as those who were left out of 
the mainstream. 
 
4.11.7 The DFID version of social exclusion framework (SEF) 
 
 
The DFID version of social exclusion framework says:  
Social exclusion is a process by which certain groups are systematically disadvantaged 
because they are discriminated against on the basis of their ethnicity, race, religion, sexual 
orientation, caste, descent, gender, age, disability, HIV status, migrant status or where 
they live. Discrimination occurs in public institutions, such as the legal system or 
education and health services, as well as social institutions like the household.’ (DFID 
Policy paper 2005) 
In DFID, the SEF was applied to tackle social exclusion in order to reduce global poverty. A 
comprehensive application to meet the international need for the adaptation of SEF was a 
striking feature of the latest definition of DFID's Social Exclusion Framework. While the 
earlier French version laid heavy emphasis on social exclusion as a localized phenomenon, 
DFID’s version of the SEF, by virtue of its global application to poor communities from 
developing countries, included the social exclusion caused due to religion, caste, race, 
ethnicity, sexual orientation, and migrant status as well. 
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Nevertheless, DFID’s framed definition of socially excluded in its policy paper in 2005 
indicates the operational aspects of social exclusion while mentioning the underlying social 
markers of identities. This hints at the gradual change in style and prose of policy writing 
where language becomes more direct and rationalizing for intervention but still elusive about 
its purpose or solution. Neither does it talk about the root cause of the issue of social 
exclusion.  
 
4.12 Textual analysis of two selected Social Exclusion Framework (SEF) 
definitions.  
 
 Total four definitions have been discussed above, however, for the analytical purpose only 
two definitions, the French one and DFID’s are used in the following analysis. The 
discursive, analytical linguistic tools, such as ‘appearances and reality’, ‘nominalization’, 
‘equivalences and differences’ and ‘rationalization ‘(legitimation) are used in the following 
exercise. This exercise is in order to deconstruct and classify the usage of various parts of the 
clause, adjectives, and adverbs employed in language to achieve certain effects while 
constructing statement, representation and constructing the social specific context of the 
problem in hand. This exercise is done to show how the social issue is framed while 
underlying games of power, hegemony, and non-empathy exist significantly below the 
surface of terms employed to create the frame. In addition, this entire exercise hints towards 
the omission of the social-political agency of the socially excluded and the power of framers 
of the socially excluded. Each of the selected texts that represent a specific discourse of social 
exclusion in its respective social-political context discussed above is followed by the analysis 
using the linguistic tools and de-framing. 
184 
 
 
4.12.1 The French version 
 
The following definition is borrowed from the original text, Les Exclus: Un Francais sur Dix 
by René Lenoir, wherein he included a wide variety of following people, other than the 
conventional poor, that constituted the excluded, which made up one-tenth of the French 
population. They are: 
mentally and physically handicapped, suicidal people, aged invalids, abused children, substance 
abusers, delinquents, single parents, multi-problem households, marginal, asocial persons, and other 
social ‘misfits'- those who fell through the insurance-based social safety-net (1974) 
This definition was originally formed in modern France in the 1970s to represent French 
citizens below the poverty line, suffering from destitution with different attributes than the 
poor in general. This formulation, as it has been observed, had an ideological leaning of 
republicanism that presumed the social contract of solidarity as per the Rousseurian 
proposition (Silver 1994). 
 
Appearances and reality: A) The social, political analysis or description of the excluded as 
suicidal, delinquents, marginal, and misfits are biased and superficial in appearances to the 
realities beneath and it takes issues at face value rather than the consequences of prior 
circumstances or the social trajectory of an individual. It is as good as stereotyping the 
communities by conferring attributes. Casual social-structural or political effects on the 
above-mentioned subjects are not implicated. Moreover, we get an impression that these 
groups, with their attributes, are responsible for what they have been branded as by policy 
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makers in position and authority to label them rather than the external forces such as the 
market and a lack of propitious circumstances to overcome the handicap. 
 
Nominalization:  A) Again, terms like mentally and physically handicapped, invalids, 
misfits, and substance abusers are highly opinionated and one sided that nominalises the 
subjects as the separate entity rather than consequences or product of broader political-
economic processes. This is probably a product of a point of view from the social-economical 
vantage grounds that exudes the air of social  aloofness towards which excludes these 
community members with “special needs” (as they are understood today) of their social 
personality and dignity. Moreover, this exercise of naming ‘merely’ nominalises the social 
structural root causes, unequal distribution of resources and market forces responsible for 
purpose of ‘development intervention’ without ‘accountability’. 
 
Equivalences and differences: A) The subjects of the social exclusion, that is, the excluded 
one and their division and further subversion (say combination) under one nomenclature is a 
good example of differences and equivalences.  This process is a textual instance of the 
production and reproduction of words and phrases and their unification. This originates from 
the political process and hegemony or top-down view (Fairclough 2003:99). This 
grammatical process is intended to classify and clump together.  The way the “misfits” or 
“invalids” of all the hues and colours from French society are mentioned and clubbed 
together as “Les Exclus” makes it an apt example of a semantic exercise done in policy 
framing. To put it in plain words, this is how the ruling elite class of contemporary France 
could perceive and describe the socially excluded. 
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Legitimation: A) A rationalization is the main form of legitimation, which refers to the 
necessity and efficacy of institutionalized action (Fairclough 2003:99). The very ‘insensitive’ 
terms used for the victims of social exclusion, like mentality and physically “handicapped,”, 
substance abusers, invalids, delinquent, abused and misfits in themselves act as terms that 
rationalize the third party or state intervention so as to uplift the worst of the poor. These 
terms appeal to the conscience of common masses as well as other political and economic 
stakeholders. In addition, it is in line with the commonsensical understanding that anyone 
who is suffering from such circumstances deserves the solidarity and helping hand of the 
society, hence the terms utilized acts as realistic images urging and rationalizing for 
“redemptive” action. Now, this legitimation while creating the rational ground for moral 
action or responsibility towards the socially excluded segregate and sophisticatedly maintains 
the dichotomy of interrelations between the social positions and situations of ‘haves' and 
‘have-nots'.  
 
4.12.2 DFID version 
 
The following is DFID’s definition of social exclusion that was published in a 2005 policy 
paper.  The UK Aid adopted and reframed social exclusion framework to tackle the causes of 
chronic poverty among the poor communities from developing countries such as South Asia, 
China, and South Africa. This analytical concept was redefined in order to address and 
analyze the causes of the chronic poverty anew. Due to its analytical strength, this framework 
was considered suitable to tackle the non-economic, social structural factors behind the 
global poverty. The contemporary dominant geopolitical paradigm during this definition was 
neo-liberalism or new capitalism. 
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        “Reducing poverty by tackling social exclusion.”  
                                                                                       (Heading of DFID Policy paper 2005)  
“People need the opportunity to participate fully in the life of their community if they are 
to flourish and realize their potential. However, certain groups in society are 
systematically excluded from the opportunities that are open to others, because they are 
discriminated against on the basis of their race, religion, gender, caste, age, disability, or 
other social identities. 
People who are excluded like this are not ‘just like’ the rest of the poor, only poorer. 
These poor are also disadvantaged by the reason of who they are or where they live and 
consequently they are locked out of the benefits of development. Social exclusion 
deprives people of choices and opportunities to escape from poverty and denies them a 
voice to claim their rights.” 
      (Foreword DFID policy paper 2005) 
Appearances and reality In the DFID conceptual framework, the social actors (subjects) are 
represented in a passive colour, (i.e. “People need the opportunity, disadvantaged ...those 
who are discriminated”) hence implying their incapability to exert influence or challenge the 
situation thus their agency has been underplayed. Compared to the original concept of social 
exclusion, incapability of agency to the sufferer is still prevails, even after 45 years of change 
in awareness about the stigma attached to certain social, mental and economical inabilities. 
However, unlike the original, second categorization does mention “those who are 
discriminated” at least allude to how the excluded have been discriminated and there is 
someone who is a discriminator. 
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Nominalization:  Nominalization of the excluded is been avoided in the DFID’s 
definition, rather the characteristics are attributed to groups and communities denominated by 
the defining factors like caste, ethnicity, sexual orientation and religions. The representation 
of the event of exclusion (in this case, the ones who are excluded in public places and 
institutions) obfuscates the individual agency and in a patronizing way creates the need of 
rescuing them from the social tyranny without making any explicit reference to who is the 
discriminator. 
 
Equivalences and differences: A similar exercise of bringing about the varied categories of 
the socially excluded under the umbrella of one term has been repeated in the later period 
within DFID as well. As if, it is a potent exercise to highlight the subjects by the ‘makers of 
the universe of poor’. However, DFID uses politically correct terms rather than insensitive 
and offensive vocabulary like in the original, which signifies a general awareness about the 
underlying meanings of language. 
 
Legitimation The DFID policy paper starts its foreword with a strong justification 
(rationalization) that outlines the need to help the socially excluded people. With the 
ascending argument, i.e. excluded are not just like the rest of the poor- but acutely 
disadvantaged and deprived hence deserving candidate to be developed through giving aid–
the foreword builds a strong case of legitimation for development intervention.  
The ascending use of the phrases like below proves it: 
 (a) ‘people need the opportunity to participate fully ... life of their community’ 
(b)... to flourish and realize their potential' 
189 
 
(c) ... Certain groups are systematically excluded...because they are discriminated...based on 
their race, religion, gender, caste, age, disability, or other social identities. 
(d) They are not ‘just like’ the rest of the poor, only poorer 
In addition what looks like the new approach to ‘framing' is the solution or objective to aid 
the socially excluded people has been included in this definition. This is reflected in the 
phrases like ‘people need the opportunity to participate fully... to flourish and realize their 
potential. 
 
From the point of view of contemporary economic and political systems, the French 
definition is limited to the French context, while DFID’s definition was meant to apply to the 
global poor in the days of neo-liberalization and globalization.  DFIDs definition takes into 
consideration the excluded people and the phenomenon of poverty throughout the globe. The 
movements of people across borders and potential exclusion the newly forming clusters of 
various ethnicities and migrants might face in their migration to new destinations are 
represented in DFID’s definition of social exclusion.  
 
This is visible in the classification of the ‘excluded people’ by Lenor (1974). While the use of 
terms for  ‘excluded social groups’ in French version  i.e. “delinquents, invalids , substance 
abusers and ‘misfits’ connote localized marginalized characters which connote the modern 
phenomenon; however, the inclusion of race, religion, migrants, descent, gender, and 
ethnicity as an indicator of exclusion signify the post-modern characteristics and 
globalization of local issues through the  movement of people .  
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 It also signifies the broader application of the social exclusion approach to the central 
elements of deprivation, multidimensionality, and the processes and social relations that 
trigger deprivation (de Haan 1999). Hence, we can say that the French social exclusion 
approach was intended for social groups that were excluded from within the nation and in the 
DFID; approach is for groups within and across the changing context of globalization. In 
addition, DFID’s definition was characterized by new findings based on empirical studies and 
research that informed new directions in understanding poverty through the lens of chronic 
poverty (Bevan 2003) and exclusion using rights-based approach and debates on conceptual 
differences between traditional poverty and exclusion (Room at el 1992). 
Moreover, the application of right based approach is characterized by the addition of a new 
marker of social discrimination, namely caste. The inclusion of attributes of the race and 
migration as a potential marker of exclusion hints towards the contemporary economic, 
political, and social processes and relations operating on a global level hence relates to the 
processes of globalization.  
 
Fairclough (2003:101-102) simplifies the Bourdieun (1984) proposition of the relationship 
between “vision” and “division” as two ways of dividing up parts of the world while 
generating a particular “vision” of the world, ways of seeing and acting upon. Different 
discourses employ different categorization of the excluded,  as it is evident from the above 
two discourses divided by two different spans of times, the modern or post WWII and the 
neo-liberal era, two different geographical areas, two different kinds of societies, two 
different visions of worlds they exist in. The former definition of the phenomenon of social 
exclusion is limited to groups excluded from the mainstream of French society during the 
1970s wherein the terms delinquent, invalids and misfits reflect the hegemonic 
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representations of poor people suffering from mental, physical, and social disabilities. 
Eventually, this social and economic backwardness or exclusion from mainstream society 
results into categorization or classification of marginalized groups from the perspectives of a 
politician who is also a member of the French ruling class. 
 
However, in the textual construction of both the definition of what is common and what is not 
changed, despite all this time and space difference, is that it does not nominalise the one who 
excludes or executes the process of exclusion, in the French definition.  
 
The terms “mentally and physically handicapped”, “suicidal”“, abused”, “and marginal” and 
“other social misfits” does not name the forces that cause these things. As Eyben (2004:12) in 
her joint development, bibliography on political and social inequality adds up to Wood’s 
(2003:4) suggestion, that “people are poor because of others”. She argues that ‘poverty is also 
a state that is quintessentially defined (by those experiencing it), either in relation to others 
who are not in that same state or to themselves in an earlier or hoped for the future state". 
From Eyben's perspective although the ‘social exclusion' was defined by the so-called 
socially excluded but the usage of those terms seems to put the burden of the cause of 
exclusion on the excluded themselves while omitting any reference towards the forces, vested 
interests or groups from market economies and conventional power structures. The same goes 
the DFID’s definition, particularly the phrase, “those who are discriminated against on the 
basis of…”  
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However, this does not mean that there have not been changes in perspective and approaches 
towards the poor or socio-economically weaker sections of the society. The positive aspect of 
difference in the social and global attitude towards the excluded is reflected in DFID's 
definition by describing the “victims” of social apathy. In addition, there is a drastic change 
in the approach towards the preventive measures reflected in the terms used to signify the 
reasons of exclusion within the span of two decades. In addition, the social and public spaces 
or spheres of potential discrimination indicate a more open approach and positive awareness 
about the matter in hand and non-patronizing attitude unlike earlier.  
 
There have been diverse discourses about poor and poverty in development industry since 
1949
53
 mostly dependent on the defining spirit or self-perceptions of donor nations that were 
deeply reflected and ingrained in the framers, policymakers, development practitioners and 
managers of the development industry with regards to what the recipient countries and their 
mainstream culture think about. This problematic of outward projection of larger than life 
historical, political, and social self has have been one of the dominant characteristics of the 
international development industry. This outward gaze of donor countries can be equated 
with the occidental tendencies or tendencies of Orientalism. The anthropology of 
development has been part and parcel of this problematic and this problem of the lack of an 
inward gaze in the development industry has been started to be addressed by the 
anthropology of development (Mosse 2005, Eyben 2004; Gardner and Lewis 1996). 
 
4.13 Emancipatory reading of policy 
 
                                                             
53 Since first American President Truman first pronounced it in his speech in  1949 ( Esteva 1992) 
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Production of policy knowledge or policy framing according to Mosse (2011:10) involves 
decision-making knowledge, including, apparently hard economic facts and statistics, are the 
outcome of complex relationships including negotiations over status, access, disciplinary 
points of view, team leadership struggles, conflict management or compliance with client 
frameworks defining what counts as knowledge (Best 2013).  The complexities that surround 
policy production also influence the policy content or the gist of policy. Therefore, policy 
reading is distinct from any reading of technical material or literature; it requires different 
perspective and technique. 
 
Apthorpe (1996) argues in his classical article on reading development policy and policy 
analysis that the two phenomena of the framing and naming of the policy are two crucial 
ways when it comes to the discursive analysis of development policy. A CDA focuses on the 
framing and naming of policy eventually aids in what he calls, quoting Green (1983), is an 
“emancipatory reading” of a policy. 
 
By introducing discourse analysis into development policy studies, Apthorpe offers us a 
glimpse of the exemplary outcome of his substantive analysis of aid policy language that 
depicts development policy-talk as being “helping” by “giving” (and his later addition) 
“promising” through aid made available under certain conditions (1996). This is what he later 
calls the “emancipatory reading” of policy language. This emancipatory reading tells us about 
the social, structural, political, and ideological dimensions of the policy. It is geopolitical, 
historical, social and political context against which it comes into existence, ironically 
enough, omits the very critical background that it arose from which is demonstrated in CDA 
exercise above. Although Apthrope recommends the use of two other tools, numbering, and 
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coding, I have decided to use only the first two tools, framing and naming, so as to 
deconstruct the discourse of social exclusion. The processes of framing the policy idea help 
to project the policy in an unquestionable manner. It creates a seemingly legitimate need for 
the intervention or act of providing a solution or remedy for social, economic or political ills. 
Framing and naming obscure the very politics of policy, making it difficult for those who 
advocate for and implement the policy to be reflexive. Here by reflexive, I mean reflecting by 
stepping into the shoes of the excluded. Moreover, by politics of policy, I mean the process 
that result in the choosing of selective terms and language to frame policy to build a 
legitimate case of development or humanitarian assistance. This process is discussed above. 
Simultaneously, while the act of framing social exclusion and naming includes a set of 
factors that caused the exclusion of a person, it omits several other factors, possibilities, and 
insights that could eventually inform the production and constructive implementation of 
policy in future policies.  Hence, this misses the dynamics of policy processes and services it 
is designed to provide thus defeating its own cause. We are going to see how this happens in 
the following section. 
 
 
4.13.1 De-framing the concept 
 
What is “de-framing” and what does it involve? De-framing could be described as an attempt 
to avoid or break the existing frame of any conceptual framework. In the case of social 
exclusion, it is to look at the depoliticization of the processes and examples of social 
exclusion to look at those who label the socially excluded and to whom they label. It would 
mean also to look at who are not socially excluded.  What picture is conjured up when we say 
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socially excluded? Does it involve looking into the possibilities of the socially excluded 
people existing beyond the established frame? If we do this exercise, it could be termed as 
de-framing. Here, depoliticization implies decontextualizing the perspective. For example, 
going beyond the value position or social standpoint of who is saying socially excluded to 
whom. 
 
For example, as per my informant Ray, breaking the frame of the social exclusion framework 
would be to delimit the frame of poverty so it only includes the poor or marginalized. Once 
we break the narrow frame of poor and poverty, we would be able to see that there are rich 
and well to do among poor communities and poor countries as well. If we break the boundary 
of the SEF, we decontextualize it from the permanent social and spatial context where we 
look for social exclusion, and then we might be able to get a broader view and comprehensive 
factual picture of this social phenomenon. What if we look at the former socially excluded the 
underdogs from similar socially excluded surroundings who later on become socially upward 
mobile? We will get real life stories highlighting the firsthand accounts of livelihood 
strategies and ways that helped them to rise from the squalid and destitution.  
 
The findings of CDA in this study hints towards at least two important factors. One is about 
those who have been excluded within the frame of social exclusion and the other is the 
successful access of those to all those opportunities, which, have been denied to the socially 
excluded, on the basis of their social marker of identities, social status, and social-economical 
handicap. 
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Therefore, if we look at the frame of social exclusion and contemplate, we should be able to 
see that the frame of social exclusion is omitting the groups of people excluded for more or 
less same reasons but they may not be poor or may not be facing deprivation but belong to 
the well-to-do strata of society. They might also have gender issues, drug issues, age issues, 
disability, or they might have been facing some of another form of religious or racial 
segregation or discrimination but they are not poor or excluded to that level. What about 
studying the consequences of privatization of public welfare departments on social-
economically upward mobile communities vis-a-vis middle class and their potential 
livelihood strategies? What about looking at the neo-liberal reforms that aid free market 
capitalism and market manipulations? What about researching the ultra-modern, rampant 
digitalisation, the explosion of information through internet, excessive consumption of 
energy, revolutions in technologies of communication and consequent new forms of 
destitution and deprivation that might have been the product of our time?. There is a range of 
possibilities that opens up new vistas for us to see the different social realities. Are we 
looking at them and other overarching geopolitical forces that so closely influence and shape 
our local lives and environment? So when we say, “tackling the social exclusion to reduce 
global poverty”, do the development industry or international development institutions and 
policy framers and implementers take into consideration these above-mentioned factors? 
 
There is a strong possibility that the dominant framework of social exclusion restricts our 
cognition of underdogs from the worst scenario socially excluded to those who have made 
their way upward out of social exclusion. Or, most probably, the ones who are still amidst the 
same stock of socially excluded but have been devising ways towards upward mobility at 
individual, family or community levels ( Fieldwork informants Alex, Ray).  
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Nevertheless, it would be worth looking at the preventive measures taken or solutions applied 
by the members of affluent groups with similar disabilities compared to those of the socially 
excluded poor communities as well as the individual efforts or successful attempts of those 
from the lowest rung of the socially excluded. This could teach a lesson or two to the aid 
institutions and policy makers and aid managers that might help them design pragmatic 
policy and projects. 
 
The income based analytical frameworks used to understand policy utilized prior to social 
exclusion indicate the economic disciplinary inclinations of the related networks, advocates, 
and lobbyist. However, the very emergence of a social exclusion policy within UK Aid 
signified the social scientific leanings of the actors and factors behind the SEF (informant 
Rebecca). Whereas the policy framework of economic growth through market reforms and 
governance that followed SEF clearly indicate the economic disciplinary leanings of its 
framers and lobbyists, reflecting the broad economic policies of the coalition government that 
influenced the international aid policy of UK Aid.  
 
The concerted and combined performance of the aforementioned phenomenon that takes 
place in the development literature, like WDRs, White papers and working papers produced 
in the international institutions specific research divisions (Broad 2007:701) creates the effect 
of what Cornwall (2007:472) calls “normative resonance,” or “ paradigm maintenance” 
(Broad 2007:702). As Alfini and Chambers (2010:502-3) shows that this exercise defies the 
very purpose language has been employed for.  Despite the negative dimensions such as 
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conflict and corruption, mainstream development language still dwells upon the roles and 
responsibilities of poorer countries and there continues to be a lack of language articulating 
the responsibilities and obligations of the powerful countries and international organizations 
towards those who are marginalized and excluded. Hence, the  effect of framing, naming and 
labeling in policy and practice is said to decontextualize the root cause of the problems 
people  suffer from, devalue their understanding, de-emphasize the material, non-material and 
cultural factors that need to be addressed to mitigate the suffering (Eyben and  Moncrieffe 
2007:65). This is similar to what happens when the poverty-related problems of so-called 
poor countries are framed, named or labeled. Labels like Third World, the middle-income 
country, South, underdeveloped, poor, poorer, developing, and socially excluded, serve to 
decontextualize the root cause of problems these countries and communities are suffering 
from, devalue  their local  understanding, de-emphasize the lived experiences, strategies they 
apply to address or mitigate own sufferings .  
 
In his critical scrutiny of the SEF, written for the Asian Development Bank, Sen (2000:26) 
considers SEF as one of the socio-scientifically robust frameworks that takes into 
consideration the multidimensional factors of poverty and relational features of capability 
deprivation. Moreover, De Haan (2011:2) makes a strong case for SEF as an analytical 
framework with conceptual flexibility and theoretical strength that could serve varied 
institutional and ideological interests in the DFID. De Haan (2011:2) believes that if DFID 
can walk long enough with this framework, it would make a major difference in its 
commitment towards international poverty alleviation in addition to other goals set by the 
UN. However, despite the observations of this exercise of CDA of SEF, as a social event or 
text of that social event that sees the nature of exclusion in linear fashion (Fairclough 
2003:13), it seems that the strength of this policy framework has itself become its weakness. 
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Eventually, making it impossible for the SEF to remain in the good books of DFID and its 
political movers (de Haan 2011, Informant Arthur). However, my findings coincide with the 
evaluation study of DFID's social exclusion approach to tackling poverty reduction 
commissioned by DFID itself. It has been observed that there was a lack of unanimity due to 
the lack of conceptual clarity or lack of awareness among various top actors from 
development organizations and bureaucracies about the causes of social exclusion, about the 
location of socially excluded communities and the nature of social exclusion itself (Gaynor 
and Watson 2007: X). Moreover, this was one the problems that restricted its growth as a 
framework. This is despite the studied observation that indicates the bureaucratic reluctance 
could be linked to the working culture of the organization and its inherent institutional 
weakness and ontological weaknesses of internal policymaking that makes any good policy 
un-implementable (Mosse 2005, Jones and Mendizabal 2010). If the bureaucratic reluctance 
or lack of clarity could be credited to the theoretical shortcomings of SEF, as is reflected in 
its discursive formation, what remains to do in order to take it beyond the discursive 
development phase of the policy towards the theoretical evolution or up-gradation phase? 
This evolution or up-gradation is contingent on the process of adaptation to the new spatial 
and institutional contexts that require the consideration, comparison, and connections with 
new categories, social situations, and political issues. However, this does not mean that the 
concept was undergoing only theoretical change and not discursive, but as action speaks 
louder than words, the policy practices that shaped the policy framework can tell us more 
about the change. As real action that lies in the informal policy practices of the social 
entrepreneurs committed to the bring about change in the day-to-day lives of global poor. 
This we shall see in next chapter. 
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Moreover, it coincides with the main findings of the consummated critical discursive analysis 
that hints toward elements of a linear worldview of policy advocates or social structural 
projection of reality within the chosen frameworks of development policy approaches. The 
textual representation of any social event or social issue in policy approaches or framework 
of any (‘non-victim’) policy maker or initiator of policy obscures the vantage point of 
reflexivity on the part of ‘victim’ of that problem, in our case the socially excluded. Despite 
the potential reasons behind the decline of SEF for being reformist and an approach touching 
the social structural and political issues behind exclusion, one of the missing links could be 
the “victim's eye view” of the very phenomenon of exclusion. Another reason could be a 
skewed understanding of exclusion stunted due to the conceptual frame of social exclusion 
that limits the excluded and occurrence of the exclusion only to those within the lowest strata 
or poor and not those who are powerful, and on the helm of the socio-economic world. 
Consequently, ignoring the possibility of learning lessons from similar occurrences of similar 
phenomenon i.e. social exclusion among the well to do classes would result in missing the 
opportunity to learn a lesson from them. The lessons learned could be used  to inform the 
further policy implementations and formation of new policies that would redress the causes 
of social exclusion that regulate the chronic hardships. 
 
Evans (1998:42) argue that “basic assumptions and values about deprivation and (would be) 
appropriate responses” from the premise of social policies designed to help the poor. 
However, many times this becomes the root cause of the problem that haunts the policy 
practices. In development industry, these basic assumptions and values about deprivations 
and the appropriate response have a patronizing slant. It is so simple yet confusing that those 
who assume about the poor, poverty and resultant handicap forget to reflect on the origins of 
their own capabilities and agencies as well as the capabilities and agencies of the socially 
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excluded. From their first case study of deforestation in Africa to recent research on the 
political economy of Ebola, studies by Fairhead and Leach (1996) repeatedly hint towards 
this phenomenon. In his first combined study with Leach on “ misreading the deforestation” 
of an African landscape by international development institutions,  Fairhead  and Leach made 
an eye-opening discovery about effective measures taken by locals themselves to fight 
deforestation without any external help. Similar findings highlight the need for policymakers 
to take into consideration the social agency and cultural perspectives of the so-called victims 
of poverty and underdevelopment, keeping aside the subconscious wiring of projecting a self-
understanding of poverty and knowing all about the lives of the poor. And this should be 
done while introspecting and reflecting on the sources of capabilities of the socially included 
or socially dominating communities. This is why the politics of policy that is constructed and 
influenced by the economists and economics of donor countries, respectively, (Apthorpe 
1996:18) fail drastically to follow up the politically problematic agendas of policy 
frameworks like social exclusion.  This is because the framework has a reformist rather than 
the transformist objective (Beal 2002:50; de Haan 2011:20) that strives to address the social 
structural issues that cause the social exclusion.    
 
 
4.14 Concluding remarks 
 
Apthorpe (1996:32) observes that most of the policies in general and development policies, in 
particular, are made up of answers in search of questions. For instance, in our case, social 
exclusion was an answer to the question: what causes chronic poverty in the postmodern 
context? However, he thinks that policy discourses fail to reveal the causes of the problems 
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they seek to solve and hence they deprive themselves of room for manoeuvre to make a 
difference (Apthorpe1996:32). Moreover, the time constrained need to float an ad hoc policy 
template to address the social-economical issues in hands like poverty or social exclusion 
makes policymakers focus more on the analytical framework, which is present in the contexts 
of both representative frameworks selected for critical analysis in this section. This focus on 
the policy frame does not help because rather than learning about the various social, cultural 
and political agencies of the excluded it ignores it ,consequently missing to note the strategies 
applied by these socially excluded in coping with their handicap, addiction, and destitution 
(informants David, Arthur). Social exclusion met with the same fate at the hands of Labour as 
well as Conservatives. The exceptions were socially passionate development policy 
entrepreneurs who by the virtue of their involvement with grassroots communities could 
make the most of this framework. In the former case, the coalition government in the UK 
neglecting the SEF the downside was concentrating too much on the analytical strength of the 
framework and later pushing it away because of the political dimensions of the concept that 
reveals the structural inequalities. Moreover, by limiting the focus of frame only to the so-
called socially excluded, this frame excludes the well off people and hence did not take into 
consideration the reasons of their comparative well-being in the same society. Hence, we can 
say that the policy that drafts itself in the guise of ‘selective’ answers so as to legitimize its 
mere operations of development intervention loses an opportunity to learn lessons from its 
own investment and project evaluation that goes beyond success or failure indicators. 
 
Discourse is not so much concerned with conflicts between concrete interests, but more 
focused on the total “language forms” that these interests are expressed in (Anthro base).54 In 
                                                             
54 Available on: http://www.anthrobase.com/Dic/eng/index.html, Accessed on 
30/11/2014] 
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both of the abovementioned cases of the French and DFID definitions, the power to 
determine who is socially excluded and how to define them, remains in the hand of a third 
party; people other than the socially excluded or who were excluding  and categorizing the 
excluded ( excluded who are  absent in the policy making). This third party takes it as its 
responsibility to redeem the socially excluded while ascertaining the causes of their social 
exclusion, without being politically incorrect in both cases. By being politically incorrect, I 
mean without trying to transform the social structure that is producing the social exclusion 
and excluded, they plan to include the socially excluded into the mainstream. In addition, a 
question arises about how the socially excluded are going to be included when the social 
structures producing the inequalities are still abounding or not being reformed.   Discourse 
creating exercises like framing and naming help to divert and digress the difficult questions 
like this one. However, there were several attempts made by academic-professional activists 
to rectify these drawbacks and conceptual lacuna in the SEF, making it more theoretically 
strong and practical in implementation. This was done through gradual commissioning of 
studies, organizing conferences and establishing study centres and projects in various 
development think tanks in the UK. But this requires us to look beyond the discursive 
dimensions of the SEF. The practical aspect of the formative and evolutionary phase of this 
framework we are going to see in next chapter. I am using an adjective ‘practical’ because; 
the social policy entrepreneurs from DFID put these frameworks to work among 
underdeveloped communities.  And they did it despite the top-down bias and inherent 
‘lacuna’ of framing social issues of exclusion according to political necessity in the 
‘conceptual framing’ of the term social exclusion in both cases. While in France as well as 
Britain, this framework was utilized to serve the pressing political needs. In France it was 
used for recognizing the neglected issue of social exclusion of 10
th
 of its impoverished 
population and in Britain it was first used for electoral gain and later on as international 
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development policy framework of UK Aid eventually put it on the back stove by the post-
Labour coalition government in the UK.  
 
Framing and naming are some of the crucial processes of building the discourse and 
constructing the narratives. It has more preparatory but profound and overarching functions 
to accomplish. This function is to guide our cognition towards its basic purpose, to construct 
the problem, the issue in hand. Interestingly, the problem constructed accordingly has 
implicit suggestions for logical solutions to those problems (Apthorpe 1996:32). However, 
this is not sufficient: this idea has to be rational, legitimate, and appealing to our social 
common sense that would logically unfold on a mental level. For example, the employing of 
phrases like mentally and physically handicapped, invalids, misfits and substance abusers 
may sound straightforward, blunt, or insensitive, but these terms reasonably unfold the image 
of unquestioning necessity to help to the needy on the mental plane. In its first instance in the 
minds of the taxpayers, so-called well to do, civilized and educated, the image the ‘policy 
frame’ conjures culminates into the ‘broader’ development intervention in the poor nations. 
This power may be the power of knowing the things like knowledge, political or economic 
power or being able to produce and disseminate knowledge on poverty as well as 
development.  
 
******* 
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Chapter 5 On Undocumented Policy Practices 
 
5.1 Introduction    
 
This chapter focuses on the undocumented policy practices within development organizations 
in general and one of the leading aid institutions of UK Aid in particular. The introduction is 
followed by a subsection that outlines the conceptual and theoretical context of ‘the 
unofficial’ and ‘the undocumented’ practices in bureaucratic processes of policymaking.  The 
second subsection discusses the paradigm of human Economy and offers the theoretical 
framework of ‘social entrepreneurship’55 that is broadly based on the “voluntary activities of 
social economical import that does not fit into the conventional understanding of 
entrepreneurial activities in development bureaucracies” (Hart et al 2010:57 &148). The 
following subsection analyses the types of development practitioners and analytical types 
derived from their narratives of self and actions, based on fourteen narratives. These 
narratives are also exemplary instances of the focus of this chapter i.e. the hitherto 
undocumented, unofficial practices within aid industry. The chapter concludes with a 
discussion that summarizes the case studies, highlighting the points that feed into the broader 
argument about undocumented policy interventions identical with the social entrepreneurship 
phenomenon. The phenomenon of social entrepreneurship in the development industry aims 
                                                             
55 This concept is based on the thesis of Nobel laureate Elinor Ostrom who defined  public entrepreneur as 
someone who ‘has to envision the possibilities of joint actions and bring together the necessary factors of 
production into one unit (Hulgard 2010:293) Later this concept was incorporated into the ‘human economy' 
approach by Hart et al (2010). Hart et al (2010) made it broader to encompass the economic phenomenon with 
the edge of camaraderie, commitment and humanitarianism adding new ‘human' dimensions to the private but 
non-profit ventures of social development that do not qualify the traditional economic understanding of 
entrepreneurial activities.  Further, this concept was reinvented in the light of the concept of economy solidaire 
or solidarity economy that was gaining footing in France and Brazil (Laville 2010:13). The economie soilidare 
approach that is based on Human economy framework is theoretically and empirically helpful in grappling with 
the new kind of policy entrepreneurship initiated by those who were engaged in non-profit and private 
intervention in the development industry and bureaucracy.   
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to help poor communities through the effective implementation of anti-poverty measures 
designed within the aid institutions.  
 
 
The previous chapter draws on the case study of social exclusion policy framework and 
builds the case of the inevitable processes of framing and de-framing in the development 
industry. It also analyzes the framing processes and its consequent drawbacks highlighting 
the role of interest groups, many other factors, and undocumented practices in framing a 
policy. Therefore, taking lead from the previous chapter this chapter will illustrate and 
analyze the role of “social policy entrepreneurs” in the formation as well as implementing 
phases of the aid policy. 
 
 
5.2 Looking at the aid policy: The dichotomy of policy and practice  
 
Mosse argues that “by looking at the power and professional life of experts across 
disciplinary, institutional, and global/local divides, within and between advocacy networks, 
new ethnography could examine how universal models are produced in socially specific 
contexts” (Mosse 2005b:12). Another anthropological perspective that highlights the 
proactive role played by the development agents as a third party in “chains of translation” 
between local people and anthropologists enables anthropologists to triangulate their findings 
and gain a better perspective on themselves as an actor in the field (Pollard and Street 
2010:2). This dissertation engages with both phenomena mentioned above by the way of 
studying the social life of the policy idea of social exclusion as well as its journey from local 
concept to universal model through myriad actors. This dissertation attempts to achieve it 
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while underlining the proactive role of development agents in its evolution and 
implementation besides other similar empirical examples within aid policy spheres. Apthorpe 
(1996b:166) describes this sphere as the policy realm that is: 
…beyond a focus on planning, agencies and governmental or non-governmental 
interventions, planistrators and peasants, there lies the whole field of policy which does 
not emanate from such agencies, and is unlikely to be written in policy documents of the 
type used by such agencies, and has altogether different boundary conditions. 
The undocumented or extra-official policy practices within the policy sphere that go beyond 
formal policy realms raise theoretical questions about the rationale of the behaviour of the 
bureaucrats and limits they transcend in their everyday life within the bureaucratic settings. 
Durkheim (1986:49) considered the state as an essentially moral institution. He argued that 
the moral regulation of everyday life is a product of individual freedom and the boundaries of 
permissible behaviour. The same is true for policy entrepreneurs, activist-researchers, social 
development entrepreneur, or the movers of the informal economy of the policymaking. They 
are active within the twilight zone of aid bureaucracy characterized by the interplay between 
moral-amoral, permissible-impermissible and formal-informal (informants Rebecca, Marlyn, 
David). While the permissible, official behaviour could be based on the rationale behind of 
mode of standard official operations, the informal or undocumented actions could be 
understood as those that fall out of the official ways of getting things done within the 
bureaucratic setting. 
 
Weber identified a rational-legal authority in bureaucracy that sought legitimacy from a legal 
order and the laws enacted within it, which is in contrast with traditional forms of authority 
that arose from phenomena like kinship (Gerth and Wright 1954:217). Weber maintained that 
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rationalization describes a transition in society, wherein traditional motivators of behaviour, 
like values, beliefs, and emotions, are replaced with the rational calculations. Weber termed 
the increasing rationalization in Western societies as an "iron cage" that traps individuals in 
systems based solely on efficiency, rational calculation, and control (Weber 2005:124-25). 
However, my findings hint towards individuals in aid bureaucracy more aware about the fine 
distinction between the mere rationale of rational behaviour as a civil servant and rationale of 
a higher form of solidarity or accountability towards the destitute and deprived. These types 
of development practitioners see themselves as championing a radical cause that they are 
passionate about (Crewe and Young 2002:7). In plain language, they identify themselves as 
(an activist) development professionals (informants). Hence, rather than getting trapped in the 
“iron cage” of institutional rationalization, my informants free themselves using the broader 
and higher forms of the same rationality that take a form of passion for the poor. Inspired by 
this, they exert their agency by actualizing the policy via extra-official policy practices. The 
disciplinary inclinations and ideological leanings of the social policy entrepreneurs aided by 
their grassroots insights seemed to have spurred these policy enterprises. In case of policy 
entrepreneurs Marlyn, Judith, and Larry and his economist friend, it looks that the voluntary 
policy interventions were triggered by the situations and circumstances they witnessed at the 
grassroots level (see 5.4.7/8/14 this chapter). Almost all of my informants, while reflecting on 
the rationale behind their extra-official policy initiatives, said that it was a “kind of passion” , 
“solidarity” or “a deep sense of moral responsibility towards poor communities” that 
impelled them to do whatever they could (Marlyn, Larry and Judith). One informant said, “it 
was an internal urge to make a difference, to make the world a better place.”(Marlyn) They 
concluded that this urge came to them from their formative years with a liberal, humanitarian 
upbringing 
 
209 
 
5.2.1 Through the lens of policy-practice 
 
Mosse (2005:6) offers a broad overview of the range of issues that the “new ethnography of 
development” attempts to deal with. The complexity of policy as an institutional practice, the 
social life of projects, organizations, and networks of professionals are some of these issues. 
It is recommended that the policy phenomena should be looked at from the lens of actor-
oriented perspectives, looking at their ideological commitment, disciplinary convictions, and 
diversity of interests behind the policy models (Harry Jones 2009:15). However, the actor’s 
agency is not the sole driver of any policy change or policy emergence. There are other 
crucial factors, such as the successful formulation of policy consensus amidst contending 
policy themes, alignment of the right constellation of actors, (mediated) political interference, 
influencing the policy maker and utilization of power shift. Usually, the calibration of varied 
actors and networks of actors situated in the interstices of aid architecture follow the process 
of the policy consensus (Mosse 2005b:3). However, concurrently this has to coincide with 
broader objectives of the institutions they inhabit. This process is more pronounced on the 
level of knowledge production and dissemination of knowledge produced by policy 
prescribed or preferred by the establishment. Among the diverse set of issues, one cannot 
ignore the professional decisions taken by individuals to advance one's career while 
calibrating with the overarching emergent policy themes. Lewis and Mosse (2006) term these 
actors and policy entrepreneurs as “brokers” and “translators” those who forms an important 
part of the episteme communities in the development industry. However, how this is achieved 
by the range of actors within these aid institutions could be an independent research question. 
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The development actors are engaged in activities of lobbying, advocating, promoting, 
mobilizing, and indirectly insinuating ideas and concepts that “frame” the future policies. 
These processes are not always achieved by the formal means of obeying the institutional 
protocols, especially not through the modes of operations dedicated by the descending flow 
of institutional power and political-bureaucratic authority. The majority of these activities are 
implicitly done and undocumented in nature, as per my fieldwork findings. These actions and 
activities are coordinated and concerted by networks of professionals and could be 
spontaneous but always a brainchild of an individual that sprang out of their conviction. Here 
an individual should be understood as a continuous receptor and processor of ideas and 
concepts from myriad sources engaged in the cognitive processes of comparing, connecting, 
and convergence of ideas (fieldwork informant). 
 
However, power, agency, and socially specific contexts that shape and influence the formal 
development policies and practices could also be looked from the lens of the nature of the 
practices. That is to look at these practices to see whether they are done via the 
undocumented (i.e. unofficial) or formal (official) ways of conducting official procedures. 
The study of informal actions, within the confines of highly formalized institutions, could 
also help us to examine the populist holistic picture of policy practices in the everyday life in 
aid institutions. The aforementioned exercise can also shed light on the gap between the 
praxis of policy and policy practices eventually, offering a realistic picture of policy 
formulation and actualisation.  
 
These kind of extra-official voluntary activities are conducted by various actors situated 
within the development industry in a range of situations and circumstances. Although the 
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majority of these practices are unofficial, off the record, or unauthorized in the sense of 
formal practices, they have direct implications for and influences on the eventual 
development policy and implementation. Most importantly, whether official and non-official 
in nature, these practices involve and affect the political, economical aspects of the everyday 
lives of masses across the globe (Shore and Wright 1997:4). Whereas the nature and effect of 
standard policy practices are all pervasive and perceivable, the unofficial activities and 
underlying processes are often covert, indirect, strategic, and replete with complexities. 
Hence, while the effects of extra-official practices are intelligible to experts only, they are 
non-visible to the common eye as they are devoid of formal, ritualistic, and bureaucratic 
dimensions of official technical dictates.   
 
5.2.2 How to make sense of the unofficial policy practices 
 
The study findings show that these ‘kind’ of unofficial policy practices conducted by policy 
entrepreneurs are unlike the standard official, bureaucratic procedures. The phenomenon of 
informal or undocumented policy practices I am talking about is comparable to the socio-
economic phenomenon of helping each other by going out of the formal or official, 
institutional ways of development activities through acts of solidarity rather than altruism or 
formality. Here the development professionals rise and exert their agency as a third key 
stakeholder, along with international donor organizations and poor communities from 
recipient countries. While informally aiding poor communities through their often-
undocumented interventions policy entrepreneurs or development agents simultaneously 
serve the purpose of effective aid delivery. These kind of extra-official activities and 
practices fall under the concept of social entrepreneurship (Hulgard 2010:293). This entire 
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phenomenon feeds into sustaining and running the broader aid industry. This phenomenon is 
compatible with the conceptual framework of social enterprise (Defourney and Nyssens 
2010:248) or social entrepreneurship (Hulgard 2010:293). 
 
However, the idea of undocumented voluntary activities in terms of the newly formulated 
conceptual framework of social entrepreneurship needs to be understood in the historical 
context of institutional efforts to organize society along the formal lines within the 
bureaucratic fold (Weber 1954:73-74). Hart (2010:142-43) argues that this “ ‘form’ is a rule, 
an idea of what ought to be universal in social life; and for most of the twentieth century the 
dominant forms have been those of the bureaucracy, particularly the national bureaucracy, 
since society has become identified to a large extent with nation states”. Whereas, the duality 
of official and non-official has a background of “form”, especially the standard bureaucratic 
form as it is witnessed in our daily life and as it was observed by Weber studying the 
European bureaucracy. Then the question arises, how can we understand or interpret the 
unofficial activities or practices within formal set up? Mosse (2005:2) suggests the solution 
thereof. He says, ‘this could be done by looking at the gap between policy and practice or by 
focusing on the development practices rather than the established theories’. Mosse (2005:18) 
points out that in the everyday life of aid projects, the development practice leads to policy 
and not the other way round. To study these kinds of everyday practices of development 
practitioners would require considering the actor-oriented approaches that would impart us 
the theoretical base. Devising new conceptual term like ‘solidarity policy practices’ or 
‘unofficial policy practices’ based on the narratives of  the meta-official activities might help 
us further in clarifying the nature of these practices. The social entrepreneurship approach 
sounds complimentary to these approaches as it applies to the non-standard or non-official 
economic activities that policy entrepreneurs or social development practitioners engage in to 
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aid the poor during the formal development and aid interventions for the benefit of joint 
action and governance (Lewis 2010:267). 
 
Other important characteristics of these undocumented policy practices are its scope and the 
objectives.  These self-motivated unofficial practices and actions were directed towards the 
end of shaping, constrain, or influencing the dominant political wills and institutional 
decisions so as to ensure the pro-poor effects of policies and redress the “real problems” of 
the poor as they are witnessed at the grassroots level by development practitioners (findings). 
On this particular topic, some important observations arise out of discussions with 
interviewees ranging from social development practitioners, governance advisors, 
independent consultants, policy advisors, and policy analysts. The majority of development 
practitioners were guided by their ideological commitments, convictions based on 
disciplinary insights. Even policy entrepreneurs are not an exception to this, their policy 
interventions are based on their firsthand knowledge acquired through grassroots level 
engagement. Their  personal engagements with poor households, socially excluded 
communities, activists, NGOs, civil society organizations as well as aid bureaucracies and 
establishment and local level administration plays a crucial role . Nevertheless, the unofficial 
policy practices that involve the decisions taken and strategies orchestrated by the senior 
bureaucrats and development professionals are not distinct. However, these policy practices 
are conversely shaped and influenced by the constraints of internal policies, administrative 
and political pressures, experienced by the social policy entrepreneurs while walking on the 
tightropes of institutional positions and jobs. However, their undocumented actions defy the 
rational choice theory highly influenced by reasoning that stresses the maximization of 
individual utility and prioritizes individual benefit over larger ideals (Hart et al. 2010:10).  
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The case study of  social exclusion framework (SEF) and its life cycle (see Chapter 4 section 
I) reveals that SEF, too, was created through a series of extra-official practices and acts of 
social entrepreneurship by development practitioners who pushed and upheld this policy 
framework that was otherwise politically problematic in the development industry since its 
inception (Informant Arthur, Marlyn). Because this policy framework exposed the social 
structural dimensions of inequalities and often touched the blurred lines of political 
correctness of development interventions (de Haan 2011:2). Eventually, the social exclusion 
policy framework was side tracked in 2010.  All these years between 1997 till 2010, the 
advocacy and traction of this framework was more in the interest of poor communities ridden 
by chronic exclusion and less or not related to the personal-professional interest the policy 
entrepreneurs and development professionals who upheld it and volunteered strategically to 
advocate for it in the DFID (Informant Arthur, Marlyn). The rational choice approaches 
based on Weberian analysis of highly rationalized bureaucratic behaviour in modern 
bureaucracies has little to say about the embedded character, forms of solidarity and 
institutional configurations of social entrepreneurship (Hulgard 2010:294). 
 
However, as the narratives of Social development advisors (SDA) show SDAs and 
governance advisors trained in anthropology and social sciences already dealt with most of 
the obstacles of political correctness skilfully. These manoeuvres included framing the 
poverty-related issues in non-problematic terminologies, convincing politicians in donor and 
recipient countries tactically, strategically introducing new ideas and policy themes to people 
from different or overlapping policy spheres, upholding certain ideas while underplaying 
others while producing briefs, articles, and papers and launching certain policy ideas etc. 
Some of the key actions included influencing and mobilizing political, academic, and civil 
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society actors to support and uphold specific analytical models or conceptual frameworks in 
the larger interest of poor from recipient countries (based on fieldwork data analysis).  
 
5.3 Anthropology of Social Entrepreneurship 
The anthropology of social entrepreneurship builds on the anthropology of social change, 
anthropology of moralities and economic anthropology. Anthropology as a discipline has 
always challenged the traditional ideas on understanding of social – individual actions 
directed towards social change. Understanding the processes of social change has been one of 
the key agendas for modern anthropology as a social scientific mode of inquiry. The 
ethnographic research methods such as participant observation, in-depth interviews, and life-
history interviews aided with analysis, interpretation and triangulation made anthropology a 
suitable mode of inquiry to study people and places and understanding their actions and 
intentions. 
Economic anthropologist Keith Hart while doing his Ph.D. fieldwork in South Africa came 
across some non-profit economic behaviour among poor communities, which did not fit, into 
the mainstream economic theoretical framework. Individuals stuck in cycles of poverty were 
observed to be helping each other in need economically without any ‘interest’ or profit 
against it. Hart (2010) who initially tried to grapple with this phenomenon through the lens of 
‘informal economy’ later on came up with the ‘Human economy’ approach. Hart56 proposed 
that the ““new institutional economics” to be formed out of anthropology, sociology, political 
economy, economic philosophy and world history. Marcel Mauss and Karl Polanyi, who pioneered 
such a synthesis, argued that we must rely on practical experience for information and analysis, in 
other words, start from the “real economic movement”.  
                                                             
56 Available on : http://sds.ukzn.ac.za/files/Keith%20Hart_%20Building%20the%20Human%20Economy.pdf 
Accessed on: 07/07/2016 
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Hence, the human economy framework gave birth to the ‘Solidarity economy’ and ‘solidarity 
economy become the theoretical foundation of the concept of ‘social policy 
entrepreneur/ship’. (Please refer to Chapter 2). 
 
Social entrepreneurship, social development entrepreneur or public entrepreneurs are all 
terms used for those who work in the inter-related areas of public and social policy (Hulgard 
2010:293). Nicolls (2010:35) defines social entrepreneurship by two constituent elements: (1) 
a primary, strategic focus on social impact and (2) an innovative approach to achieving its 
mission. Hart et al (2010:15) trace the history of the concept of social enterprise in 
policymaking circles and in the popular imagination. Whereas, Gasper terms it as 
collaboration between aid professionals or aid entrepreneurs as per ideological leanings that 
could be studied through ‘stakeholder's analyses (2003:1). Mosse and Lewis (2006) later on 
endorse Gasper’s theoretical position in their monograph ‘Brokers and Translators’. 
 
The concept of social entrepreneurship builds on the human economy or informal economy 
paradigms that involve informal economic activities. Here it will serve our purpose if we 
understand the term economy as a careful management of available resources (which is the 
second main meaning of the term economy) as mentioned in the Oxford dictionary
57
 online. 
The human economy approach focuses on the organizational and individual activities that are 
neither public nor private for-profit initiatives in nature (Laville 2010:276). Dees (1998) 
offers the best-known definition of social entrepreneurs. According to him, social 
entrepreneurs play the role of change agents in the social sector by adopting a ‘mission to 
                                                             
57 Available on : http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/economy#nav2  Accessed on : 
06/05/2015 
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create and sustain social value, recognizing, and relentlessly pursuing new opportunities to 
serve that mission. They engage in a process of continuous innovation, adaptation and 
learning, acting boldly without being limited by resources currently in hand, and finally 
exhibiting a heightened sense of accountability to the constituencies served and for the 
outcomes created’ (Dees1998:4).  
 
5.3.1 Social entrepreneurship and its relevance 
 
In this section, I discuss the relevance of the abovementioned emergent theoretical 
framework of social entrepreneurship, which will help to shed light on the unofficial policy 
practices of the policy entrepreneurs within and outside the premises of aid institutions. An 
engagement with the social entrepreneurship framework will help in understanding the 
difference between solidarity, moral obligation, and compulsion.  
The studies on the policy process and policy change often refer to but seldom elaborate the 
practices that shape the policies and policy outcomes. These practices are sometimes looked 
upon through the lens of morality, ideological inclinations, disciplinary leanings, and other 
times through altruistic and patronizing angles (Scholtes 2009:2). These practices are 
practiced on individual levels or by networks of policy entrepreneurs and development 
professionals with common interests. However, what could be the compelling force or moral 
imperative behind these informal actions within formal structures could be a next logical 
question. Therefore, I am going to discuss the concept of social entrepreneurship as a 
theoretical framework that builds upon the moral and humanitarian dimensions of such social 
enterprise. This is because the moral position of ‘solidarity’ of social policy entrepreneurs 
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towards poor communities surpasses the possibilities of instant monetary gains and 
institutional incentives. 
 
Social entrepreneurship is a conceptual framework that focuses on the role of catalyst 
between international institutions and grassroots. Lewis (2010:267) offers a clear definition, 
saying that the  
...catalyst role (of policy entrepreneur)... may be defined as an ability to inspire, facilitate, or 
contribute to improved thinking and action to promote social transformation. This effort may 
be directed towards individuals or groups in local communities or among other actors in 
development such as governments, businesses or donors. It may include grassroots organizing 
and group formation, gender and empowerment work, lobbying and advocacy work, and 
attempts to influence wider policy processes through innovation and policy entrepreneurship. 
Lewis (2010:267) 
This definition supports the findings of this study that involved the social policy 
entrepreneurs engaged in unofficial policy practices on policy and project levels in the aid 
industry with the aims to add practical social value. 
 
Another significant insight about the policy entrepreneurs from the aid policy sphere that I 
came across during my fieldwork was concerning their prevalence. During more than thirty 
interviews, my informants underlined the occurrence of their undocumented voluntary social 
entrepreneurial actions, which typically sought to address areas of unmet social need or new 
social opportunity creation that the public or private sectors have failed to address (Nicholls 
1996:39). This aspect of the social entrepreneurship underlines the comradeship or solidarity 
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behind these non-economic, non-profit initiatives displayed by professionals in public 
administration who take risk by their direct involvement in innovations affecting public 
institutions (Hulgard 2010:293). 
 
This is why perhaps the idea of social enterprise or entrepreneurship was later couched in the 
human economy approach (Hart et al 2010:15). The human economy approach builds on the 
premise of integrating the moral politics (i.e. to want to be good, do well, to pursue the good 
life beyond market and state). This is based on the assumption of economic (activities) with a 
“human face” (Hart et al 2010:13).  
 
However, the concept of solidarity economy is an offshoot approach that derives its 
theoretical and empirical strength from the broader framework of human economy. The 
students of solidarity economy observe that social enterprise or social entrepreneurship have 
become important aims of many development practitioners and policymakers. Moreover, they 
argue that the development actors are conscious about the welfare of poor people against the 
broader politics of international aid and thus take a moral-practical stand (Dees 1998:4) (my 
findings confirms this as well). However, this moral stand does not contradict or conflict with 
their rational choices implied in the Weberian concept of officials from European 
bureaucracy (Weber translated by Parsons 2005:124-25). Hence, this framework could be 
used to look at the creative ways that policy entrepreneurs formulate between markets and the 
state, which upholds the idea of “community participation” (Hart et al 2010:8). This could 
also highlight the ways they articulate and utilize the groups and networks within and beyond 
their instant aid institutions to initiate, advocate, and mobilize resources towards what they 
deem to be serving the interest of poor. 
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The advocates of the human economy approach are confident about the theoretical and 
practical existence of these phenomena, and they hold that economic models and approaches 
that dominate media and universities are responsible for the obscuring of this concept (Hart 
and Cattani 2010:15). However, the critics argue and express their doubt that the human 
economy approach reinforces neo-liberal program for dismantling social democracy due to 
the potential tension between the attempt to develop genuine solidarity approaches to markets 
and politics (Hart at el 2010:15). 
 
The social entrepreneurship approach, if applied to the actions of those who have been 
working within development industry not for absolute material gains, but rather out of their 
ideological convictions for human solidarity while carrying their bureaucratic duties and 
responsibilities, can give us a distinct view of the phenomenon of extra-official policy 
practices. While the rational choice theory presents the picture of a social actor mostly 
inclined towards maximising his or her own benefits (Scott 2000:136), it does not explain the 
distinctive characteristics of solidarity or social development embedded in the actions of 
social entrepreneurs pooling resources together so as to achieve public good.  The informal 
activities here involve coordinating and pooling of human, organizational, and material 
resources together in the course of their work in the international development intervention to 
achieve pro-poor development. These people those who work with international projects, 
corporations, and organizations that involve the public and social policy are called social and 
public entrepreneurs. The social entrepreneurs are those who commit themselves to the 
development of local communities and governance networks for limited periods or for a 
lifetime (Hulgard 2010:295). This is quite different from the individual that merely serves the 
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bilateral and multilateral economic interests of nations. In addition, the scope of their work 
deals with development interventions in its all hues and colours, which is what makes this 
enterprise distinct as its objective, is non-economic and informal nature. The majority of 
these activities have ideologically leanings.  
 
Seeing this kind of entrepreneurship as pure altruism would not be taking the personal 
agendas, professional trajectories, and career advances of those who are involved into 
account. At the same time, I would say their extra-official, pro-poor actions and intention to 
really help poor and to make a difference in their lives being victims of chronic or recurring 
poverty could not be underplayed. The criteria of their genuine intentions towards social 
development could be based on the achieved results of their actions while working within the 
formal development institutions. Because international aid institutions are well known for 
their dry, economical calculations and bilateral economic interests, such as strings of trade 
and import-exports attached to so called development aid. A case that reminds me of 
questions raised on the utility of UK aid to India was published in May 2012
58
 in the Daily 
Mail UK.  The then Indian cabinet minister Pranab Mukherji commented on UK aid, stating 
that its worth “peanuts” while the Indian defence departments made a defence deal with the 
French government for buying fighter jets rather than from the UK. Here while the tabloid 
was trying to question the utility of UK Aid flow towards the Indian poor, when Indian state 
was spending money on buying fighter planes and that too not from the UK but from France, 
this news also underlined the strings of bilateral trade relations attached to the international 
aid. However, in doing so, I distance myself from the monolithic approach like that of 
Escobar (2012 p: vii) and Ferguson (1994:283) in perceiving development (bureaucracy) as a 
                                                             
58 Available on :http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2096628/British-foreign-aid-India-tells-Britain-dont-
need-peanuts-offer-us.html   Accessed on :15/08/2015 
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new global mechanism of the outright or indirect North–South domination or neo-colonialism 
etc. (Escobar).  Several instances during my research point towards many development 
episodes that took place between international aid organizations and international 
development practitioners. During these episodes, social development entrepreneurs were 
found to exert their agencies in bringing about change in development policies and projects. I 
found that the business as usual saying is not always true, and that changes do take place in 
institutions like DFID on policy and practice levels due to the efforts of policy entrepreneurs 
within (Gardner and Lewis 2000). Moreover, my finding confirms the Sussex school of 
anthropological thought (Grillo et al 1997, Gardner and Lewis 2000) regarding the 
functioning of the development industry, which maintains that aid institutions and 
development organizations like any other social organization are susceptible to change. I 
maintain that there are overlapping and intersecting layers of networks of experts, academics, 
social scientists, consultants, aid managers and policymakers moving across these 
organizations and institutions all over the world, cross-pollinating ideas and influencing each 
other (Pollard and Street 2010:1). They work along with various civil society organizations, 
local non-government organizations (NGOs) and international NGOs, while working within 
and out of premier aid institutions like DFID, OCED, think tanks like ODI and IDS. These 
networks of policy entrepreneurs, development practitioners and other stakeholders are called 
episteme communities by Mosse (2005b:7-8) and they do exert their agency and do influence 
and shape the eventual development practices and policy products. This may be called the 
final product on a policy level, policy knowledge level or policy based project 
implementation level, the manifestation of the aid industry. These processes or practices take 
place while adjusting, calibrating, and contributing to the formal dominant policy paradigms 
or objectives, which are decided by the top bureaucracy in the light of political directions of 
the ministries.  
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There is, however, an interesting parallel from the point of view of adjustment or calibration 
on the individual vis-a-vis organizational level and organization vis-a-vis organization level. 
While in the former group, various individuals and networks calibrate with the internal as 
well as an objective policy of institution they are part of, for example, DFID. In later group, 
organizations like DFID, OCED, and SIDA calibrate with the top organizations like World 
Bank and IMF (Informants Caroline, Bella, David, and Alex). In both cases, the varied 
stakeholders try to influence each other on a policy level, eventually shaping the final product 
of these development activities spanning the globe and consequently creating universal policy 
models in the social context of aid institutions. The example of the first type could be this 
entire chapter that focuses on the informal practices of development professionals and policy 
makers and consultants who act as social policy entrepreneurs rather than obedient 
conforming employees. The crucial example could be the strategic campaign of DFID to 
influence World Development Report 2000 and in turn to shape the anti-poverty agenda of 
the World Bank that was overshadowed by their economists and economic paradigms 
(informant Alex). This was achieved through the painstaking usage of terminologies and 
laboriously maintained coherence on paper with success indicators and development 
objectives determined by top organizations (this is discussed in detail in Chapter 4, section I). 
This entire exercise on the part of development professionals termed as “paperwork of 
development” or “development on paper” by critics (Stirrat 1997; Moses 2005b) may ensure 
the continuation of their salaried jobs and development enterprise. However, how much do 
the policy practices help in achieving the real development of the poor could be rightfully 
questioned.   
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5.3.2 Social entrepreneurs vs. the conformists 
 
Social entrepreneurship shares the same objectives as a social enterprise. Specifically, a) to 
provide goods and services which the market or public sector is either unwilling or unable to 
provide b) To develop skills c) To create employment  and d) To foster pathways to integrate 
socially excluded people (Smallbone et al 2001:18). 
 
This divides the development professionals in two types: the one who are committed to social 
development and the others who are conforming and follow the established practices in the 
development machinery. They avoid undue risk due to their narrow perspective of the global 
state of affairs.  I call this type of bureaucrats “conformist” as they are kind of self-centred 
and self-contented with the nature of their job. They feel good about   helping the poor. They 
are happy with their self-aggrandized way of patronizing thinking that they are helping the 
poor without looking into the details (informant Ken, David, Dan).  
 
One of the London-based informant, a policy consultant, David told me about the “obedient, 
scared and under pressure that is the conformist type of bureaucrats.” David has two sets of 
acquaintances in the aid industry due to his non-compromising and non-conformist attitude 
when it comes to principles and prioritizing poor. The first who are quite cordial and 
cooperative and second who are in his friend circle, but not his friends,  as they keep away 
from him. David is a believer and he believes he is a content fellow as he lives within his 
means and has much less avarice being a god-fearing person. 
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David was talking to me about how one looses their freedom and peace of mind due to selfish 
decisions they make for temporary gain. On one hand, this indicates the restrictions on 
“speaking the truth” or “spill the beans” or inability to act conscientiously on the part of 
bureaucrats due to their vested interests or unwritten organizational restrictions. These 
bureaucrats, who were called "circumscribed”, (by an interviewee of an activist kind) were 
reluctant towards the social entrepreneurial actions because of their current job obligations 
and consequent unwillingness to go against institutions they work with. They have fear 
because this type of action goes against the interests of establishment that fund their 
institutions. Crewe and Young (2000:17) mentions them as ‘staff within bureaucracies that 
tends to resist fundamental challenges to the status quo.’ On the other hand, there are also 
people in the development industry who speak and stand for what they think is in the interest 
of the poor as well as institutional efficacy, notwithstanding the pressures of stakes within the 
aid industry. 
 
 
 
5.4 Some narratives  
 
5.4.1 Last free man in UK ‘policy’ world 
 
I was interviewing a senior policy consultant, Ken, from a London-based think tank cum 
policy institute. This institute had played a crucial role in formation and assessment of the 
pro-poor domestic policies during the labour government. His interview was very informative 
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regarding the evolution of social exclusion in 10 Downing Street. Further, I received a wealth 
of information on the metaphysical and materialistic thinking of the consultants and policy 
makers, which determine their choices and priorities in the course of their careers. These 
choices and priorities were reflected in their professional lives and their career trajectories. 
 
We were talking about the reluctance on the part of a range of people, including those in 
politics, aid bureaucracy and academia to cooperate during the research. This discussion was 
also about the case study of the social exclusion policy and some of its undocumented 
contexts during policymaking. After seeing the expression of dismay on my face over the 
non-cooperation, I was receiving, Ken replied to me in a sincere tone. He said, “I think I am 
the last free man in the UK [in the policy world].” On my request to elaborate how he 
explained that what he meant in this context was his satisfaction with his humble income and 
his control over his lifestyle that makes him nothing to lose about and he doesn’t have to 
compromise his principles. Moreover, because of this principle and commitment towards 
development he has happily agreed to speak to me. According to him, the nature of his 
outlook gave him the relative freedom to express at a policy level and do what he thinks is of 
value in his work as a consultant. He spoke passionately about the days when he started as a 
young development professional, full of ideal and belief that he and his colleagues were 
really going to make a difference in English society while working on poverty. Brought up in 
an upper-middle-class family in a London suburb by a strict engineer father and an educated 
mother, Ken had never experienced deprivation himself. However, he did receive an 
expensive schooling and a good job by the virtue of his social standing, which was his 
justification for getting a good job in the development industry (probably generated at his 
subconscious level thinking, as I did not question him about it). 
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Nostalgically speaking about his career as a policy analyst and consultant, the undertone of 
his monologue was characterized by a genuineness of his desire (and that of his colleague at 
Policy Institute) to devise ways to help the poor more than merely earning a livelihood in the 
name of development. His pride reflected in what he continued to live as the legacy of life 
while many around him were running behind monetary and other privileges by conforming 
unquestioningly to whatever was going on in the development industry. 
 
This example, along with others, strongly supports the premise of one of my key arguments: 
there are many selfless and principled social development entrepreneurs active in the wider 
development industry (Laville 2010). These social development practitioners are busy 
applying their guerrilla techniques and activist strategies within the interstices of national and 
international bureaucratic and institutional spheres of donor and recipient countries in the 
larger interest of the poor and marginalized. I call them “constructive-rebels” because they do 
not conform to the institutional rational conventions. Rather they find out ways to do what is 
in the larger interest of the poor while enhancing the quality of aid delivery despite 
overarching institutional rules and regulations that prioritize the politics of bilateral economic 
interest.  
 
The following section will deal with various examples in unofficial or informal efforts taken 
by different social development entrepreneurs or policy practitioners at different times, some 
of which coincide with the social exclusion timeline in DFID. I am going to include the 
instances of informal practices and initiatives taken by people from the aid industry and the 
policy world in terms of my case study of social exclusion policy. I will take into account 
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other examples within the fold of the development industry and spheres of policy and 
practices so as to strengthen my argument.  
 
Contextualizing these examples of activist policy practitioners or policy entrepreneurs in the 
context of the general organizational mood from DFID in the wake of Labour party’s 
ascendance and related changes can give us quite a distinct picture of the policy processes.   
DFID became autonomous under the enthusiastic yet powerful and principled cabinet 
minister.  Fieldwork findings reveal there was a rumour that followed entry into DFID that 
the then International Development minister wanted to sever all ties with the World Bank. 
However, the minister was duly advised by DFID SDAs “that they should not break-up with 
the World Bank, but should work from inside and improve the policies in collaboration with 
the Bank” (fieldwork Informants Larry, Rebecca, David, Ron). The background for this 
working from inside was set up by publishing the White paper in 1997. This White paper 
contained reformative ideas and policy themes on the UK’s role in global poverty alleviation. 
A range of SDAs heavily contributed to this White paper from the DFID (informants 
Rebecca, Marlyn, John) through the inclusion of their social scientific knowledge and 
empirical insights. Every activist kind of policy entrepreneur within development circles was 
pleased about active engagement in making of the White paper. The White paper published 
on poverty was seen as a relief as the previous focus of DFID under the conservative party 
was not on poverty reduction. Particularly all the social anthropologists from within DFID 
were pleased about this aforementioned change because it meant more power to them and 
more opportunities to engage pro-actively with development apparatus. The above-mentioned 
developments eventually culminated into an innovative act on the part played by DFID 
through an international paradigm change.  The role of SDA cadres from DFID in influencing 
and contributing to the making of World Development Report 2000 was a remarkable social 
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entrepreneurial accomplishment. The collective endeavour of influencing WDR involved 
their theoretical and empirical contribution towards poverty policies. The prominence of the 
social analysis of poverty policy injected in 2000 WDR tells us a lot about the work culture 
and institutional mood of DFID then. This was the mood and ambiance that gave freedom to 
government advisors, SDAs, to express and exercise their ideas and implement their 
knowledge in the larger interest of joint objectives and targets of the DFID and United 
Nations Organisation (UNO) (based on fieldwork data and informants Alex, Rebecca and 
Bella). 
 
5.4.2 The informal contribution to propagation of SEF  
 
The story of origin and evolution of SEF has been discussed in detail in Chapter 4: section I, 
however, in line with the topic of the chapter the following section underlines the 
phenomenon of ‘informal activities’ of policy entrepreneurs in the propagation of SEF. 
Any formal policy analyst, academic, or bureaucrat from the French society or polity did not 
deploy the term social exclusion. Like many other terms that were methodically appropriated 
by the development industry from civil society organizations or day-to-day usage (Batliwala 
2007), this word was borrowed from an informal source or religious social entrepreneur who 
wanted to identify the deprived and destitute parishioners from his parish. This term was used 
first used by a Polish Catholic priest, Father Wresinski, in 1957 in France, used to label the 
people “next door”, those who have been neglected or excluded from mainstream society – 
les Sociale excludes. French politician Rene Lenor (1974) later adopted the term in a report 
wrote while serving as secretary of the social policy department in France during the Chirac 
government. Afterwards, the term started to be used internationally to label a specific cluster 
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among the poor in the hands of the International Labour Organization (ILO). In DFID it 
became a comprehensive term with new social-structural and political dimensions and mixed 
social-cultural nuance of the ethnic context of a globalized society. These later add-ons of 
social-structural, cultural-political, sexual-physical and ethnic features widen its connotation 
in the international context of aid directed towards the new genre of poor (see Chapter 4&5). 
However, how this conceptual framework was redefined, worked out and introduced into the 
DFID is a good example of social entrepreneurship or the informal economy of policy 
making.  
Charity is one of the cardinal values of Christianity. So is the practice of helping the poor 
through organized religious institutions such as the Church. However, the informal efforts of 
a Christian priest that took the form of an international movement have also contributed to 
the coining of an analytical, conceptual framework that helped in efforts reduce poverty in a 
global scale. (See Chapter 4: section I) 
 
5.4.3 Introducing Social exclusion in the DFID 
 
A senior DFID bureaucrat who later turned to academia shared the following narrative. In the 
course of interaction when I asked her how she would like to identify herself, as a 
development professional, an anthropologist or an activist, she replied I would say, “an 
activist anthropologist/activist-anthropologist working as a development professional”. Her 
story offers us with one of the main examples of unofficial initiatives or practices within the 
UK aid from my research. In this case, a senior official from a top development think tank in 
London became instrumental in introducing a domestic policy theme of UK government to 
the above-mentioned senior DFID bureaucrat. This (senior official) policy entrepreneur 
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ended up cross-pollinating the policy framework of social exclusion from domestic policy to 
an international development policy framework. 
 
5.4.4 The inception of social exclusion in IDS 
 
The inception of social exclusion as an analytical concept took place in one of the prominent 
think tank in the UK. This was just prior to the “(social) policy entrepreneurial” attempt of 
introducing social exclusion to a senior SDA by a policy entrepreneur (see Chapter 6:3.2). 
The entire process of emergence of the conceptual framework of social exclusion was the 
outcome of experimenting with certain concepts and ideas in the think tank, which led to a 
conviction for the necessity in consistency between domestic and international development 
policies in the UK. It was during the weekly lunchtime seminar that concept of social 
exclusion was introduced. The discussions during this period highlighted the prospects of 
social exclusion concept to development interventions, which targets global poverty 
alleviation were discussed. John was one of the key actors behind this entire policy process. 
The important aspects of the career trajectory of John, closely related to his policy 
entrepreneurial initiatives, is his work experience in Africa and South Asia as a development 
economist prior to his work at IDS. As my fieldwork confirms, the career movements of 
policy entrepreneurs between international development and finance institutions is one of the 
main features of social development entrepreneurship. Nevertheless, as per John’s own 
narrative, he was in close communication with a London based think tank, the New Policy 
Institute, which was working on domestic poverty problems within England, this fact  was 
confirmed during an interview with a policy analyst from this institution. Based on his 
international and national knowledge and policy insights, John came up with the comparative 
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analysis of poverty trends and characteristics from the developed and developing countries. 
This was an act of social policy entrepreneurship that culminated into the convergence of 
diverse poverty knowledge connected with identical social-structural and political, economic 
nodes (from the global North and South) into the analytical conceptual framework of social 
exclusion. Then the social exclusion framework was recommended to the contemporary 
constellation of social policy entrepreneurs in the DFID (source informant). 
 
As an essential part of the academic ritual of launching social exclusion as a new alternative 
to existing approaches used to analyse global poverty, the brainstorming at the lunchtime 
seminar culminated into a conference and special issue on social exclusion. In the research 
magazine, social exclusion was introduced as a new alternative concept for the study of 
deprivation, suggesting that, as a concept, it has the capacity to shed light on the relational 
and multidimensional properties of poverty and issues that perpetuate the poverty (de Haan 
1998:10). 
 
 During the comparative analytical exercise in the research magazine, contributed by various 
development practitioners and researchers and their well-defended articles, social exclusion 
was examined and analyses thoroughly in reference to the contemporary debates of poverty 
and existing common concepts such as poverty, vulnerability, and entitlement. Eventually, 
these studies highlighted the analytical-political signification of social exclusion while 
underlining the innovative aspect of the concept of social exclusion that facilitated the focus 
on processes, the mechanisms and institutions that exclude people from the mainstream (de 
Haan 1998:10-11-17). These conclusions were later transfused into policy implications and 
recommendations in reference to the context of contemporary dominant development 
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paradigms and approaches of poverty reduction, from 1950 through to the 1980s, further 
upended by more studies commissioned and conferences funded by the World Bank, ILO and 
DFID. All of this is what initiated the concept of social exclusion later on to be introduced in 
the DFID. 
 
There remain further political and social contexts to explore the trajectory of social exclusion 
as a concept that goes beyond the history of social exclusion in the UK and DFID. This 
background is comprehensively discussed below and briefly described in the chapter that will 
act as backdrop to this discussion. 
 
5.4.5 The power lunch 
 
A couple of month after the 1997 Labour party victory, the then top official from a prominent 
development think tank, John, casually invited another top social development official from 
DFID, Rebecca, for lunch. Coincidentally a high-level politician from the then government 
was already present there. This person was instrumental in the formation of a strong new unit 
of social exclusion in the light of the ruling party’s manifesto and its promises to its vote 
bank. This seemingly casual lunch turned out to be a power lunch. 
 
John had already been a part of joint efforts of development think tanks that were working on 
comparative analytical projects on poverty in the UK as well as poverty between developed 
and developing countries. Moreover, John was a keen supporter of thought that supported the 
consistency in the domestic and international development policies in the UK. During this 
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lunch and informal discussion, John positively convinced the DFID senior bureaucrat, 
Rebecca, to consider the concept of social exclusion as the model for poverty analysis in 
DFID in its efforts toward global poverty alleviation. John argued that social exclusion as a 
conceptual and analytical frame allowed for the looking into the globalized processes of 
exclusion and inclusion. He reiterated convincingly that, despite different social-political and 
cultural context, exclusion technically remains similar whether it is in the developed 
countries or developing countries, and that we should get rid of binary to see what we can 
learn from each other. This convinced Rebecca to a certain extent, although she was not yet 
comfortable with the concept of social exclusion.  
 
John acted like a true social policy entrepreneur by introducing or initiating the dialogue 
between two prominent offices of the British establishment.  That is, the Cabinet ministry and 
the Department of International Development – he proactively worked on the idea in 
comparative analytical manners by engaging with the concept of social exclusion while 
working as director of one of the prominent development think-tanks in London. By the 
virtue of his engagement with other leading policy institutes in London, and being abreast 
with related policy development in the UK and abroad, he took great efforts to connect the 
various groups of people. He invited and connected the key actors from the DFID and 
Cabinet ministry (most probably who was involved with projects and programs of the Labour 
government) and made a case for the development of the UK's domestic policy framework 
into its international development aid policy framework. Those days this framework of social 
exclusion was in the currency due to the Labour party's agenda of social justice and inclusion.   
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However, the actor from the DFID, who was not so much attracted with the conceptual basis 
of framework compared to his approach related to human rights, needed some convincing. 
Therefore, John argued about the plus points of the social exclusion framework that would 
diminish the binary of development perceptions about developed and developing countries or 
donor or recipient countries. This resulted in a joint conference or seminar on social 
exclusion, which was published as an IDS bulletin (John, Rebecca). Moreover, later on, this 
work converged in the DFID’s target strategy papers series published by the DFID. However, 
the idea of social exclusion did not get traction easily in the DFID. It was introduced in a 
contentious ambiance where many ideas were articulated and their backers trying to create 
consensus. The intellectual atmosphere from the DFID vigorously upheld and tactically 
argued the rights-based approach and gender-in-development. On top, the then cabinet 
minister was not quite positive towards the social exclusion paradigm (Informant). However, 
this concept got leverage at the centre through the Labour party manifesto and domestic anti-
poverty programs to tackle social exclusion meant that this idea eventually got an unbeatable 
boost in the DFID.  
 
As we can see how a casual lunch that may have been strategically planned caused 
productive exchange of the ideas and connections, which converged into a new chapter in the 
UKAid. The voluntary ‘intentional’ endeavour to coordinate two top brass official by a policy 
entrepreneur resulted into floating the ‘policy framework’ that dominated the UK aid for a 
nearly decade. Now nowhere in the literature so far produced on the social exclusion policy 
framework , we are going to read about this ‘account' of policy entrepreneurship, which is 
very likely to be taken for granted as a regular event in everyday life from the bureaucratic 
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sphere. However, there was a ‘method’ behind this activity, which moved the mountains (of 
ideas) within the highly formalized and organized political-administrative world. 
 
5.4.6 Politically ‘incorrect’ terminology of ‘human rights’ 
 
Another incident that took place during the same period involves the framing of the policy 
framework and the blending the social exclusion framework with the human right approach. 
This episode is one of the suitable examples of undocumented policy practices’ on the part of 
the Social Development Advisor Rebecca. The past connection of the UK international aid 
enterprise  ODA with the Foreign Office and its political underpinnings and economic ties as 
international, bilateral relations cast deep influence of politicians, top civil servants, and 
economists on this entire institution that prevailed even after it was given autonomy as the 
DFID. This kind of super-ordination and power had not only lasted longer than the 
connection, but as we could see, it has been re-asserted via Conservatives and Neoliberals 
soon after they assumed the power in the centre. This is exemplified by “the political decision 
by Conservative-led coalition to put social exclusion policy framework on back-stove” in 
2010 (informant).  Therefore, this incident is also about a permanent secretary who behaved 
like any seasoned mandarin (diplomat) who takes cautionary measures for whatever goes 
against the state. In our case, the permanent secretary opposed the usage of what he thought 
were politically wrong terms in ‘DFID’s target strategy paper. 
 
One of these initial papers after adopting social exclusion concept in DFID was titled 
“Realizing human rights for poor people”. It was directed towards strategies for achieving the 
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international development targets (IDTs) in terms of chronic poverty as a violation of human 
rights. This paper embedded social exclusion as one of the key causes of chronic poverty that 
is not only causing the people’s failure to enjoy their human rights but also hampering the 
achievement of IDTs. However, DFID’s stance on social exclusion or poverty as a violation 
of human rights made the permanent secretary uneasy. He took it seriously (Informant 
Rebecca). 
 
The then minister of international development who was known as a strict and outspoken was 
quite enthusiastic about the international development. Later on, this minister grew quite 
insistent on DFID’s coordination with international organizations like WB and UN and its 
commitment to achieve the IDTs, which later transpired into the Millennium development 
Goals (MDGs). When, with intellectual collaboration with a Chief Social Development 
advisor (CSDA) and other SDAs, it was decided to include a social exclusion model to assess 
poverty into the main policy fibre of DFID, a series of policy papers were produced to show 
how DFID was going to support IDTs by tackling the issues causing poverty. One of these 
policies spoke about “realizing the human rights of poor people”, which sparked an internal 
battle in DFID. The usage of the term social and economic as human rights upset the 
permanent secretary (the head of civil services). He either objected the usage of those terms 
due to his skewed understanding of connotations of these terms or his political-diplomatic 
perception of human rights as problematic issues as something politically incorrect way of 
development intervention in foreign countries. He expressed his dislike for the phrase “denial 
of social-economic rights” (in the wake of social exclusion) and there was a huge verbal 
battle on this within the corridors of the DFID.  
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Therefore, to avoid the further conflict and complications, a strategy was planned by the 
policy entrepreneurs. The strategy was to reframe the paper. The paper was systematically 
reframed and rephrased; the CSDA approached the matter in the paper in such a way that 
made it positive and convincing without losing its core essence. They turned around the 
social exclusion to inclusion and approached the paper with highlighting the three pillars of a 
rights-based approach: participating, obligation, and inclusion.  This eased the political 
conscience of the permanent secretary and the paper was eventually published (Informant 
Rebecca and Caroline).  
 
This is but one example of many during which the social advisors were more subtle, 
innovative and diplomatic while driving certain ideas and pro-poor policy themes to 
politicians and the super-class-one official who had their own versions (understandings) of 
the idea of the grass root implications of development policies and projects. 
 
 However, the root cause of the theoretical and general misunderstandings between the 
different levels of aid bureaucrats is also due to the reluctance on the part of bureaucrats, aid 
managers, and development professionals to read and grasp the central policy themes. Jones 
and Mendizabal (2010:12) found in their research survey that ‘nearly 30% of the respondents 
had never read all or part of a DFID-commissioned research report’. In such situations and 
technical deadlocks, the policy entrepreneurs resort to the creative ways to avoiding the 
conflict to get ‘work done’. These creative ways and individual and collective actions go 
unnoticed due to the informal and mundane nature of these activities. 
   
239 
 
5.4.7 Making a case for gender, caste, and social exclusion  
 
The following example was during the period when social exclusion gained traction in the 
DFID. Social exclusion was receiving increasing acceptance as a conceptual framework to 
focus the inequalities, differences, and divisions giving rise to deprivation, mortality, and 
destitutions of the poor population around the world. A Senior Social Development Advisor 
(SSDA) and the member of the Asia Regional Team in DFID set an example by and 
creatively pushing the issue of inclusion of caste as the basis of gender discrimination. The 
first-hand experience and grassroots involvement of this SSDA convinced her that caste 
dimension of gender is what causes the alarming rise in infant mortality in addition to cholera 
and typhoid among the poor from South Asia. 
 
This senior SDA, Marlyn, thought that social exclusion was a pragmatic concept and a useful 
way of putting forward an agenda that was more than just gender in terms of non-economic 
and social equalities. This perspective did not dawn to her all of the sudden. Rather, as per 
Marlyn’s account of the story, a series of events connected with her thought processes based 
on studied comparison and connections over a long period of time on various interrelated 
factors within her target population were responsible for her conclusion. While working in 
South Asia, she recognized the interconnection between the illiteracy, motherhood, and social 
exclusion responsible for the increase in infant mortality rate due to not being vaccinated. Her 
work among the statisticians at a health research institute in South Asia introduced her to a 
quantitative approach while measuring the ratios of child mortality. However, the correlation 
of ratio of child mortality with poverty made her ask certain questions to herself. There was a 
follow-up study on children that looked at which children were not getting vaccination. In 
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this study, the children who came to the cholera hospital with diarrhoea received their first 
dose. In the follow-up study, six weeks later to see which children did not receive 
vaccination; Marlyn came across some shocking and striking findings: the non-vaccinated 
children belonged to mothers who have not been to school and mostly their fathers and 
families were extremely poor. This convinced Marlyn about the power of social factors that 
determined the likelihood of children getting re-vaccinated. However, then, the issue was not 
about caste, but other social factors that were clearly linked to the infant’s survival chances. 
Later on, while working on the South Asia desk in the DFID office in London, Marlyn came 
across an article referring to the British Medical Journal saying that if one can get rid of 
gender inequality it would reduce child mortality from India in the huge proportion. For 
Marlyn it was a kind of revelation, discovering the missing link. It was also during this time 
that she received information from local NGOs in India about atrocities on Dalits and their 
massive social exclusion restricting their access to health facilities. The question in front of 
Marlyn was how to mobilize the DFID machinery and attract its attention towards addressing 
this problem. Therefore, during this juncture of time Marlyn started expressing her views 
about DFID’s commitment to the Millennium Development Goals about reducing the child 
mortality rate in informal group conversations. She thought this was the Achilles’ heel, this is 
the thing she can push DFID on and not on the atrocities. To push DFID about atrocities in 
India would be politically problematic. Therefore, Marlyn changed the definition of atrocity 
itself. She formulated a standpoint, a statement, she said, “It’s an atrocity to die in childbirth 
because someone refuses to touch you. It’s an atrocity to die of measles because somebody 
can’t be bothered to give you vaccination.” She found a corollary between social exclusion 
and being a Dalit (a former untouchable), and she thought the very word socially excluded 
and Dalit means somebody doing something to someone else; it invokes the image of not 
only the victim but also the perpetrator. Marlyn started deliberately speaking and discussing 
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her perspectives on the interrelation between child mortality, and caste as the basis of social 
exclusion on daily basis with her counterparts and colleague in DFID for months. 
 
Simultaneously, Marlyn coordinated with an international organization fighting for human 
rights of Dalits and worked out a program to push the local MPs from their constituency to 
lobby for and to take the issue of human rights of Dalits to the British Parliament. She also 
briefed the related MPs about the gravity of the issue in hand and its relevance to the UKs 
commitment towards global poverty alleviation. Marlyn roped together a team of distinct 
actors with ideological similarities from civil society organization, legislature, and aid 
bureaucracy and implicitly campaigned until she achieved success. Soon DFID channelled its 
resources equipped with social exclusion perspectives towards the aforementioned region. 
This helped in creating awareness and uniformity of thoughts and indirectly forming the 
consensus on how social divisions like caste generate a multitude of handicaps and thus 
obstruct the achievement of Millennium Development Goals. Subsequently, this sentiment 
started finding expression in policy papers and poverty reduction strategy papers and projects 
designed to run programs to tackle the social exclusion. 
 
5.4.8 Trial and error: Exerting authority beyond jurisdiction 
 
The following account is about an episode of undocumented and extra-official policy 
intervention in the hands of one of my key informants, Larry. Larry worked as a Governance 
Advisor (GA) in DFID during early 2000. In this incident, he, and his economist colleague, 
and a consultant, together successfully influenced the decision of a senior politician from a 
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conflict-ridden country of South-Saharan Africa. In this attempt, they were severely 
reprimanded (by their bosses). To catch the narrator’s spirit of narration, (which I have 
experienced), I have decided to transliterate the story with minimal changes and thus present 
it in first person narrative. 
Larry:   
I worked as a governance advisor then. Governance advisors were partly involved in the delivery of 
pro-poor projects that would improve the conditions of the poor but we were also involved in ensuring 
microeconomic policies delivery and that meant overall structures of government in the recipient 
countries.  
It was during the regime of a fiery lady cabinet minister who had renown for her straightforward style. 
It was when the DFID policies towards poor countries were in the lines of World Bank policies; hence, 
the microeconomic policies were similar to those, which were sanctioned by World Bank that is why 
we could work with World Bank. So, once you might think that policy sphere was quite limited to do 
something off beat, however, I experienced that time even within my jurisdiction there was enormous 
policy space. If you could argue your point, you have to argue it by refereeing to the pro-poor policies 
without overtly going against the grain of the DFID and by the way, World Bank policy dictates or 
decisions. Of course, you could not say ‘I disagree with the World Bank and I want something else but 
if one has to argue it you could point out particular situation within due to particular circumstances. For 
instance you could argue against the policies those were different, however, were no more useful in 
reference to context to the IDTs i.e. International Development Targets. The IDTs were transpired to 
MDGs i.e. Millennium Development Goals, that obviously could be used to bring the objection into the 
broader picture of DFID’s commitment to the MDGs prioritized by World Bank while making your 
argument. But if you fail to do so you are doomed. 
Nonetheless, policies were decided top-down, the International Development minister was a forceful 
person. When she had a view, you just could not change it. The war-torn South Saharan country 
Bangalla I was refereeing to was decided early on by minister to be led by progressive government. Of 
course, this was in the aftermath of the genocide over there and a minority group had gained power in 
government. This government waged war by proxy in the mainland and killed many people. However, 
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this was underplayed and thought as a pro-poor government, a necessary evil due to the existence of 
other genocidal militant groups in the political picture of that country. 
As the above-mentioned country came into our jurisdiction as well, one of my colleagues  from our 
Greater African Home division of DFID, who was an advisor for Humanitarian aid, come to know 
about the stark ground realities of killings over there being committed due to the proxy war. He has 
turned his help down, as everyday; he was presented with clear circumstantial evidence that the 
government of Bangalla was directly involved in supporting the murders in the mainland. He could not 
keep quiet so he pushed and pushed the DFID to acknowledge the grave situation, urging not to work 
with the groups government of Bangalla supported in the mainland. When the pressure of his 
opposition increased, a closed conference was called for our department. The minister said ok this 
meeting would clean the air we can discuss the issues. If you have any disagreement with our policy or 
any evidence to be discussed, bringing it out here and this person, he brought up his disagreements and 
everything, but his resistance was crushed. It is very clear in this meeting we were told and this is the 
policy, and shut up or leaves. She was the boss so he shut up and found another part of DfID to work 
with. 
However, as we concluded my economist friend was too direct and confrontational while dealing with 
this case. This was a learning curve for others and me. We learned from this mistake but not without 
paying for it. 
Regarding the policy space and how it positively contributes and changes the policy 
implementation in the interest of the poor, the other anecdotal incident that involves Larry is 
to follow. During this incident, he (Larry) was able to get through without much grief or risk, 
unlike his colleague above. 
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5.4.9 Heuristic learning 
Larry:  
In my case, to start with, despite the dictatorship in Bangalla, the pro-poor statements of the 
government of Bangalla were recognized by the DFID for its face value. Moreover, we all from 
Greater African office were ok with it. However, I was of the opinion that the way World Bank tried to 
push through what I considered as neoliberal reforms would harm the economy of Bangalla and would 
further weaken the administration excluding the poor sections of society. I argued that we should 
follow the ideas of budget support and support the pro-poor strategy for Bangalla while strengthening 
the civil service to enabling to deliver the pro-poor programmes. As trying to privatize the development 
would weaken the delivery. Now this stand would go against the number of standard policies within the 
DFID, which was keen on privatizing and seeking to implement market-related principles as much as 
possible. On the other hand, I was saying strengthen the state because this is actually, where they are 
connected. Moreover, if we assume that they (DFID) would prefer to implement pro-poor policy there 
was scope here in what I was saying. In addition, I could get away with that argument. Not only me, 
but my economist colleague supported it as well. Together we could put the policy proposal that took 
that line of those ideas of governance.  The whole department was very active in trying to ensure that 
the Poverty Reduction Strategy, policy for Bangalla was being supported at all levels including high up 
in World Bank. Now I think had it been another country we might not have had that leeway. 
Nevertheless, this was an example of flexibility on certain principles as long as we could argue the 
point within the overall DFID framework, which was to support the Bangalla government. 
 
5.4.10 Setting up ‘check’ mechanism in the recipient country 
 
Larry:  
In retrospect now, I think that there were gaps in policy implementation in Bangalla. 
Despite the top-down flow of policy politics, in the sense that as long as we supported the 
general policies in this case the PRSPs (Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers) we can say   
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in this case government of Bangalla was pro-poor and must be helped.  We could use that 
freedom in the clearly specific conditions of Bangalla to give them much more leeway 
that the other governments would have received. I am not sure whether the other sections 
of DFID had similar opportunities, but it was my impression that in general when the 
governance advisors met at retreats all of us had stories about what we have prioritized 
within our respective countries. What most of us seem to say was that we produced an 
analysis of what mattered and they could be approved. Because you could have an 
analysis that said in this country, supporting civil society is a priority because we need to 
strengthen democratic politics. You could also have an analysis that said in this country 
that   the financial control is most important. Therefore, to some extent it was up to us to 
make those judgments and that would mean we could support policies that were much 
more bottom-up or top-down. While DFID certainly in principle was supporting what I 
could call neoliberal reforms at the macro level and within government structures, there 
was the poverty reduction White paper, there were the ideas of social exclusion. There 
were the PRSPs (poverty reduction strategy papers). 
 
In that sense it was a great time to work there, you felt you could do what you choose and 
what you believe and what you support. I personally think I had a lot of influence; my 
economist colleague and I were instrumental in pushing through for Bangalla. This 
worked in following way at that time. DFID has just started to have the approach, which 
involved the memorandum of understanding with the good people, and within the 
countries, that DFID felt they could trust. Therefore, in Bangalla’s case and other two 
countries in South Saharan Africa, DFID had a memorandum of understanding, which 
meant that we guarantee that in near future we will maintain levels of support at the level 
they were now or increased and that we will give a huge chunk of budget support. In 
return for that, we got assurances from countries that they would maintain certain pro-
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poor policies. When the PRSPs came into existence, it was agreed that the aid recipient 
African countries would fulfil their poverty reduction strategic goals and we will then 
support them in the endeavour.   
However, in Bangalla’s context that memorandum of understanding was also like a 
smoke screen because it shows that the government of Bangalla would fail in improving 
their human rights records and any concerns one might have in involvement in other 
states. Therefore, after much deliberation, my colleague and I decided to introduce a 
check mechanism for the Bangalla government. We came up with an inventive idea. 
Every year there was a meeting on MOU (memorandum of understanding), wherein they 
would discuss the issues and take stock of ongoing affairs. This meeting would be a top 
level meeting where the boss of DFID section would need to be with the main person in 
government in the state that was in charge of the Aid relations. In Bangalla’s case, 
normally it was Minister of Finance; he was the core person there. In addition, the way 
we then decided was that if for this memorandum of understanding and for the meeting to 
carry any mileage, we would have to have any external consultant, so as to assess whether 
the MOU agreements have progressed as promised when it was implemented when it was 
agreed.    
We invited consultants in to look at and to ask questions to the Minister from Bangalla 
and Civil society in Bangalla about its record of human rights, government issues and so 
on.  When the International Development Minister heard about it, they were actually quite 
angry, they did not say anything to me, but I understood from my colleague that they 
thought it was too risky. I thought I was an academic and I did not care about governance 
advisor-ship, as it was not my career. If the DFID went wrong, it went wrong, but it just 
seemed right. That was the right thing to do. Therefore, I suggested it and my immediate 
boss has agreed on it and only afterwards afterward got a bit of cold feet.  Our boss was 
told from above that this is a bit dubious exercise and there was ambivalence for a little 
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while. It was me and it was my suggestion. It was my first two months while I was there 
and a most senior governance advisor who supported it took it up and so it was he who 
had to negotiate this matter with the DFID.  I knew that he was essentially told OK, we do 
this, but it is on your face if it goes wrong. Therefore, we went headway and it was a 
success.  Nevertheless, we got a very competent person to do this external assessment 
work and he was one of two highest civil servants from DFID. He and the other person 
did it for us and of course, they were ‘smooth’ people. While they wrote  the report they 
did not give minus points like  C - or  plus point like  C+ but they said they want to hear 
that different views about the issues at hand, so as to document the situation from 
Bangalla. This documentation later led to good discussions with the Government of 
Bangalla. The reason I am mentioning this again, there was a leeway, and there was 
possible to introduce something like this (Fieldwork informant Larry). 
 
5.4.11 Using the agency for taking supra-authority decision 
 
The other incident narrated by Larry is about how he took the decision to close down a press 
in Bangalla using his powers as a Governance Advisor because it was not serving its purpose. 
In Larry’s words, it happened like this:  
So that was the mood of those times in the DFID that you could do things, and I think I 
said I was effective because it meant people could try out things and had fun doing it. 
Likewise, I got a project on support to the press close down. Because when this five-year 
project was set up before, I joined and it was giving money to the government of 
Bangalla’s press and to make it technically better. In the agreement thereof, there were 
promises from the establishment that they would increase the press freedom and other 
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voices within there for the press of Bangalla, and when I finally looked at it after a year; I 
could see they have not done any of that. So we had meetings with concerned people and 
we gave them some months to change their ways of running the press. As expected, they 
did not change it and so we closed it. Later we heard that the Bangalla minister was not 
happy about it, but there was no way we were going to revoke our decision. We argued 
and we got our immediate bosses’ support in the hour of need.  We were told that we 
were opening ourselves up to criticism from the other donors. On one hand, we claimed 
we were for press freedom in Bangalla that we meant it. However, the government of 
Bangalla’s immediate policy makers did not do what they were claiming to do. We had a 
strong counter argument. Consequently, the voices of advice were on the rise again but 
for no avail.   
This incident again proved that in those days as long as we have an argument, we could 
have a voice even such politically critical circumstances and overbearing superiors. On 
the other, hand the worldliness. As my economist friend who was being told off and told 
to shut off clearly shows it was those few years when people in DFID felt that they had a 
say. 
5.4.12 Injecting ‘social’ into the WDR 2000 
 
The World Development Report (WDR) is the annual flagship publication of World Bank 
that is published once every ten years. It is meant to tackle the over-arching issue of poverty 
reduction (Maxwell 2001:143). The following incident is related to the making of the WDR 
2000, which was significant in many perspectives compared to earlier WDRs. WDR 2000 
was not only exclusively focused on the issues of global poverty, but also stood as one that 
bears imprints of a paradigm change on international levels in terms of poverty analysis. The 
quality of the WDR 2000 was outstanding compared to earlier WDRs in many aspects. For 
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example, WDR 2000 was not only focussed empirically but also paradigmatically on the 
nature and causes of poverty. For the first time in the history of World Bank, electronic 
platforms, such as the internet, were used to discuss and interact directly with thousands of 
poor men and women from all over the world in an attempt to develop realistic development 
measures based on their lived experiences. Nevertheless, the involvement of aid 
organizations, scholars, and experts other than World Bank worked both ways. It influenced 
the WDR and other stakeholders ideologically, strategically and technically, eventually 
contributing to the broader spectrum of the newly emergent aid paradigm. This mutual 
process of influencing shaped the aid industry not only in the following decade from the 
perspective of development objectives, but also in ways of understanding the causes of 
poverty. Economic analysis as the dominant paradigm to understand the root causes of 
poverty was, to the large extent, overwhelmed by the social analytical paradigm that is to say, 
a class-based analysis faded from the picture. 
 
However, the theoretical and ideological conflict that rose during the preparations procedure 
of the WDR culminated in an international controversy that erupted at the resignation of 
WDR team director, Cornell professor Ravi Kanbur. The preparations for WDR 2000 were 
going on full swing. DFID along with leading development think tanks from the UK were 
some of the active contributing institutions. The SDAs and governance advisors from DFID 
were in coordination with the WDR team and it’s Director, who was quite fastidious about 
the usage of particular conceptual terms and terminologies to include the explanatory 
definitions of the social structural causes of the poverty. This incident involved a distinct 
social entrepreneurial dimension of policy intervention. The recollection goes like this: - 
during the drafting of WDR 2000, Ravi Kanbur insisted on the strategic positioning of key 
concepts on poverty analysis so as to include certain conceptual ideas that aligned with the 
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World Bank’s views (fieldwork informant Alex). This was in an effort to show how the 
endeavours of the World Bank led naturally to the information in the WDR, such as progress 
towards the IDTs. The team director, who was quite painstakingly looking over all the WDR 
preparations, was insistent on the inclusion of the social analytical terms and definitions. He 
included a grid of key terms and their definitions on the strategic places all over the WDR 
report in order to promote the social analytical effect of poverty analysis (Alex). This offers 
insight into how social development practitioners have been utilizing their positions and 
opportunities strategically to bring about paradigm changes in the institutions under the 
stronghold of old-school political economists (as Kanbur puts it 2001:3). Eventually, the 
disagreements between Kanbur (representing academic non-economists, civil society) and 
economic ideologues from International Finance Institutions reached a breaking point when it 
came to issues of fiscal imbalances, lower inflation and external deficit. As a result, Kanbur 
resigned from his role as the team director of WDR 2000. Although the WDR 2000 was 
eventually published, this WDR retained the imprints of social paradigm promoted by the 
collective efforts of social development entrepreneurs, including Kanbur. This was an attempt 
of knowledge management and dissemination of phrases, terms, and, words with an 
anticipated buzz or cognitive functions;  many times such procedures culminate in the 
rationalization  the poverty issues, thereby legitimizing the logical development intervention 
in the poor countries (Cornwall and Eade 2010, Board 2007:702).  However, in the above 
instance, the self-motivated processes of framing the WDR along social lines served social 
entrepreneurial purposes and were committed to the larger cause of poverty eradication. Such 
observations are also supported by Gardner and Lewis (2000) and Eyben (2003). 
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5.4.13 The Tao of making policy work 
 
This is another anecdote by a seasoned policy practitioner from the policy field where even 
an apparent failure to affect project outcomes was turned into a success through the 
deployment of unique attitude to introspect and resolve in order to find the answers. This 
account involves a freelance policy analyst and consultant, Ryan, who was commissioned to 
write a report on rural empowerment program run by the World Bank in the West Africa. 
This gentleman and his small team of three multiethnic researchers produced a great research 
paper on the potential policy implications of rural empowerment program. However, to his 
dismay and frustration, it proved to be one of the most unsuccessful papers in his career as a 
policy analyst. This policy product did not have any practical impact for the ongoing project. 
However, therefore, he started meeting, communicating, and interacting with the related 
program staff and ministers from this small West African country. Many times the local 
stakeholders and government official were reluctant to interact with them in the policy 
context. However, Ryan was determined and looked for ways to open them up. He started 
going to local recreational places, clubs, and events where the development professionals 
from different agencies used to hang out or get together. Mostly they had informal 
conversations on the positive or flip sides of policy and program outcomes. Consequently, to 
their own surprise, the state government authorized and entrusted he and his team staffed 
with two experts on local governance to implement the policy recommendations based on 
their own findings. Accompanied by the deputy minister, this team got involved in the 
technical work of carrying out its own policy recommendations, which were far more 
successful than the research paper produced. In the course of this action, this team did come 
across opportunists and people only concerned with their own profit rather than the welfare of 
poor. However, most of the recommendations were executed in favour of the weaker sections 
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of that country. The key informant credited the success to his pattern of doing things. Most 
important to this success was his strategic, unofficial meetings and informal conversations 
with ministers and World Bank staff and his convincing ways of making those people see 
what he could perceive. 
 
5.4.14 Judith makes a difference in Latin America 
 
This narrative tells us about a DFID bureaucrat who using informal tactics became 
instrumental in making the reluctant and corrupt politician from Latin America work jointly 
with DFID on its projects on tackling social exclusion of the majority.  
After the acceptance of social exclusion framework as one of the analytical models for 
poverty analysis in DFID, Judith, one of the key bureaucrats left her job in London, DFID to 
work in the DFID chapter of Peru in Latin America. Here Judith’s achievement was the 
implementation of social exclusion as a pseudo rights-based approach in the DFID programs 
in Latin America. Judith associated the concept of social exclusion with the fairly small 
amount of populations that has been marginalized for structural and historical reasons. 
Therefore, initially, she found the use and application of social exclusion concept in Peru 
unfeasible. This is because, in the Peruvian case, the majority of the population that was 
excluded. She found it impractical to use the concept of social exclusion in this context, but it 
was one of the best options she had. Nostalgically remembering her work in Peru Judith said, 
"You can take the discourse that works in political circumstances; it does not necessarily 
have to be your favourite discourse.”  
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In Peru, the majority of the population was excluded by the virtue of its remote geographical 
locations, causing isolation and exclusion from the mainstream. Because the World Bank had 
used this concept and the World Bank had to sway over the Peruvian government, Judith 
thought it was the one concept she could have used to hold the government accountable. 
Actually, what Judith wanted to do was to get the Peruvian government to implement the 
poverty reduction strategy as they were just pretending to implement it rather than taking 
concrete steps. It was a small corrupt elite caucus running the country and the great majority 
of the population was living under deprivation and poverty. At this point, Judith said to 
herself, “When you are a political actor, you have to take advantage and to compromise.” She 
tactically utilized the term social exclusion to compel the Peruvian politicians to implement 
the poverty alleviation programs. 
 
However, in retrospect, Judith thinks that she was able to successfully implement the social 
exclusion policy framework in Latin America because of the influence of the World Bank. 
The famous 2000 World Development Report had three pillars aimed at poverty alleviation. 
They were an opportunity, empowerment, and inclusion or reducing social exclusion. The 
Peruvian government was very keen on World Bank at that time. So actually, Judith ended up 
introducing social exclusion language in Peru. Nevertheless, she channelled DFID resources 
on sensitizing the issue of social exclusion in Peru by means of seminars and research studies. 
 
It was because of Judith’s efforts that DFID funded a whole series of workshops with 
different excluded groups. A poverty reduction strategy paper (PRSP) was written on Peru 
being an indebted, poor country. Moreover, because of the World Bank, they had a whole 
chapter on social exclusion in the paper. However, Peruvian politicians were not doing 
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anything about it. They were just trying to please the World Bank. Therefore, Judith decided 
to persuade the Peruvian Government to take practical efforts in their strategy by actually 
implementing the policy on tackling social exclusion.  She did it rather diplomatically.  Judith 
convened several meetings of Peruvian ministers of rural development and finance ministry 
to convince them the importance of implementing the DFID programs to tackle social 
exclusion as it was showing Peruvian government’s commitment to the International 
Development Targets backed by the World Bank. Judith became instrumental not only in 
coining social exclusion discourse embedded in the rights-based approach, but she was also 
successful in joining DFID and the Peruvian Government in this campaign on the grassroots 
level. This entire exercise also involved introducing and implementing the DFID aided 
programmed targeting social exclusion in collaboration with the Peruvian government. 
Hence, the diplomatic attempts of Judith were responsible for benefiting the Peruvian masses 
neglected by the corrupt regime. 
 
 
5.5 Discussion 
 
Narrative is considered as an analytical-concept within the anthropological studies of 
moralities. This is because “narratives are widely seen as a way in which persons make, remake, 
articulate, interpret, and come to understand the meaning in their lives and as such  the analysis of 
narratives has become central to many anthropological attempts to understand social life in 
general and moral life in particular ” (Fassin 2014:204). My intention behind giving long 
quotes from the ‘social policy entrepreneurs’ was to let them tell their stories of their ‘social 
entrepreneurship’ in their words. Because I encountered lack of research on the 
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‘undocumented policy interventions’ conducted in aid industry, I contextualized the 
phenomenon of ‘undocumented policy practices’ with the analytical framework of ‘social 
(policy) entrepreneurship. Giving the long quotes I let the informants explain their own 
narratives of policy entrepreneurship- how they did and why they did it. However, the 
‘narratives’ of informants about their ‘social enterprise’ are preceded by elaborate discussions 
on the Weberian theory of rational choice, the ‘solidaire economie’ approach based on wider 
the human economy concept and the social entrepreneurship framework. 
The closest studies on the quite similar phenomenon of  ‘voluntary’ policy intervention out of 
solidarity I came across while carrying out the literature review are studies by Hulgard 
(2010), Nicholls (2006) and Dees (1998)  and especially Taylor’s work (2010:236) with 
reference to the Noble laureate Elinor  Ostrom. 
 Above-mentioned policy entrepreneurial feats involve some of the classic strategies applied 
by intermediary policy entrepreneurs or development practitioner. I interviewed a wide range 
of Governance advisors, Social Development Advisors (SDAs), former and present directors, 
academic-bureaucrat-anthropologists, anthropologist-activists, and development consultants. 
While interviewing them and reading their interviews between the lines, I noticed reoccurring 
accounts of   undocumented and informal practices. These were the policy decisions taken, 
successful policy persuasions, policy lobbying, policy networks mobilizations and alliances 
formed across and within the recipient and donor, countries and aid institutions located in 
them. 
 
These practices or actions taken by a range of development professionals in some or other 
juncture in their careers or professional lives were different from formal administrative 
modes of working or standard organizational procedures. These were undocumented, extra or 
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non-official actions aimed to get work done. However, some of these practices were later 
formalized as they fed into the broader picture of policy or projects run by the aid industry in 
the Interventional level so as to achieve the former IDTs and later MDGs.
59
  For example, the 
official inclusion of social exclusion framework in the World Bank that culminated in World 
Bank's initiatives on social inclusion.
60
 
 
The basic nature of these activities could be described as quite mundane, casual, regular, and 
unofficial. However, these acts were intentional and subsequently added value to the aid 
delivery from the development perspective out of the policy entrepreneurs’ passion towards 
making a difference in the lives of people. The conscientious (human) understanding of right 
and wrong, individual convictions about good and bad, guide these undocumented social 
entrepreneurial activities, rather than the canon of institutional behavioural propriety or 
organizational dictates about the bureaucratic code of conduct.    
 
These activities range from inviting someone for an informal lunch, casual conversation, 
introducing a colleague without explicit intentions, promoting, advocating and introducing 
specific ideas or policy themes, creating consensus, convincing intended people or 
gatekeepers about your convictions. However, the acts taking calculated risks within official 
settings were mostly directed towards social welfare and humanitarian cause rather than 
progressing self-interests. The undocumented activities included the manoeuvres of 
convincing one's ideas to someone else, cross-pollinating different ideas and themes through 
an official (ghost) writing the policy literature or writing on behalf of institutions, drafting 
                                                             
59 http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/socialdevelopment/brief/social-inclusion 
60 http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTECONEVAL/Resources/SocialExclusionReviewDraft.pdf 
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speeches and briefings to senior officials, counterparts and politicians (in such a way) so as to 
channelize, legitimize, normalize the ideas. The undocumented policy practices also involved 
reframing the concepts and rephrasing the ideas in order to make the disapprover feel 
comfortable with what they otherwise think of as problematic ideas and uneasy terms. These 
informal activities also constituted (well-planned) actions of (indirectly) mobilizing and 
employing the civil society organizations so as to positively encourage their parliamentary 
representatives to raise the questions in parliament or to lobby behalf of certain issues 
(information based on fieldwork data). However, one should keep in mind that one of the 
main reasons behind devising these ways to achieve abovementioned effects was the passion 
or solidarity of these policy practitioners towards poor and marginalized. 
 
There is a good possibility that the tactics of coordinating, networking and getting things 
done indirectly or unofficially in the everyday life of aid bureaucracy could also be for 
serving personal interest or preferences due to individual political or disciplinary bias. It also 
may be out of stakes as well as biased perceptions about any theories or ideas based on 
empirical knowledge. It could also be for making a case or lobbying for certain projects or 
policy that might create job prospects for someone or other, which likewise could be done 
voluntarily with the aid of like-minded people within and out of the formal setup of the aid 
institutions. The previously mentioned possibilities could be a topic of independent research. 
Although, we could not deny the converse possibility, the findings of this study strongly hint 
towards the fact that all these unofficial strategies and activities were directed towards the 
social cause and not for advancing any personal interests. 
                                                                         ***** 
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Chapter 6 The twilight zone of aid bureaucracy 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
This study set out to explore the social life of policy ideas in semi-autonomous policy spaces, 
and zones within aid bureaucracy through the lens of undocumented policy practices. I have 
termed this the twilight zone of aid bureaucracy. By twilight zone within aid bureaucracy, I 
am referring to the policy spaces wherein networks of aid bureaucrats and (individual) social 
policy entrepreneurs exert their agency through voluntary extra-official efforts. Generally, 
these extra-official efforts are directed towards the pro-poor policy formations as well as to 
enhance the aid efficiency. This study has also sought to understand the rationale behind 
these self-motivated policy interventions along with the varied techniques employed by the 
social policy entrepreneurs, leading to what I have described as the ‘undocumented’ social 
life of policy ideas. 
 
As soon as my research proposal was sanctioned, I set off to do archival research in the IDS 
archives. Thereafter, I started my fieldwork in London. Although I had three months of prior 
fieldwork experience during my Masters, the Ph.D. research was a massive learning curve for 
me. I faced many of the demons of Ph.D. fieldwork during this lifelong experience. First of 
all, like many Ph.D. students, I had to face the terrible reality that I was not going to be able 
to follow my initial research proposal, which would have been to work with Voice of Dalit 
International (VODI) to study the caste dimensions in aid policy formation. This project 
terminated for reasons beyond my control, and it was quite a destabilizing experience as I 
was personally involved in it. However, I quickly realized that such changes were part of the 
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course and that during the research process one gets both setbacks and helping hands alike; 
changes are not always for worse. 
 
The nerve-wracking and prolonged issues of acquiring access to the Department for 
International Developments (DFID) main office and the non-cooperation by some of the key 
informants during fieldwork caused other diversions in my initial research objectives and 
methods. However, a question from my questionnaire played a pivotal role in the transition to 
my present research aim. It was a question addressed to the aid bureaucrats about an 
anecdotal or interesting incidence in the course of their careers, where they have tried to 
manoeuvre around mainstream bureaucratic form to make a significant change in a policy or 
at a practical level. The consequent recurring narratives of anecdotal accounts by key 
informants attracted my attention. As a result, I shifted my research focus from the life-cycle 
and traction of social exclusion policy frameworks (within DFID) towards the self-motivated 
and voluntary policy practices that influence, shape and introduce pro-poor policy themes 
and help poor communities from the recipient countries. 
 
In addition, I also incorporated other homologous policy processes and policy practice 
instances in order to argue that it is not the standard, official, and linear processes of policy 
production but rather the undocumented social context of policy practices that forms the key 
part of policymaking. 
 
If the formal, visible policy procedures constitute the tip of an iceberg, then the 
undocumented practices or the social life of policy ideas are equivalent to the rest of the huge 
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invisible portion under the water. That is to say, the emergence of policy themes and ideas do 
not flow top-bottom according to the authority or institutional hierarchy; the policy processes 
are not top-down or linear in their proceedings in an aid organization (Sutton 1999; Jones 
2009). Rather, policy ideas flow bottom-up and through, from everyday life, venues and 
sources. Sutton (1999) calls it “chaos of purposes and accidents” while Crewe and Young 
(2002), Jones et al (2010) term it the ‘complexity’ that surrounds social policy processes. 
There are twilight zones in everyday bureaucratic operations wherein committed and non-
conformist bureaucrats and development agents i.e. social policy entrepreneurs strategically 
shape and influence policy and the policy outcome with the zeal of an activist. Here, by non-
conformist, I am referring to the actions of the aid bureaucrats or social policy entrepreneurs 
who go beyond the official procedural set up and take a risk to make a difference in the life of 
poor out of their passion and solidarity towards the poor. These policy enterprises or 
individual attempts of policy entrepreneurship are seldom documented or written about in 
policy literature or during and after the realization of the policy ideas. This is because of the 
nature of these policy practices. These policy practices are voluntary, extra-official, these 
activities are casual and mundane in its nature, therefore, overlooked, and often not 
documented. As I show in Chapter 4, the general theoretical literature on this subject and 
specifically in the context of policy practices in the aid industry is inconclusive on some vital 
questions. The questions such as what causes the emergence of certain policy themes and not 
others? What is the nature of these kinds of policy interventions? How the policy 
interventions shape the policies, how these interventions take place are so far unanswered 
questions. 
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In this light, this study sought to answer the following three questions: 
1. Where do policy ideas originate from? How are certain policy themes and 
frameworks launched, promoted, advocated, upheld, and incorporated? 
2. What is the nature of these extra-official, undocumented, and self-motivated 
policy practices that shape a significant part of the aid policy and development 
practices? 
3. What is the rationale behind these policy practices? What role does the policy 
entrepreneurs play in it? 
 
The nature of these meta-official policy practices poses a theoretical challenge with regards 
to how one makes sense of them, particularly because these practices challenge the rational 
choice theory, which is often how bureaucratic decision making is understood (which I 
elaborate on in Chapter 2 and 4). The social entrepreneurial nature of unofficial policy 
practices gives rise to the question about the theoretical implications of the rationale behind 
the phenomenon of the practices. The issue of rational choice theory involved questions such 
as: What could be the rationale behind such practices? Why do some development agents 
take such a risk while others do not? How does the risk-taking, non-profit activities of 
development practitioners I came across during my research fit into the rational choice theory 
of bureaucratic actors whose actions are directed by highly rationalized work cultures of 
modern bureaucracy according to the Weberian theory of  the “iron cage?”  If that does not 
explain it, then what could be the most suitable answer? 
In this chapter, I will synthesize the theoretical and empirical findings of the study. This is 
followed by separate sections on the practical policy implications, the future direction of the 
research, as well as limitations of the study and concluding remarks. 
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6.2 Empirical findings 
 
The Chapter 3 through Chapter 5 offers in details the main findings of this study. This section 
synthesizes the empirical findings to answer the studies three main research questions that 
focus on the nature of undocumented policy practices (i) its social context or origin (ii) the 
rationale behind them, and (iii) the role of the policy entrepreneurs61 in introducing the policy 
ideas through undocumented policy practices. 
 
 
6.2.1 The origins of policy ideas and its emergence 
 
The following section discusses some important co-related themes from my findings that 
involve the origin of policy ideas as well as how policy ideas emerge in the aid industry. It 
highlights the mundane origins of policy themes, which are not bound within any particular 
time or geographic location. The convergence of these (often contending) ideas within the 
policy sphere of the aid industry is an outcome of processes harmonizing with development 
priorities of  aid recipient countries based on the comparison and connecting of actors and 
institutional factors (Eyben 2007:640, Maxwell 1998:20).  The themes are explained below 
under individual titles as key findings so as to help the readers. 
 
 
                                                             
61 Available on : http://www.simonmaxwell.eu/blog/how-to-avoid-the-winners-curse-lessons-for-a-new-
nutrition-policy.html  Accessed on : 13/01/16 
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Policy ideas and frameworks have mundane origins 
 
As illustrated in Chapter 4, almost all policy frameworks, including the celebrated policy 
concepts, have their source in everyday life and social movements raised by common people. 
The findings on  the mundane origins of most influential policy themes also referred to in 
research that discusses the origins of  policy themes  like empowerment and sustainability 
(Batliwala 2007; Andrea & Brock 2005)) which gave new momentum to the international 
development endeavours.  One of the main examples from the case study of social exclusion 
policy framework exhibits a dramatic origin of this framework. Social exclusion as a 
conceptual framework originated from a small parish of France, a Chaplin used it to define a 
new kind of poor from his parish. This celebrated term from development industry was 
employed by polish Father Wrenziski to identify ‘new sections of poor’ individuals and 
families excluded from mainstream French society. Later French social policy department 
picked up this concept and made it comprehensive adding more ‘social misfits’ to it. Further, 
this concept was adopted in European Commission and passed on to the World Bank via 
England as a form of new analytical paradigm.   The idea of non-linear, bottom-up 
progression of policy themes goes against the common perception of policy making that only 
the top-level authorities systematically produce policy solutions for the social problems. 
However, the findings of the research in hand and complementary studies remonstrate that  
the policy ideas, concepts, and themes are picked up, internalized or adapted from the 
everyday life by various social policy entrepreneurs to be promoted later within the policy 
circles (Appadurai 1988; Apthorpe and Gasper 1996; Crewe and Young 2002). Appadurai 
(1988) uses the metaphor of ‘social life of things’ which perceives the exchange of 
commodities from person to person or groups to group as an exchange of the values 
enshrined in those commodities. Here the transition of social exclusion framework as a 
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concept pervaded in media and academia , later on, picked up and internalized by social 
policy  entrepreneurs to be reproduced in international aid policy sphere could be likened 
with the ‘social life of ‘ideas'.  While, Apthorpe & Gasper  (1996) argue about the 
development policies in terms of frames and discourses constructed by stakeholders (i.e. 
professionals, policy entrepreneurs) with specific ideological and disciplinary interests, 
Crewe & Young (2002) underlines the social, political context of policy and policy 
entrepreneurs, empirical evidence and links that could bridge gaps between the development 
research and policy formations in aid industry. The venues of policy formation are the 
overlapping and intersecting layers of aid institutions, think tanks, academia, aid 
consultancies and aid bureaucracies. The social policy entrepreneurs are situated within these 
various layers of bureaucracy, academia, think tanks, and other professions (Grillo and Rew 
1985). Of course, the idea they prefer or profess depends on their ideological, political 
agenda and disciplinary orientation (Lewis and Mosse 2006). 
 
Policy ideas are not time and space bound 
 
Chapter 4 demonstrates that policy ideas are not necessarily contingent on the social-
economic problems from the developing countries only, but can also be formulated on 
problems faced in developed countries and then reworked before applying them in poor 
countries. In addition, the chapter shows how ideas from the past are reconceptualised to fit 
the present issues and its social-political context (Maxwell 1998). The timeline of social 
exclusion framework began in France, a “developed” country in the 1970s through 80s & 90s 
making its way into new millennia in WDR 2000 in World Bank, eventually to become a 
global parameter of poverty analysis for application among poor communities from 
“developing nations”. This exemplifies that time, space, do not bind the policy idea and more 
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so they are adaptable and malleable in development industry that is fuelled on its own 
“knowledge management and fact production” (Chambers & Alfini 2007; Board 2007) 
 
Contending policy ideas 
 
The study findings included in Chapter 4 and 5 show that while there is often more than one 
contending policy themes existing anytime in the policy space.   Marlyn (a key informant) 
informs us that during her feat of gaining traction for social exclusion policy framework in 
the DFID, her head of the department was not quite enthusiastic about the social exclusion 
approach.  Marlyn's boss was inclined towards the ‘rights based approach'. Hence, Marlyn's 
initial efforts to push social exclusion framework through meted with a cold shoulder. 
Moreover, the gender in development approach was on the rise then, therefore, the emergent 
social exclusion policy framework has to compete with the rest. Especially Marlyn had to 
join forces with other policy entrepreneurs, political actors, and civil society organization for 
social exclusion to survive and flourish in the DFID. 
 
The aforementioned finding coincides with an insider’s account of mainstreaming the social 
dimension into international development administration by Eyben (2005) 
 
Therefore, it can be said that only those themes, that get the propitious circumstances of the 
right people, at the right time and with the right kind of leverage, rise to prominence in aid 
policy circles, hence, social exclusion successfully rose to the challenge (Eyben 2003; 
Batliwala 2007; Gardner & Lewis 2000). Here the salient features of propitious 
circumstances  involve being supported by skilled and committed advocates who have 
success in forming a consensus, being in congruence with institutional priorities, having 
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practical applicability, and the capacity to reframe ideas in different contexts that are more 
appealing to those who would otherwise not support the chosen theme. However, Jones 
(2009); Jones et al. (2013) interpret these peculiar circumstantial prerequisites as complexity 
that surrounds the process of policy formation. 
 
Harmonizing within aid institutions 
 
Findings from Chapter 3 and 4 points to the tendency of harmonizing aid; that is while 
employing policy frameworks in new contexts the political agendas or development 
preferences of the recipient countries are taken into consideration. Top aid bureaucrats, as 
well as project managers from the respective country offices of the DFID, are always careful 
and vigilant about not going against the grain of local political development priorities, take 
conscious efforts in harmonizing their policy, and project with that the recipient countries. 
Although this process has its advantages and disadvantages, the research by Eyben (2007), 
Broad (2007) and Jones et al (2013) supports these findings. 
 
Comparison, connections, and convergence 
 
The findings of the study summarized in the conclusions of Chapter 4 show that policy 
themes that are advocated, promoted and incorporated into the aid industry go through 
processes of comparison, connections and convergence, which is in line with the expositions 
by Silver (1994:570) and Maxwell (1998:20). The policy entrepreneurs are the main catalyst 
in this process as they conduct the processes of comparison, and connection to cause the 
convergence of various ideas into policy themes and frameworks. These policy entrepreneurs 
are convinced about the utility of certain conceptual frameworks in light of their multi-sited 
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fieldwork experience and insights (Eyben 2007; Room 1995; Mosse 2005b). Therefore, they 
strategically connect the relevant human recourses situated in various institutional nodes and 
demographic locations to form a consensus, thus helping policy themes emerge and get 
traction (Mosse 2005b). Mosse & Lewis (2006:1) call these coordinators, ‘development 
brokers and translators’, who, ‘assume the role of mediators and capture significant resources 
in the mediated cultures of development’. This mediation is termed as ‘translation’ by Mosse 
& Lewis (2006:1), however, there is a basic difference between brokers, translators and social 
policy entrepreneurs, and that is the difference of intention. Whereas, the brokers and 
translators translate the overarching global political paradigms into policies and projects, the 
policy entrepreneur focus on benefiting those on the receiving end of society and economy 
irrespective of political-economical systems. 
 
The collective effort by the DFID social policy entrepreneurs of roping in various key 
economists, development practitioners, and policy makers from a range of institutions and 
academia during the making of WDR 2000 could be the suitable example for the 
aforementioned kind of strategic attempt. During the making of WDR 2000 not only the 
dominant economic paradigm of the global poverty assessment was challenged but an 
effective alternative social paradigm of ‘poverty analysis’ was introduced  to highlight the 
political-social structural causes of the chronic poverty among global poor 
communities.(refer 5.4.12 Chapter 5) 
 
The theoretical cases for the origination and framing of the conceptual framework of policy 
ideas need to be taken into account to understand the social life of policy ideas further and to 
make sense of the complex processes of policy formation referred to by Sutton (1999) and 
Jones et al (2013). Deconstructionist approaches suggest the appropriation of analytical-
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conceptual frameworks from social movements by international aid institutions and 
development elite to legitimize, rationalize, and form an optimistic consensus on the 
development intervention into developing countries (Leal 2010; Batliwala 2007). 
Nevertheless, studies by Rist (1990), Stokke (1995), and Sachs (2009) underline the political 
conditionality of aid and the problems of consistency and coherence in aid policies that donor 
countries insist on in reference to recipient countries. Whereas, the social movement aspect of 
policy ideas from the research by Leal (2010) and Batliwala (2007) support the research 
findings. These studies note that the adaptation and reproduction of ideas by social policy 
entrepreneurs within policy spheres are framed by the social-ideological context rather than 
the superimposed, rarefied, policy-orientated, and institutional dimension of aid. In this case, 
the emergence of the specific policy framework within DFID towards developing the poor 
communities happens within the context of individual conviction about human rights as well 
as cognate practices. The traction of policy themes within aid policy circles subsumes the 
confluence of common interests and convergence of various individuals their expertise, 
experience, and resourcefulness in upholding and utilizing any dominant policy framework 
(Seur 1992; Sutton 1999, Jones 2009, Crewe and Young 2002). The policy enterprise by 
informant Judith in Latin America as well as the self-motivated act of social policy 
entrepreneur Ryan in the West Africa of connecting with the local politicians and 
stakeholders is a self-evident phenomenon of setting up connections based on social-political 
assessment, which converges into anticipated policy outcomes (refer to 5.4.13/14 from 
Chapter 5). 
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6.2.3 The nature of extra-official policy practices 
 
The following section will engage with the nature of extra-official, undocumented, and self-
motivated policy practices that shape a significant part of aid policy and development 
practices. This segment locates the extra-official practices within its social context of 
everyday bureaucratic life where in social policy entrepreneurs often utilize the normal 
modes of performing the regular bureaucratic actions skilfully. The findings are presented 
under relevant subtitles and elaborated in order to facilitate a step-by-step comprehending by 
the reader. 
 
 
The social context of policy practices 
 
Many policy interventions are self-motivated, extra-official policy practices in the everyday 
life of the aid communities. Some of the skilfully devised practices include the influencing 
and shaping of certain policy through casual activities like interaction, conversation, 
suggestion, discussion, introduction, and organization of events between individuals as well 
as networks of professionals connected via personal, political, and professional interests 
(Seur 1992:119). This kind of common human interaction and activities that result into 
everyday communicating, conforming, agreeing, empathizing, internalizing, consenting, and 
contributing eventually culminate into one unified action. However, the regular, normal 
nature of these social activities makes them nearly invisible or insignificant for many of us. 
We do not even think that these activities could be initiating a dialogue or policy discussion 
or forming a consensus on certain policy themes. Hence, we do not consider them important 
at all to be a contributing factor for any serious business like policymaking.      
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 These undocumented policy initiatives and practices have always been part of what could be 
called the “informal work wisdom” or heuristic learning process (of social policy 
entrepreneurs), which are often alluded to in informal discussions and conversations among 
aid professionals and experts, but seldom included or expanded in any policy literature. These 
characteristics of the policy practices are mirrored in the narratives of key informants 
discussed in Chapters 3, 4 and 5. 
 
The mundane appearance of the policy practices 
 
These policy practices go unnoticed or undocumented due to the casual or non-formal nature 
of everyday human communication. These policy activities can be individual or collective 
initiatives of social policy entrepreneurs within institutions inspired by the personal 
convictions, ideological leanings, and political interests (Seur 1992:119). Hence, they are not 
found in an institutional rational base and remain taken for granted, covert, and less 
discussed. Their mundane and casual nature make it difficult to differentiate between the 
standard official dictates and these non-official personal initiatives. 
 
The salient features of the policy practices 
 
The social policy entrepreneurs attempt to influence the policy processes during its formation 
and implementation stages. This is to ensure effective aid delivery as well as efficient aid 
administration. Undocumented policy practices involve strategic ideological assertions, 
indirect counsel, oral briefings, implicit and explicit advocacy of certain policies and 
development interventions the actors were convinced that it would have a constructive effect 
271 
 
for empowerment and the betterment of target poor communities. These phenomena also 
entail the systematic utilization of agency on the part of key stakeholders and actors through 
the “policy windows”62 (Jones et al 2013) within the donor institutions and the recipient 
countries that eventually actualize the policy in day-to-day life. Dees (1998) and Hulgard 
(2010) in their studies refer to the bureaucrats, officials, and policy practitioners who were 
seen to pull together the private and administrative resources to run institutions, projects, and 
policies that would create value for public and benefit the people.  These policy practices 
could be summarized as the timely performed strategic and coordinated moves by aid 
bureaucrats, which have political, economic, and socially empowering import in the everyday 
lives of poor communities. 
 
Theoretical examples of the aid policy practices and processes need to be revisited in order to   
understand the limitations and strengths of the abovementioned undocumented policy 
practices under the rationalizing “architecture of aid” (Mosse 2005:3). 
 
Mosse (2005a) argues “both the critical and the instrumental perspectives of policy as an 
institutional practice diverts attention from the complexity of policy that involves the social 
life of projects, organizations, and professionals”. The linear model of policy-making was 
considered inadequate long before, and it was recommended that policy and policy 
implementation are best understood as a “chaos of purposes and accidents” (Sutton 1999:5). 
The semi-autonomous policy space utilized for the undocumented policy practices is 
characterized by "the factors of disjuncture and peopled by epistemic communities, 
mediators, and brokers" (Mosse 2005a:23). This could be described as the social life of 
policy-making that subsumes "the social life of projects, organizations, and professionals, 
                                                             
62 A term used in policy circles to denote an opportunity to influence the policy or policy outcome. 
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from the perspectives of actors themselves and form the diversity of interest behind policy 
models" (Mosse 2005b:6). 
 
Mosse (2005b), Stirrat (2007) and Broad (2007) in their respective studies reveal the 
construction of success on paper as well as the rationalizing impact of knowledge 
management in premiere development institutions. Mosse (2005a:22), while reiterating the 
“complex agency of actors in development”, concludes that the practices of development 
actors are not governed by “policy prescription, but generated by very different and diverse 
administrative, political or social-relational logics” which are concealed by the rationalising 
effects of policy (Seur 1992:192). These studies also allude to the concerted endeavours on 
the part of staff within the bureaucracy to maintain “business as usual” in the aid industry. A 
kind of resistance meted to any fundamental challenges to the status quo within an aid 
institution (Stirrat 1997; Crewe and Young 2002:7). 
 
However, as observed in this study, these policy spaces are also used by certain kinds of 
ideologically inspired development actors who proactively intervene in pro-poor policy 
formation and development practices to better the marginalized living conditions of the poor. 
The findings show that these extra-official policy practices positively influenced the overall 
quality of aid delivery. This pattern is consistent with the observations made by Gardner and 
Lewis (2000), Eyben (2012) and supported by Crewe and Young (2002), but contradicts the 
findings of Escobar (2001) and Fergusson (1994), which depict the development industry as a 
monolithic mechanism with neo-colonizing effects (Escobar 2001). Development practices in 
general and policy processes and practices in particular, therefore, do not necessarily only 
work towards orchestrating the success or failures of development projects as suggested by 
Stirrat (2007) and Mosse (2005b). Nevertheless, in the hands of social policy entrepreneurs, 
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the policy processes also work in the favour of poor communities, as they are shaped within 
the restricted twilight policy zone. 
 
6.2.3 The rationale behind the extra-official policy practices 
 
Significantly, these policy practices were driven by the thought of solidarity towards the 
target poor communities, doing whatever is in their power to better the lives of poor. The 
rationale behind the undocumented policy practices can be traced back to notions of 
solidarity, ideological conviction, and passion of bureaucrats and professionals (Hart et al 
2010:13; Taylor 2010:236; Fechter and Hindman 2011). These policy activities can be 
individual or collective initiatives within institutions inspired by personal convictions, 
disciplinary inclinations, ideological leanings, and political interests (Long and Long 1992, 
Apthorpe 1996-1996a; Mosse and Lewis 2006). 
 
The ideological leanings of the professionals aided by their professional and disciplinary 
insights spur these policy enterprises, which are triggered by the situations, and 
circumstances they witnessed at the grassroots level. Almost all of my informants, while 
reflecting on the rationale behind their extra-official policy initiatives, said that it was a “kind 
of passion”, “solidarity” or “a deep sense of moral responsibility towards poor communities” 
that impelled them to do whatever they could. One informant said, “it was an internal urge to 
make a difference, to make the world a better place.” They concluded that this urge came to 
them from their formative years with a liberal, humanitarian upbringing (See Chapters 4 and 
5). 
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We will have to reconsider the rational-institutional model of decision making to understand 
the theoretical implications of the rationale behind the extra-official undocumented policy 
practices within an institutional set-up. This will shed light on the humanitarian objectives of 
these policy practices that originated from the commitment of policy entrepreneurs and 
researchers in academia-turned-development professionals, who saw themselves as 
championing radical causes. The institutionalist and monolith perspectives of organizations 
make it difficult to understand the complexity that surrounds the policy processes and 
practices. They not only obscure the role of state-centered technocrats and bureaucrats but 
also neglect the policy efforts of epistemic communities and experts who are trying to draw a 
golden mean by enhancing the efficiency of aid delivery from institutions while successfully 
empowering poor communities through opening windows of opportunity on various levels of 
aid bureaucracy. 
 
Weber is one of the main proponents of rational choice theory or the rational model of 
decision making within the modern bureaucracy, which is said to have systems that focus on 
the efficiency, rational calculation, and control (Gerth and Mill 1958:56). According to 
Weber (2005), the “iron cage” of institutional rationalization deeply colours the decisions or 
choices made by bureaucrats. These decisions should safeguard their own interest within the 
confines of rational-institutional dictates, which are the standard official or technical practices 
within any said bureaucratic institution (see Kalberg 2001). 
 
However, the findings from this study show that aid bureaucrats were creatively engaged in 
the activities, which were not a direct part of institutional dictates or standard official 
practices, nor were these activities were necessarily going against the grain of aid institutional 
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objectives. These were voluntary actions directed towards the social development of poor 
communities located in the global South. This finding is supported by Grillo and Rew (1985), 
who includes the testimonies of colonial anthropologists working for the government, who 
assumed that their responsibility was to safeguard the interests, attitudes and expectations of 
local African communities, and not only the government they were serving. They derived this 
inspiration from the commitment to their discipline and moral obligation towards a broader 
international community (Grillo and Rew 1985). Hulgard (2010:297) defines the actor as an 
individual who takes calculated risk through his private, non-profit endeavours towards 
social–economical development of the public while working on various levels of institutions 
and bureaucracies. Informants interpreted their own actions in terms of “devising their own 
ways of getting things done” within the aid bureaucracy and development institutions, which 
signify the ‘policy windows’ or intervening spaces within the aid institutions utilized by the 
social policy entrepreneurs ( Jones et al 2013; Shore et al 2011).   The work of Mosse 
(2005b) and Eyben (2012) support the findings of this study in their auto-ethnographic 
accounts of anthropologist-turned-development professional, in which they elaborate on their 
commitment towards the poor and the learning curve as an activist within the bureaucracy, as 
they perceived themselves. 
 
6.3 Policy implications of this study 
 
The theoretical and empirical engagement with social science with development (as an 
international political-economic phenomenon, which also impinges on local social structures 
and cultures) has been replete with negative connotations. Criticisms have been levelled 
against development as a neo-colonial design (Escobar 2001, 2012), development as an anti-
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politic machine (Fergusson 1994) and development as a growth of ignorance (Hobart 1993) 
that thrives through politically charged buzzwords and seductive fuzzwords (Cornwall and 
Eade 2010). However, a balanced social scientific analysis of the successes and failures of 
development policies and projects from the point of view of insider-researchers would cast 
focus on the constructive side of development (Eyben 2000; Magrath 2010) for both donors 
as well as recipients. Such a perspective can offer insight into the positive practical 
engagements of aid institutions with grassroots communities (Mosse 2005b; Eyben et al 
2006) as well as help understand effective aid delivery. This is a perspective that has been 
comparatively underplayed or less explored in most of the abovementioned studies. The 
policy implications of this research are based on this premise. 
 
Thus the empirical findings from the study  show that the aid industry is not monolithic in 
nature but is subject to change to both negative as well as positive effects on project and 
policy levels, just like any other social institution. These findings are supported by studies by 
Long and Long (1992); Eyben (2000); Gardner and Lewis (2000); Eyben (2003), Mosse 
(2005b) and Hulgard (2010). However, further findings of this research prove that the dual 
effects within the aid industry may happen irrespective of the administrative authority and 
political-institutional rationality invested in the development agent. Here, the main catalyst is 
a peculiar kind of development practitioner who has been described as a social policy 
entrepreneur. They are the development agents who take the risk of conducting and raising 
the “social enterprise” out of limited resources they have. Guided by their ideological 
commitment and solidarity towards global underprivileged population these social policy 
bureaucrats connect, coordinate, and harness the bureaucratic setup to achieve their noble end 
(Hulgard 2010; Mosse 2011). 
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The findings of this study also underline the privileged position of development agents as 
insiders, which enables them to get a view from inside the agency (Eyben 2000). 
Simultaneously, the everyday lives of aid-men and aid-women (Mosse 2005b, Fechter and 
Hindman 2011; Apthorpe 2011) in recipient countries offers them (aid workers) practical 
insights and skills to make sense of real-life situations. The aid professionals gain empirical 
insights and technical-administrative knowledge due to their engagements with grassroots 
communities as well as aid bureaucracies, which they further utilize during the potential 
social policy enterprise.  The vignette shows the professional position and willingness of the 
protagonist in an entire episode of forming a consensus on social exclusion framework in the 
DFID, social policy department. The voluntary enterprise of the social policy entrepreneur is 
backed with her first-hand experience with the women from socially excluded communities 
from the South Asia.  In addition, she was in touch with the local activists and organizations. 
This experience and insight equip them better to negotiate, convince, and devise a way out on 
institutional, political, social, and cultural dilemmas that arise during policy formations and 
development interventions. These set of skills acquired by these development practitioners 
could be practically utilized in the following context in near future of the aid industry. 
 
The aid industry is undergoing a dramatic transition; aid recipient countries of yesteryear, 
such as the BRICS nations including Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa are 
themselves emerging as new donor countries. The prediction about the receding flow of aid 
from developed nations to developing countries also indicates the changing role of the aid 
industry based in the global North (Sumner and Mallett 2012). This could be the role of an 
aid educator, as a sharer of technical and empirical knowledge on poverty alleviation and 
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empowerment of the global poor. The theoretical argument for this justification suggests the 
need for international aid agencies to re- invent a role of “aid expert” or a “hub of aid 
consultants” for the new donor countries to benefit new donors for more productive aid 
interventions in the near future.  The new donor countries and their workforce will have many 
practical lessons to learn from the first-hand experiences of former donor agencies and its 
expertise, especially from the ‘social policy entrepreneurs’. 
 
6.4 Recommendation for future research 
 
This research offers insights into the undocumented policy practices of social development 
entrepreneurs in the everyday life of aid industry. Drawing on the research it is possible to go 
further and look into the phenomenon of administrative and institutional failings as a part of 
DFID’s work culture that triggers the social development entrepreneurship within aid 
bureaucracy. 
 
Moreover, taking the lead from this study, future research can explore the life histories of 
DFID alumnus focusing on their formative years, various causes of commitment and critical 
anecdotal actions within the aid industry. Such research would enable the potential researcher 
to map the role of habitus (as Bourdieu perceives it) in the making and un-making of social 
entrepreneurs and conforming bureaucrats. In addition, it might give us a fair idea about the 
social-cognitive processes that embed the ideas, concepts, and belief systems in an individual. 
 
Eventually, drawing on the findings of this study, there is a possibility of a practical project 
around the idea of policy innovation. More specifically this would be to produce a handbook 
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for policy entrepreneurs and social development practitioners from the aid industry that 
would guide and facilitate future policy interventions and better development practice. This 
study has  would offer a firsthand experiential perspective on the social life of policy ideas 
and the key role of extra-official policy practices that forms a significant part of 
policymaking and development practices within the aid industry. 
 
Oral history, semi-structured interviews and prolonged, topic-focused conversations and 
discussions in official as well as informal settings have played crucial role in this research. 
Moreover, we need to consider the number of limitations this study has faced as a direct 
consequence of this methodology. Because of the inability to do participant observation 
within the premise of the DFID headquarters in London and one of its main think tanks, ODI, 
due to issues of access, this study could not directly explore the official rituals of 
policymaking or the in-house professional work culture of the aid bureaucracy. Due to a lack 
of access to the physical or cyber archives, this study was unable to look into the intra and 
inter-institutional communications and relations between DFID, ODI and ICAI and the Select 
Parliamentary committee on International Development, a triangulation of which would have 
helped this study have a better critical analysis and assessment of the phenomenon in hand. 
 
In addition, non-cooperation on the part of some key informants from polity and aid 
bureaucracy during fieldwork forced me to drop altogether a couple of complementary 
arguments on “policy windows” and “triggers of (specific) policy practices”. The exclusion I 
have experienced in the hands of key informants reluctant to share their information and 
inhibitive gatekeepers from aid institution central to my research made me think of my own 
approach and positional stance, which might have caused it. As Mary Douglas (1986) 
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astutely observed, the ‘institutions do not have their minds but the one who runs those 
institutions possess it, there is a possibility the experiences might have made the 
‘gatekeepers’ cautious towards my research endeavours.   Whatever, the reasons maybe this 
aspect could be an independent topic of research which would shed light on the issues of 
access to the field. However, this study has compensated the abovementioned shortcomings 
with in-depth formal and off-record conversations over prolonged duration with key social 
policy entrepreneurs who were at some time or other close with either of these aid 
organizations. I have also been able to enquire into the nature of intuitional power that leads 
to tactics of evasion, procrastination, and non-response to outside researchers. Nevertheless, 
the research strategies I applied have helped me gain proximity, trust, and rapport with 
veteran development practitioners by virtue of identification with their personal and 
professional passion, which can facilitate the attainment of future research possibilities. 
 
6.5 Conclusion 
 
This study concludes that the very essence of complexity that surrounds the policy processes 
in various stages such as its emergence, formation, launching, advocating, formation of 
consensus, and its traction within the aid industry can be located within the often taken for 
granted undocumented policy processes and practices. These policy practices and processes 
are inevitable part of the everyday lives of policy practitioners in the aid industry. 
Undocumented policy initiatives and practices have always been a part of informal work-
wisdom or heuristic-pragmatic learning processes. These processes are often alluded to in 
informal discussions and conversations among policy entrepreneurs and social development 
practitioners but have seldom been part of proper policy research. 
******* 
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